Polecolaw

2009-05-23T21:45:00.003-04:00

I've been expecting a headline about the Federal Home Loan Banks and got it today. These banks have been leveraging up and acquiring mortgages at a record pace since this financial meltdown began. This should come as no surprise to anyone who has followed my blog (here and here in 2007 and here again). Here is some of the news from this Wall Street Journal Online Edition article:

Financial troubles at some of the Federal Home Loan Banks are raising questions about how well directors of these institutions are supervising their executives.

A plunge in the value of mortgage securities bought by several of the regional home-loan banks has forced them to halt dividends and curtail funding for local housing projects. An annual report issued by the banks' regulator this past week says some of them "paid insufficient attention" to credit risks and haven't invested enough in information technology.

Unlike giant banks or government-backed mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 12 regional home-loan banks draw little public scrutiny. Created by Congress in 1932 to support the housing market, they are cooperatives owned by more than 8,000 banks, thrifts, credit unions and insurers. Because investors assume the government would bail them out in a crisis, they can borrow money cheaply in the bond market.

If the home-loan banks ever stumble badly, U.S. taxpayers would be called on to "rescue yet another financial entity," warns Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, a research firm in Washington. These banks have about $1.26 trillion of debt outstanding, putting them among the world's biggest borrowers.

Here is a quote from the FHLB press release:

Operating Results and Affordable Housing Activity:
For the 12 FHLBanks, the combined net loss for the fourth quarter of 2008 was $715 million, compared to combined net income of $846 million for the fourth quarter of the previous year. Combined net income for 2008 decreased 57.3% to $1.2 billion, compared with $2.8 billion for 2007. Combined net income for 2008 was reduced by other than temporary impairment charges of $2.03 billion on certain private label mortgage backed securities (MBS) and home equity loan investments, as well as $252 million of writeoffs/reserves on receivables due from Lehman Brothers Special Financing.

FHLBank Affordable Housing Program (AHP) contribution expenses equaled $188 million in 2008, down from $318 million in 2007, due to the decrease in earnings.

Each FHLBank actively monitors the credit quality of its MBS. If delinquency and/or loss rates on mortgages and/or home equity loans continue to increase, and/or a rapid decline in residential real estate values continues, more FHLBanks could experience further reduced yields or additional losses on MBS investment securities.

Fed Loans Losing Value

2009-05-07T22:59:00.006-04:00

This seems like small potatoes now, but those Bear Stearns and AIG loans made by the Fed aren't doing too well. As of May 6, the Fed is under water by over $8 billion. Here are the details:

On the other hand, Commercial Paper Funding Facility outstandings are down from over $325 billion in December 2008 to $164.7 billion, and down $50 billion this past week alone.

More Bailouts from Taxpayers

2009-05-05T14:32:00.006-04:00

I was reading this article in The Wall Street Journal, Online Edition today titled The Next Housing Bust and had to put down an "I told you so." Here is a quote from the article:

The FHA is almost certainly going to need a taxpayer bailout in the months ahead. The only debate is how much it will cost. By law FHA must carry a 2% reserve (or a 50 to 1 leverage rate), and it is now 3% and falling. Some experts see bailout costs from $50 billion to $100 billion or more, depending on how long the recession lasts.

How did this happen? The FHA was created during the Depression to help moderate-income and first time homebuyers obtain a mortgage. However, as subprime lending took off, banks fled from the FHA and its business fell by almost 80%. Under the Bush Administration, the FHA then began a bizarre initiative to "regain its market share." And beginning in 2007, the Bush FHA, Congress, the homebuilders and Realtors teamed up to expand the agency's role.

This should come as no surprise to anyone who has been following this issue. I wrote about this in December of 2007. Keep listening because there may be more surprises, especially from the Federal Home Loan Banks.

Thanks to Val Ivanson for the link!

Is Fiscal Stimulus The Right Medicine?

2009-05-02T16:33:00.004-04:00

The asset bubble in the United States that has recently burst has wiped out an estimated $13-$14 trillion of net worth between declines in stock and real estate prices. The impact of this value loss is working its way through the economy with dramatic effect. GDP has fallen at a rate of over 6% for the past two quarters, several sectors of the economy are on life support from the government and the Federal Reserve, and we are now entering the 17th month of a recession that began in December of 2007. We already provided an economic stimulus package of approximately $160 billion under the former administration, and we are now looking at a much larger stimulus plan under the current administration. There has been some debate over the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus. Those opposing it claim that fiscal stimulus (that is, when the government borrows to spend and/or provide temporary tax relief) crowds out private sector investment thereby hurting the real economy. Another claim is that fiscal stimulus is ineffective because money that gets to individuals through the stimulus is used to repay debt rather than spent so the economy does not benefit from the multiplier effect of a dollar being spent several times over. I believe fiscal stimulus is the correct response to today’s economic situation, even if a large portion of it goes to repaying debt.

To work through the current situation we need a few economic basics. Individuals earn income. We spend some of this income and we save some. When we save we provide a source of funds for businesses to invest. Our savings flow to businesses through the financial system and the institutions that make up the financial system. Banks are the prime example. Banks take deposits and then use those deposits to make loans. Businesses borrow from the banks to invest in new opportunities. The stock market is another example where businesses raise equity capital to invest from the savings of individual households. Business investment means more jobs and that means more income, more spending, saving, and so on. This is how the economy grows in normal circumstances. Today, however, circumstances are anything but normal. For a long time we borrowed from our future income to consume more in the present (and support a price bubble) running up household debt relative to our incomes. We borrowed for lots of reasons, but the primary asset we borrowed against was our real estate. To put this in perspective, our household debt (that includes mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, etc.) to disposable personal income (that is, income after taxes) has increased from 66% in 1983 to 135% in 2007. The graph below shows the trend in household debt to disposable personal income (debt-to-income) from 1977 through 2008.

(DPI from BEA.gov. HH Debt from Federal Reserve Z1)

The debt to income ratio peaked in 2007 at 135%. It has since fallen back to 130% by the end of 2008. 76% of the debt was mortgage debt in 2007 as opposed to 66% in 1987. The 2008 decline in the debt-to-income ratio illustrates the fact that people are now borrowing less than they were relative to their incomes. The lower level of borrowing means less spending. In addition, we have begun to save again. While we were on our borrow-and-spend spree of the last decade we also spent more of our incomes and saved a lot less. The next graph illustrates the trend in the personal savings rate.

(Personal Saving Rate from BEA.gov)

From this perspective we now see the impact of the rapid declines in housing and stock prices. This mountain of debt, concentrated in mortgage loans, is no longer supported by the price of the underlying collateral. Many homeowners owe more on their home than it is worth and the home as a source of collateral for borrowing additional spending cash has dried up. In addition to this balance sheet impact there is also the cash flow impact. As payments adjust upward incomes are squeezed making it difficult to spend or to borrow more. It’s like a huge number of families borrowed as much as they could and blew it on a mega-vacation and are now saddled with paying back the debt for years to come. Finally, there is the wealth effect. If you thought you had a large portion of your retirement needs accounted for in the value of your home and investments in stocks you are feeling a lot less wealthy today. For all of these reasons households have switched from borrowing and spending to saving as illustrated by the personal savings rate turning up and household debt-to-income ratio turning down. So, this sounds like we are on the right path. If everyone saves we will eventually pay down the debt and everything will be OK, right? Wrong.

Welcome to the paradox of thrift. Saving is good for individuals and for the economy. Remember that savings becomes investment and that helps the economy grow. But when everyone increases saving at the same time overall spending goes down. As we collectively start saving and stop spending business contracts. In this environment business investment falls because there are fewer good business opportunities. So, at the very time individuals start to save businesses don’t need the savings for investment. This is why I do not believe that government stimulus crowds out private investment in the current environment. When businesses are investing less there is nothing to crowd out. And when businesses aren’t investing, people aren’t finding new jobs. As more businesses cut back, more people lose their jobs and can’t find new ones. That means less spending again, and that leads to less investment, and fewer jobs, and so on. This is one way economies fall down into long-term underutilization. How far down and how long depend on a multitude of factors, including the size of the bubble that burst. The losses in tax revenue and other costs to society can be very dramatic. So what do we do about this problem?

Enter the Federal Government, the one borrower that can raise cheap money when everyone else is too worried to borrow and/or can’t find anyone willing to lend (the willing to lend problem is the other side of the rescue plan - repairing bank balance sheets to assure loan supply). As the government spends the money it borrows it provides income to individuals just when individuals need the income because many are losing their jobs and needing to save. If the government provides enough stimulus it may stop the downward spiral of lower incomes and investment discussed above. If those receiving income from the stimulus spend the income there will be some immediate impact on demand in the economy and that could help jump-start business investment. On the other hand, if those who receive the income from the stimulus use it to pay down debt there will be less of an immediate impact on the economy but incomes will be supported while individuals pay down debt. Once debt levels are back to normal individuals should return to spending more of their income. In effect, we are replacing private debt with public debt by providing income through fiscal stimulus to avoid the potential devastation that can result from the de-leveraging of household balance sheets that needs to take place. So even if the recipients of stimulus income use the money to repay debt the economy benefits from the resulting de-leveraging necessary for economic activity to return to normal.

In the end, whether fiscal stimulus is a smart investment depends on its impact on the economy. If it helps to prevent a long protracted depression but costs less than a long protracted depression would, then the stimulus provides a positive economic return. Of course we will never know the true cost-benefit analysis because we will have no way of measuring exactly how much of an economic downturn was prevented.

Income Inequality

2009-04-25T10:43:00.003-04:00

This link is to a summary of research on income inequality in the United States since WWI. I have looked at similar issues on this blog in the past, for example here. This research is much broader and covers a much longer period of time. I think it puts the issue of income inequality into historical context and provides a good understanding of where we are today. For the full report you can visit the authors website here.

Are We There Yet?

2009-04-06T08:17:00.030-04:00

An Opinion Piece.

I started writing about the subprime crisis back before it was a crisis. I was warning of taxpayer bailouts on the way and pointing fingers at those I believe to be responsible for the massive increase in household debt over the past decade. Since last September, however, I have stepped back because we ended up in a true financial crisis – one that could have seen the shut down of credit cards and ATM machines across the country. In such circumstances I give the authorities a pass as I do not want to find out first hand what happens when the grocery store shelves are bare (I do not own a gun). At this point, however, I think we have averted the total collapse scenario. I am not bullish on the economy or the stock market just yet, but I am no longer worried that my access to cash will be shut off. If we have indeed averted the nightmare and are now on the road to a long recovery period, then it is time to go back to asking the tough questions about how we got here and what to do about it. I think we have arrived at this point and it is time to start holding people and institutions responsible for what has transpired.

I am very angry with some of the back door dealings and subversions that have occurred in connection with bailing out financial institutions at the expense of United States taxpayers. From Paulson's "no review" $700 billion bank scheme to revelations regarding the disposition of taxpayer funds through AIG, the manner in which this situation continues to be handled is, I believe, a disgrace. For example, when I hear Goldman Sachs tell us that the $12.9 billion or so it received from AIG through taxpayer funds was unnecessary because it was properly hedged against AIG risk I automatically think, "well, OK then, give it back." So where is it? The arrogance and insensitivity to the general public is obscene. What we have had is a devastating bout of bad behavior by our financial and political institutions. What we need now is to find those responsible, hold them to account, recover the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains the best we can, and prevent this from happening again. This is in addition to shutting down the insolvent institutions before they create even more bad loans in their attempts to become profitable. So far I don't see any of that happening. What I do see is Citibank charging friends of mine 30% interest on their credit cards while at the same time this institution has access to virtually free money from the Federal Funds market and infusions from taxpayers on giveaway terms. This is too much for me to reconcile even with the current financial crisis and the pressure on the banking system.

There are several things that currently trouble me a great deal. The back-door contribution of taxpayer funds through the toxic asset purchase program to the very financial institutions that perpetrated this massive destruction of household and financial sector balance sheets for private gain bothers me. The very fact that Timothy Geithner is Treasury Secretary after his tenure at the New York Fed during the creation of this crisis (not to mention his tax "issue") is troubling. The push to concentrate regulatory power into the hands of the Federal Reserve, the very institution responsible for overseeing our financial system during the drive to leverage up the United States household and financial sectors for the profits of the financial sector (and, more directly, those individuals within it) seems out of touch. The "modification" of mark-to-market rules is shady. The blatant conflicts of interest when the former and, as suggested by Matt Taibbi, the current CEO of Goldman Sachs construct a taxpayer bailout for AIG that provides the most financial gain to - Goldman Sachs - is astounding. The refusal to take the steps we ourselves tell other countries they need to take in times of financial crisis is embarrassing. (For a good read on this point see This article by Simon Johnson in The Atlantic.) These are momentous events, and though I detect the populist rage (for example, this piece by Matt Taibbi in The Rolling Stone) it seems to me that we as a population are at risk of letting this entire affair pass us by without holding anyone accountable or truly learning the lessons we need to from it.

I think we are there – at the point where we begin to take seriously the need to recall the army of finance, accounting, and legal experts who are compensated with outsized rewards to find ways they and their clients can circumvent the regulatory schemes put into place to protect us from this very problem. Those brilliant thinkers who can conceptualize the gray areas between legislative and regulatory words and intent to find avenues of attack for profitable private gain without concern for the impact on the population at large – the public risk. We also need to cleanse the system of the influence money, in all of its cancerous forms, that results in politicians carrying the torch for a favored industry. This will require at least two steps. Step one is to find out exactly what happened, who knew what when, and hold those who behaved recklessly to account for their actions. It is easy to find out who they are – just follow the money while ignoring the cries of "witch hunt" and "class warfare" that will be shouted in protest by those responsible (and their shills). Step two is develop a set of regulatory rules and enforcement that are principals based where actions that are contrary to the spirit of the regulatory framework bring swift consequences. The regulatory changes must address both the finance industry and the political process to remove the incentives for reckless legislation and deregulation. For example, if you are a business that borrows short term funds and invests those funds in longer term assets for profit, you are subject to regulation whether you have a bank charter or not. If you provide any assurance against the risk of loss you are an insurance company. If you engage in any of these activities without registering to be regulated you are promptly shut down, fined, and prosecuted. Once registered you are subject to capital requirements and oversight. Ultimately, these are the things that need to be done.

The more we allow taxpayer rescue of financial institutions without holding those institutions to account from this point forward, the more we are doing a disservice for the American taxpayer, and the more likely it is that we will pass through this crisis into another one in the future. I believe we have arrived at the point in time when we should be swiftly moving from crisis aversion to long-term cleanup – lets get started. I hope the Obama administration, as infiltrated as it already is by insiders from Wall Street, steps up to the plate and begins to take charge. The approach to the auto industry last week was a refreshing wake up call that there is a limit to what taxpayers will stand for. At the same time it highlights the enormous benefits bestowed on the financial sector even after such monumental failures, and the concurrent lack of accountability for the devastation on our economic lives. I want accountability and I want it at the institutional and individual levels. I want a complete investigation by qualified independent investigators. I feel that until we demand it we are no better than those who should be held accountable because we are being complicit.

*A note on my belief that there are specific people to be held accountable:

I believe that any seasoned lender understands that you cannot turn a package of bad loans to people with no income into an AAA security through "structuring." At some level, people had knowledge that what was going on was bound to collapse at some point. Perhaps the analyst didn’t, perhaps the loan officer didn’t, but at some level people knew what was transpiring. I don’t really care if they had insurance from AIG, they should have demanded to see AIG’s total exposure and taken that into account. What happened represents, at the very least, reckless activity and I believe could be characterized as fraud in certain circumstances. The facts revealed in the very incomplete "investigation" into the rating agencies participation in this mess revealed this to be true, and I would bet that any true investigation into the behavior of the financial institutions involved would result in similar findings. This Bill Moyers interview of William Black provides an interesting perspective on whether or not fraud was actually involved. In any case, whether what happened meets the legal definition of fraud is something we should be investigating and, if the answer is no, then we probably need a new definition or standard to protect us from this behavior in the future.

GM and Washington - Finally an "Adult" Response

2009-03-30T11:51:00.000-04:00

I just finished listening to President Obama’s speech regarding the auto industry and I found it refreshing compared to the rhetoric that has been dealt us up to this point. It sounds to me as though we are headed for a pre-packaged bankruptcy for GM with the government standing in as the DIP financier. This is what I thought should have happened in the first place, but I think the last administration kicked the can down the road. Thankfully, down the road was an adult who picked up the can to begin cleaning up the mess.

Of course this will mean some disturbing things, especially for union employees. In particular, this probably means lower wages and cuts in benefits to both employees and retirees. Even if bankruptcy is avoided the stakeholders are now under intense pressure to give up ground. It’s hard to see how we get back on track when we cut wages – this doesn’t help stimulate aggregate demand. In fact it enforces the deflationary momentum. (Hold on, I need to mute the television. That Kudlow guy is on making some noise about this. How is he still a commentator on CNBC after being dead wrong about almost everything over the past couple of years? Goldilocks economy my a$$.) Anyway, I am encouraged that the administration is taking what I consider to be the correct position on the automakers even though there is downside on the wage front. The entire mess brings the issues of trade front and center, and I expect this will be one of the most difficult dances for us to do. Is it too late to stop pushing the US down to a Global wage or can we somehow reverse this trend at a time when we need the world to finance our bailouts? Any thoughts?

Stay tuned.

AIG - Where Your Money Went

2009-03-16T07:50:00.001-04:00

The table above shows a summary of the payments disclosed by AIG Sunday. For the detailed list you can go here.

Federal Home Loan Banks Leveraging Up

2008-12-06T09:15:00.003-05:00

I haven’t read anything about the Federal Home Loan Banks since they published their preliminary third quarter results. This is just a short post to point out that Total Assets to Total Capital has been increasing while total assets (these are typically loans to banks) has been increasing dramatically. This is one of those places where taxpayers are leveraging to replace private debt contraction. To put this into perspective, I posted a couple of graphs. The first is Total Assets and the second is Total Assets/Total Capital, which hit 25 times in the third quarter. This is looking more and more like one of those investment banks, especially since almost all of the assets are mortgage related.

For additional information you can go to the FHLBank website here.

The Money Supply And The Credit Crisis

2008-12-02T00:04:00.006-05:00

I have been reading about monetarism around the web lately and find the topic interesting. Most of the writings I have seen look to money supply measures as an indicator of whether we should expect inflation and discuss the monetary aggregates, M1 and M2. Some commentators are stressing that M3 and MZM are better indicators of the true money supply as they include institutional money market funds ("IMMFs"). I agree with this position, but I think it misses some issues of the current economic situation. I think of it this way: Under the traditional model of monetary expansion the Federal Reserve injects reserves into the banking system which then uses the reserves to make a loan. The proceeds of the loan are then deposited into a bank and this is new money! The bank receiving the deposit can use a portion of this new deposit to make a loan, and the proceeds of that loan will be deposited into another bank – more new money. This process continues expanding the money supply and debt, limited by the portion of each new deposit that must be kept in reserve rather than loaned out and the fact that in order to make a new loan, banks need capital. But what if debt could expand without expansion of the money supply or bank capital? There would be a decoupling of the relationship between the money supply and debt creation. This decoupling has happened as debt that is originated by banks is often removed from the balance sheets of the banks through securitization, and this process converts the money supply from M2 to M3 or even out of M3 completely. To see how this happens requires a rather lengthy diversion into an example, so here goes:

To see how an everyday transaction ends up converting M2 to M3, I have drawn the diagram above. Beginning with the asterisk in Bank Reserves and assuming the Fed has injected $100 in new reserves, the Bank would want to make a loan for $100. Assume the Bank makes a loan of $100 to Home Buyer to purchase a house from Home Builder. Home Buyer takes out the loan and the cash goes to Home Builder. Home Builder now takes the cash and deposits it into the Bank. (These transactions are the black lines.) This is a new deposit and it represents growth in all the monetary aggregates. But in today’s financial markets (at least before the current meltdown) the Bank is likely to sell the loan to remove it from its balance sheet. If it does so by selling the loan (either directly or through a securitization first) to a commercial paper conduit, then the blue lines would represent the transfer of the loan in exchange for cash. But where did this cash come from? Let’s assume Investor took $100 out of its account at the Bank to purchase a share in IMMF (institutional money market fund) (the red lines). IMMF used this new cash to purchase commercial paper from the Conduit, which is where the Conduit got the cash to purchase the loan (the green lines). At the end of this series of transactions, there has been no net change in bank deposits because $100 went in from Home Builder and $100 came out from Investor (no change in M1 or M2). The original $100 of reserves injected into the bank by the Fed has been replaced by the proceeds from the $100 loan purchase by the Conduit. The money supply has grown, but it is what used to be M3 that increased through an increase in IMMF balances. The Bank is now free to lend the entire $100 again, effectively eliminating the reserve requirement and bank capital as a limitation on money supply (M3) growth from the initial reserves. Because of this off-balance sheet financing of loans by banks it can be M3 that increases as loans are made and sold rather than M1 or M2. Also note that this financing structure is speculative, funding long-term assets with short-term debt. Since the funding source (commercial paper) is not generally guaranteed (as are bank deposits) it is prone to a run. If the bank simply securitized the loans and sold them directly to investors without a commercial paper conduit we could diagram the same result with respect to M2 without an increase in M3 or MZM, but it would not necessarily be speculative. In any event, we have already created the money underlying the loan, but we have converted it to something that is not measured by M2 and sometimes not measured by M3. Because of these conversions of money from one form to another the traditional concepts of money supply and monetary expansion have been altered. As debt creation escapes the bounds of the monetary system around which traditional debt expansion occurred we should monitor debt outside banks as well as M2 or M3.

To see the change in the relationship between deposit expansion and debt creation I compared M2 to non-federal-government debt (“NFGD”) using the first graph above. (NFGD is all debt less federal government debt.) NFGD has increased from a multiple of approximately two times M2 in 1980 to over 3.2 times in 2007. Historically, as debt increased through the banking system there would be a concurrent increase in M2 as the fractional reserve system of banking would multiply the monetary base through deposit expansion. Today, however, deposit expansion and debt expansion have become decoupled as banks sell loans to third parties. In addition to decoupling deposit expansion from debt expansion, the latter is no longer constrained by bank capital since the banks are no longer accumulating loans that require capital. This can create a monetary base outside of the traditional measures of money.

We have also seen a decoupling of the relationship between incomes and debt creation. In its simplest form this is the relationship between debt and GDP. The second graph shows NFGD as a percent of GDP and M2 as a percent of GDP. The divergence is striking, and I think gets to the heart of our economic crisis – the breakdown of the relationships between money supply and debt and between debt and income. With debt ballooning to new highs relative to income, the cash flow implication for consumers is less consumption and more saving – a recession. But what supports this balloon of debt in the first place? In part it is like any other bubble - the rising prices of the assets being financed by the debt provides collateral for more debt. The difference with this bubble, however, is that we have gone from a game where the ultimate size of the monetary bubble is regulated by the Fed through banking reserves, deposit multipliers, and bank capital to a system where any bubble can create its own monetary supply to support itself using securitization to multiply bank reserves in a virtually unlimited manner. At the same time we should be monitoring broader measures of monetary expansion because of financial innovation the Fed has stopped publishing M3 in the belief that it adds nothing to what M2 tells us.

So, other than restructuring how we monitor the financial system for the future, what should be done? Lets start by recognizing that doing nothing is unacceptable as the risk of a deflationary spiral is too great and the results too dire to chance. Once consumers are overburdened with debt service we should expect a recession because not only will consumers save to pay down debt, they will stop borrowing while they do so which will further reduce consumption. Reduced consumption could lead to falling incomes and prices, in which case relative debt burden increases making things worse. Assuming savings also decline through falling asset prices (stocks, home values, etc.) there would be no reason to expect an increase in consumption (save the increase in the value of cash net of the value of liquidity, if any, in such circumstances) or investment, and we could get stuck in a long-term underemployment of great proportions. If the true driver of the current financial crisis is the creation of too much consumer debt, then the only way we exit the crisis is by reducing the burden of the debt on consumers through some proactive means. There are several ways to go about reducing the burden of debt-service on consumers (other than simply using public funds to repay private debt). (1) We can try to inflate our way out of the impending cycle of deflation and recession by adding reserves to the banking system, but this assumes more reserves will result in more borrowing, investment, and consumption. Will companies borrow to invest when the economic outlook is dreadful because consumers are overburdened with debt? Will consumers borrow to consume when they are already overburdened with debt? In short, will traditional efforts to expand the money supply expand the money supply? The evidence is not in yet on this front. (2) We can make every effort to lower interest rates thereby supporting asset prices and reducing debt service payments. This would help to reduce the debt-service in the debt-service/income ratio and provide more income for consumption. The Fed’s efforts to reduce both short and long term interest rates should have some positive impact on reducing the debt burden by lowering rates and, therefore, debt-service payments and should, in turn, support asset prices. Note this is related to the inflation scenario in that monetary policy easing means lowering interest rates on the short end. The Fed has now gone to purchasing long-term securities in an effort to reduce long-term rates that have not responded to the short-term rate reductions. We can also attempt to restructure debt obligations so as to reduce the current payment obligations of consumers by, for example, extending the term of a loan. (3) We can have a major fiscal stimulus that creates employment to increase incomes relative to legacy debt-service. By increasing incomes the debt-service/income ratio would decline. The stimulus would, in effect, replace private debt with public debt, freeing up income for consumption. Based on recent reports, a major fiscal stimulus plan is probably in the works by the new administration.

While we wait to see if our efforts are successful, we can utilize the Fed and Treasury to (i) pump public money into bank capital so the banks have enough capital to make new loans when they hold excess reserves, and (ii) lend to ever increasing elements of the financial system to prevent major systemic collapse as speculative financing evaporates. None of this is news.

Is M3 Important?

2008-11-29T09:52:00.004-05:00

There is interesting discussion on Paul Krugman’s NYT blog today regarding monetary expansion and the Great Depression. For the current crisis, I think you need to look at the divergence of M2 and M3. As institutional money market investors fund commercial paper that funds asset sales by originators, M2 is converted to M3. The money multiplier becomes unlimited as the original reserves used to fund loans are returned in full to the banking system with no new net increase in deposit liabilities. What’s happening right now is the reverse – M3 is liquidating and the monetary base is expanding to, in part, accommodate the conversion. If you look at Institutional Money Market Funds on Z.1 you will see the reductions in this (and, I believe other) components of M3 relating to credit expansion in the modern financial system. I have been waiting for the next Z.1 to confirm these movements.

I believe M3 is important, notwithstanding the Fed’s decision to stop publishing it. I have not concluded that the M3 expansion is the cause of the bubble, but it certainly shows how monetary expansion and, in particular credit expansion, contributed. I plan to post more on this after the holiday weekend.

Credit Markets

2008-10-24T22:03:00.003-04:00

I have heard commentators (Larry Kudlow) making the argument that the credit markets are working OK because bank loans are up by some pretty high numbers. That got me wondering, so I looked at the percentage change in total bank credit plus asset-backed commercial paper from end of September to end of September the following year. The data include Loans and Leases in Bank Credit based on Statistical Release H.8 from the Federal Reserve (the "Fed") and asset-backed commercial paper outstanding from the Fed's Data Download Program. (In 2006 I had to use the October ABCP outstanding due to a gap in the data.) The first graph shows the results.

(Loans and Leases in Bank Credit plus ABCP)

As illustrated by the graph, total credit growth is actually quite meager. The true situation is, however, much worse. I illustrated this by taking out of total credit in 2008 outstanding loans made by the Fed and securities lent to dealers*. In other words, I am trying to isolate the private banking system itself as if the Fed's loans were to be repaid (of course, they cannot be). The second graph shows the result.

(Less Fed credit)

Credit coming from the private system is down - a lot - not up. Without the Fed's interventions we could be bartering by now. Now, there are a lot of other pieces to the puzzle, but this is certainly a more troubling view of the credit markets. Granted Mr. Kudlow was referring to the most recent 13 weeks, but if you calculate credit the way I have I still do not see any increases in credit coming from the private banking system.

* This includes the net Repo position of the Fed, the TAF, the PDCF, the Bear Stearns loan, loans to AIG, the TSLF, and the new asset-backed commercial paper financing. It does not include the new facilities announced by the Fed that are scheduled to begin Monday for the purchase of commercial paper and, as of the other day, other assets by the Fed.

Credit Problems Beyond Subprime

2008-10-13T11:57:00.004-04:00

When the subprime credit crisis began to unfold in 2007 I believed it was a sign of deeper problems in the credit markets. Easy money and unchecked leverage puts pressure on banks to lend. First they make the good loans, then the not so good ones, and then they make bad loans. So far most of the media attention has been on the subprime mortgage crisis. Last week, to little fanfare, the Shared National Credits Program released the results of its review of loans to corporate borrowers that are shared by banks in the US, banks overseas, and other institutions such as pension funds, hedge funds, and insurance companies. The review is of:

loan commitments of $20 million or more and held by three or more federally supervised institutions

The review shows considerable deterioration in credit quality of these loans.

Criticized credits increased $259.3 billion and represent 13.4 percent of the SNC portfolio compared with 5.0 percent in the 2007 SNC review. Credits rated special mention (potentially weak credits) increased by $167.9 billion and represent 7.5 percent of the SNC portfolio compared with 1.9 percent in the 2007 SNC review. Classified credits (credits with well-defined weaknesses) increased $91.5 billion and represent 5.8 percent of the SNC portfolio compared with 3.1 percent in the 2007 SNC review.

Even more interesting is how the criticized loans are distributed:

Classified credits held by non-bank entities increased to $70.0 billion from $34.8 billion and represent 42.9 percent of classified credits. The volume of classified credits held by non-banks is particularly significant given their relatively small 19.9 percent share of the SNC portfolio.

The distribution could be due, in part, to purchases by non-bank entities of credits at a discount from face value but the report is silent on this point.

So what does all of this show us? It demonstrates the fact that subprime was one area of the credit binge of the past few years. Subprime is certainly a very big part of the credit crisis, but it is not the only part. Here is what the review states about underwriting standards for these $2.79 trillion of loan commitments with $1.2 trillion outstanding:

For the second consecutive year, the review included an assessment of underwriting standards. Examiners again found an inordinate volume of syndicated loans with structurally weak underwriting characteristics particularly in non-investment grade or leveraged transactions.

Add to this portfolio and mortgages all of the other loan portfolios, including credit cards, auto loans, corporate loans, small business loans, and so on, and this crisis goes well beyond subprime mortgages. Just how far is impossible to tell, but the rapid deterioration in the portfolios of major banks, such as the loss reserves announced by Bank of America, give us an indication. As reported in The Wall Street Journal Online Edition:

The nation's largest retail bank reported net income of $1.18 billion, or 15 cents per share, down from $3.70 billion, or 82 cents per share a year earlier. The results were worse than expected. Credit losses on mortgages and credit cards dragged down the results. Its provision for credit losses was $6.45 billion, up from $5.83 billion in the second quarter. Net charge offs were $4.36 billion, as compared to $3.62 billion in the second quarter.

Nonperforming assets were $13.3 billion, or 1.42 percent of total loans, leases and foreclosed properties. The dividend cut at Bank of America, the country's largest bank in terms of deposits, mirrors similar moves by smaller banks across the country as they look for ways to cut costs and raise capital amid the volatility that has driven some of the country's biggest financial institutions out of business.

For more on credit cards see this WSJ article.

I think the credit crisis and its impact on the economy have a long way to go. There are many reasons I believe this and I have been writing about them for the past year. What I found amazing and would like to point out is just how rapidly Wall Street greed exploded, bringing the financial system to its knees. In 2004, investment banks and commercial banks were recipients of deregulation relating to the amount of leverage, on and off their balance sheets, they could employ. There have been many reports on these events, including this New York Times article addressing the investment banking regulations, this blog piece by yours truly addressing both sets of regulations, and this one I penned last May pointing my finger at Bush appointed regulators. Two years after these regulatory changes, the system imploded. True, there are many other issues that are much longer term in nature. In particular, unregulated derivatives markets turn out, not unexpectedly nor without warning, to be a major structural problem in the financial system, and easy monetary policy plus global liquidity were certainly contributing factors. But notwithstanding these other factors that come in to play in this crisis, the simple fact is that if regulators had limited the amount of leverage financial institutions could employ we would not have necessarily reached the crisis stage.

In 2004 regulators gave Wall Street some rope, and it took a mere blink of the eye for Wall Street to hang itself (and, unfortunately, a lot of others).

TGIF!

2008-10-10T22:31:00.003-04:00

Today was one of the most interesting days I have ever witnessed in the markets. I am not a market expert so take all of this with a grain of salt, but it was watching history in the making.

I would say it was a really bad day like last Friday. Last Friday I wrote that it was a really bad day that did not bode well for the markets. This week certainly seemed to support that logic with the DOW having its worst week ever in its 112-year history. It was a really bad day last Friday because the credit markets were screaming with the TED Spread at historic highs and prices of everything down on the day (everything except Treasuries). Stocks, oil, and even gold fell last Friday. By that logic today was even worse.

Today the TED spread was even higher than last Friday, stocks, oil, and gold all fell again, and unlike last Friday even Treasury securities fell in price. It feels as though there is a mass liquidation going on as investors scurry to meet margin calls. Sell anything and everything – we need cash! De-leveraging is in high gear this week.

There were, however, some encouraging signs in the stock market today. After falling precipitously at the open, over 690 points down, the DOW recovered and went positive for a while in what was a stunning reversal. It then lost steam and spent the better part of the day down between approximately 250 – 500 points. At the end of the day the index made another comeback, again turning positive by over 300 points before ending down a “mere” 128 points (seems like small potatoes now). The spread between the high and low of the day, 1,018.77 points, was the largest ever in the history of the DOW. The Nasdaq ended up just ever so slightly.

Summing it up, virtually all asset classes were down today including stocks (on NYSE record volume), bonds (including Treasuries), and commodities (including gold), while the credit markets remained in shambles. This suggests the markets are in full de-leveraging mode and its sell first, ask questions later. There were, however, two remarkable intra-day rallies in the DOW and the Nasdaq ended up for the first time all week, providing a glimmer of hope. It really did seem as though bargain hunters came out in force today and scooped up stocks on the cheap when the market was under extreme pressure. Whether this is a sign that things will moderate is impossible to tell and in the end all asset classes ended down in price. It was comforting, however, to see the cash coming to the table. Even I dipped my toe in the water and I am extremely bearish. Greed got the better of me but I kept it in check by making only small purchases and putting on a hedge. Unfortunately, if nothing changes for the better over the weekend and the de-leveraging continues, next week could be another painful one. There were hopes that the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors would come out with a coordinated plan of action to battle the credit crisis and that may have been fueling some optimism. Unfortunately there was no plan, only a "commitment" to continue working together to stabilize the credit markets – something that has not happened yet. One thing that has happened – I have a splitting headache from following this week's gyrations. TGIF!

More From The Federal Reserve

2008-10-07T14:07:00.003-04:00

The Federal Reserve announced today that it will form a special purpose vehicle (the Commercial Paper Funding Facility or CPFF) that will purchase commercial paper in the marketplace from qualified issuers. This raises many questions, such as whether the Fed is now rationing credit to US companies without oversight.

The Federal Reserve is already in effect purchasing asset-backed commercial paper through its Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Liquidity Facility (ABCPMMLF) where it is lending money to banks to purchase commercial paper that is then pledged to the Federal Reserve. The twist here is that the loans to the banks are non-recourse, so if the commercial paper defaults the Federal Reserve is stuck, not the bank that borrowed the funds – same risk as ownership if you ask me. This action was authorized pursuant to section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (see below). The commercial paper that banks are purchasing and pledging to the Federal Reserve under the ABCPMMLF is secured by the assets backing the asset-backed commercial paper.

The Federal Reserve is now expanding its use of this authority to purchase commercial paper directly from issuers that may be non-bank companies raising the prospect that the Federal Reserve will be rationing credit to US businesses. There is also an issue of authorization, and it seems definitions are malleable in times of crisis. From today’s announcement:

The CPFF will be structured as a credit facility to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) authorized under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The SPV will serve as a funding backstop to facilitate the issuance of term commercial paper by eligible issuers.

According to section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act:

3. Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank (emphasis added): Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual, partnership, or corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.

According to the highlighted section of the Act the commercial paper purchased by the Fed must be SECURED. My understanding of security in lending transactions is that there is a guaranty or some form of asset available to the lender that can be sold in the event of a default, the proceeds of which would be likely to repay the debt. According to the Federal Reserve's release:

Commercial paper that is not ABCP must be secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve. The commercial paper may be secured in one of the following ways: (i) The issuer pays the SPV an upfront fee based on the commercial paper initially sold to the SPV and a further fee based on subsequent commercial paper sales above that amount (emphasis added); or (ii) The issuer obtains an indorsement or guarantee of the issuer’s obligations on the commercial paper sold to the SPV that is satisfactory to the Federal Reserve; or (iii) The issuer provides collateral arrangements that are satisfactory to the Federal Reserve; or (iv) The issuer otherwise provides security satisfactory to the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve will consult with market participants about other methods for issuers of non-ABCP commercial paper to provide satisfactory security to the Federal Reserve.

I wonder how being paid a fee for purchasing commercial paper meets the definition of SECURED under the Federal Reserve Act quoted above. It sounds more like creation of an insurance pool to me. Shouldn't the Federal Reserve obtain Congressional approval to purchase commercial paper from issuers in this manner? The authority is not clear to me.

I do not object to the Federal Reserve taking whatever action is within its authority that could help avert a financial disaster. What I do object to is when institutions bend the meaning of laws to accomplish what they want but then speak about the rule of law and the need to police the actions of those who seek to avoid compliance. Isn't this exactly how we got into this mess in the first place? I am also troubled by the fact that the Federal Reserve can now be seen as rationing credit to US corporations and that this situation is ripe for abuse through influence. There should, in my opinion, be oversight.

Fed Goes Nuclear

2008-10-06T09:28:00.001-04:00

The Federal Reserve is going nuclear. The TAF is doubling to $900 billion, interest will be paid on reserves beginning October 9, and the rules prohibiting commercial banks from purchasing assets from affiliated money market mutual funds is being relaxed. This last move puts FDIC insured deposits behind money market mutual funds which is, I believe, a roundabout way to get taxpayers behind the funds. They previously did this for the investment banking affiliates. The interest on reserves is required because the Fed is flooding the system with reserves and if it did not pay interest on reserves its target rate would be meaningless, as overnight lending rates would plummet to near zero. This is amazing – unfortunately - and there is likely more to come. Who thought $700 billion was a lot?

Why It’s a Bad Day

2008-10-02T16:26:00.002-04:00

Today was a bad day.

First, the credit markets are screaming. The TED Spread is at historic highs. If you don’t know what the TED Spread is, it measures the difference between the interest rate paid on Treasury securities and the LIBOR rate. LIBOR is the London Interbank Offer Rate, and that is the rate banks offer to lend dollar reserves to one another in London. So why is the difference between these two rates important?

Rates on Treasuries are staying way down because investors don’t know where to put their money to keep it safe, let along make a return. So they run to the safest investment they can find – Treasuries. This is called a flight to quality. On the other side, banks don’t want to lend to each other. This is in part because they are afraid they will not get paid back and in part because they are concerned their funding sources may dry up so they are hording reserves. This is a sign that the banks are very nervous. The bigger the difference between these two rates, the more fear in the markets.

The other very troubling sign is the concurrent declines in oil, stocks, gold, and other metals on the heels of an already declining housing market. Usually, when the stock market is down, you can watch the funds flowing into gold or oil or some other investments. Now, however, that’s not happening. Stocks are being sold off and the money is going out of the markets, perhaps into Treasuries and perhaps under the mattress. This could be a sign that large investors such as hedge funds are selling to raise cash for distribution to withdrawing investors or meeting margin calls. It could also be a sign that investors appear to be coming to terms with a very poor global economic outlook. In any event what we are seeing is signs of deflation. If you have any doubts about why deflation is bad, think about paying off your mortgage as the value of your house, your wages, and everything else falls except the amount you owe. Think about a business investment when the value of the product you will produce is likely to decline while the loan you use to finance the investment does not. Deflation is a really bad thing because it hurts the wealth of anyone who is a net borrower (most households) and it discourages investment leading to more unemployment. More unemployment on top of an already weak labor market can result in a downward spiral as consumption shrinks due to job losses causing more job losses causing less consumption, etc.

Warren Buffet has been in the news lately. Many have felt comforted by his investments in Goldman and GE. I have not, because it tells us that the bluest of blue chip companies are now paying 10% plus equity warrants at or around current market prices to raise capital. This is to replace short term funding from sources such as commercial paper where rates are (or were) much lower. This tells us financing is very difficult to obtain and the higher cost of funds will likely have a negative impact on future earnings.

In the long run, it shows that Buffet has faith in the United States and that's good. What happens between now and the long term is what has me concerned. One day does not a trend make, but this is not a good day.

Policy Implications of the Credit Crisis

2008-09-27T16:38:00.002-04:00

I have been working on a way to conceptualize where our economy is and how we got here. I am trying to avoid all of the finger pointing that is currently going on (including my own finger pointing) in an attempt to remain somewhat objective, and I do not pretend to include all of the elements of our current economic system. What I am trying to present is a basic model that helps explain the relationships between our economic system and the need for tax, trade, energy, and education policies. I want something that can work for students, and I appreciate any suggestions that would improve the model and/or the presentation.

I have developed a framework that I think makes sense and it is represented by the two diagrams below. The first diagram, "The Way It Was", illustrates the basic wealth creation model of a country with balanced internal flows and net exports. This is the USA in the past. Note that there are net positive flows to investors from within the USA and from abroad (represented by blue items), while at the same time there are positive flows to the USA box, representing domestic wages and consumption (the red lines) from domestic investment and net flows from abroad. The INVESTMENTS box is subdivided into investments in productive assets and investments for consumption. I have labeled the consumption investments FINANCIAL to represent purchases of financial assets supporting consumption such as consumer loans, mortgage backed securities and so forth.

The next diagram represents "The Way It Is". Note the change in flows of investment in production from the USA to Non-USA recipients of investment represented by the red line. This creates a shift in the net wage gains and net consumption flows as we begin to import more from overseas production and invest less domestically than we otherwise would. Initially this model works well for investors as profits increase due to cost reductions. Adding tax cuts into the mix provides a dramatic increase in wealth to investors and a larger pool of investment capital. Adding to that profits from the gains made by NON-USA investors investing back into the USA and you have a gigantic pool of liquidity looking for profitable investments. Unfortunately, at the same time this massive liquidity pool is building, the reversal of flows to wage earners begins to put pressure on consumption. This should have caused a reduction in consumption in the USA that would have been a normal response to these changes in flows, but it did not. Rather than adjusting production down to a new level of consumption the massive liquidity pool was directed into financial instrument supporting consumption. This created the base for a large explosion in debt as USA consumers continued to consume financing this over-consumption through debt. Now, however, consumption is above the wage earners' means of supporting ownership and the debt underlying the financial instruments invested in by investors begins to go bad (defaults on home mortgages, for example).

Combining all of these factors we get both a debt bubble (represented by the green lines) and a wealth bubble (represented by the blue lines). This is where we are today, and the bubbles are unwinding. Wealth is falling as asset values decline and the debt bubble burst last year. We are currently on life support from the Federal Reserve and other government sources. At this time we should see a reversal of consumption flows as USA consumers pull back. This would help to slow the imbalance of international flows through a normal adjustment process (including a falling dollar as USA interest rates fall and the economy weakens). Unfortunately this is where energy policy (or lack thereof) comes in. As investors try to protect their asset values they are moving from financial investments to hard assets such as gold and energy products. Energy products are also priced globally in dollars, so as the dollar declines in value the dollar price of energy goes up. These factors are keeping energy prices high, and since the USA is a massive importer of energy the trade flows remain strongly negative.

So, what does all of this tell us with respect to our national policies? I believe it has implications for tax policy as tax incentives to the investor class may have over stimulated the economy during globalization. I pose the unanswerable question – would real interest rates have been negative for so long in 2003 if tax cuts flowed to consumers rather than investors (thereby stimulating consumption rather than "investment")? Would the size of the debt bubble have grown so large if there were less investment chasing return? Questions that merit empirical study, I think. Perhaps tax cuts for wage earners would be better policy considering all of the money flows.

It also has implications for trade policy as sustaining the structural trade flows we currently have is a recipe for massive wealth transfer from the USA to energy producing countries (this massive transfer is currently under way). That brings us to energy policy. Perhaps we should direct future investment into energy independence. This is not a new idea, but this model helps to illustrate the need and the interdependence of energy, trade, and tax policies. Developing new sources of energy could certainly help reverse the flows back to what they were in the first diagram. I'm not suggesting we adopt an isolationist stance. What I am suggesting is that we very quickly direct our investment capacity in a massive way into energy independence and additional efficiency technologies to help offset the advantages of investing outside the USA (rather than simply driving USA wages down). You can bet that other countries are doing exactly that and we are in direct competition with them. This, then, gets us to education. Should it be a national priority that we educate the population to the maximum of our capacity? I believe it is.

What has been missing, in my humble opinion, is leadership to help guide the country through appropriate policy incentives to achieving these necessary goals. This void has left us scarred and my hope is that the current crisis will point us in the correct direction for the long term. (OK, I couldn't help just a bit of politics).

What the Plan Does (and does not)

2008-09-25T15:39:00.002-04:00

Now that it appears Congress will pass the bailout plan the next logical question is “what’s next?” I don’t know the answer, but I have my concerns.

This plan may well deal with the current stresses in the financial markets. If so, we can all stop panicking that the world as we know it will come to an abrupt end and get back to the real economy. But, as one commentator just said on CNBC, this may put the fire out but the furniture is still burned. The problem is that the real economy isn’t doing too well. Unemployment is up, spending is down, people are concerned, so where are we headed from here? First, lets see what the current plan hopes to accomplish.

Here is the problem. If a bank has lots of bad assets on its balance sheet, it can’t sell them because if it does it takes a loss on the sale. That loss reduces the bank’s capital, and without adequate capital a bank cannot make loans. On the other hand, if the bank just holds on to the bad assets, it can’t raise new cash to make loans because no one wants to lend it money without knowing how bad the bank’s balance sheet actually is. So as long as these bad assets are being held by the banks lending activity slows or, in the worst case, stops all together. If this gets really out of hand and these bad assets start showing up in other places (like money market mutual funds) then investors start taking their money out of all the places they invest and all lending could stop. That would be the modern day equivalent of a run-on-the-banks. No loans, no economic activity and we fall into a very bad economic shutdown. The only difference between this kind of bank run and the classic depression era run is that the taxpayers stand behind the deposits in commercial banks today through the FDIC and Treasury so we collectively insure our deposits. This prevents a run on commercial banks. We don’t, however, insure the funding sources for all of the other financial institutions in our financial system. Money market mutual funds, insurance companies, investment banks, hedge funds, and private equity raise funds that are not insured against loss. When these bad assets start showing up in those places the sources funding them run. This is why the federal government announced an insurance plan for money market mutual funds last week, and is also why we have witnessed the demise of the independent investment banks. The investors in these banks have stopped funding them – a run on the investment banks. So, although commercial bank deposits that most Americans have in their bank are insured, there is an entire system of finance that doesn’t have this protection and is prone to a classic run. That run is in progress. The current plan hopes to remove bad assets from balance sheets of financial institutions so that lending will return to the economy and investors will stop running. It is intended to “unplug” the flow of money throughout the system by taking away the source of the clog – these bad assets. But even if it works, where do we end up?

A while back I posted an article that explained how the level of household debt to personal income has grown too high and until consumers pay down their debts to a level they can afford the economy will not do well. This is parallel to what is happening in the housing market. Until prices return to a level that makes purchasing a home affordable for the average homeowner prices will decline. As far as overall household debt is concerned, until it returns to a level supportable by personal incomes debt must be reduced. How do we reduce debt? We save rather than spend. Saving more and spending less means less economic activity, and that means a possible recession. So how does the rescue plan deal with this issue? I don’t think it does because it doesn’t deal with the bottom up issue that consumers are in too much debt. How much debt are US consumers in? Total household debt is about $14 trillion, or approximately 145% of 2007 annual disposable personal income. What was this ratio the last time we went into a banking crisis in, say, 1991? It was approximately 85%. That leads us to a thought experiment. What would it take to get us back to the levels of debt to income that we had during the last crisis? If we assume disposable personal income will grow by 2% for this year, then personal income for 2008 should be approximately $9.8 trillion dollars. At 85%, household debt would be approximately $8.4 trillion. Since actual household debt is currently in the $14 trillion range, we need to de-leverage about $5.6 trillion to get back to the 85% ratio we had in 1991. In a $14 trillion economy that represents about 40% of one year’s GDP. In fact, it’s even worse than that because if we stop borrowing in order to save then we also lose the GDP funded by debt (another $880 billion). Comparing other developed countries that have seen similar increases in household debt to disposable personal income, Japan stands out as it went over 120% in – you guessed it, 1991 (see page 47). This was the start of the “lost decade” for Japan.

I don’t expect we would make up all 40% of our adjustment back to 1991 in a short period of time, nor am I convinced that we will ever actually get there without a major new boom in real economic activity (such as discoveries relating to new energy technologies) or a major bust where debt gets written down in mass quantities. The situation does, however, point us to what we can expect next. Expect a rather protracted recession and/or more government interventions into the economy before this is over. I expect the next intervention will be of the bottom up sort, and eventually if the Federal Government owns enough mortgages I can see debt forgiveness of underlying mortgages owned by taxpayers.

Debt numbers: here
Personal Income numbers: here.

Goldman Profits Up on Short Sales of Goldman

2008-09-24T08:40:00.001-04:00

OK, the headline is completely fictional, I think. I just re-read some articles about how Goldman Sachs was at the heart of creating so many toxic mortgage securities and how watching its former head (Treasury Secretary Paulson) pining for $700 billion of taxpayer money to clean up the mess is disgraceful. One of the points that came out again was the fact the Goldman came away from the whole mortgage crisis relatively unscathed from a profit point of view because it was shorting that market heavily as the crisis unfolded. Now, of course, regulators have prohibited short sales in Goldman stock to prevent Goldman's stock from collapsing and there is a witch hunt going on to find those evil short sellers. Wouldn't it be an absolute riot if it turns out Goldman was one of them?

Senator Schumer Insurance Plan

2008-09-23T12:30:00.001-04:00

Senator Schumer came up with what I think is a really good idea, although I think it could be modified a bit. His idea - rather than charging specific companies fees or equity participation for participating in the bailout program, charge a general insurance fee to all (“large”) financial institutions to provide a fund that would protect taxpayers from eventual losses. I like that idea because it socializes the losses among the financial institutions rather than the general taxpayers. It also resolves the objection Paulson has to protecting taxpayers by charging specific participants. Paulson's concern was that institutions would not participate if there is a cost involved. I think that’s a stretch for taxpayers, but Schumer’s idea isn’t a bad compromise. I would like to see a substantial required contribution into the insurance fund at the expense of dividends if necessary. After all, in the end we want capital to flow to financial institutions on a net basis but we want the ultimate protection to come from the owners of the financial institutions. If we simply charge an insurance fee over time it will ultimately be passed along to taxpayers anyway through higher costs for banking as the fee is built in to the cost structure of these institutions.

Bailout Testimony

2008-09-23T11:31:00.003-04:00

Chairman Bernanke’s testimony today was astounding to me for two reasons. First, he stated that by using public funds to purchase toxic assets from financial institutions we would gain a better understanding of the hold-to-maturity prices of these assets. In effect, he is saying that the market doesn’t work and only government intervention will provide a price discovery mechanism. I take exception to this conclusion because it is based on internally flawed logic. Creating a market with public funds does not provide price discovery, it provides a new market that is not based on “market” prices at all. Rather it is based on availability of funds from taxpayers and it is ripe for abuse.

Second, Mr. Bernanke said that punitive measures should not be used against institutions that participate in sales to the government because it would limit participation. The only reason this could be true is that the government will not allow these institutions to fail so, rather than participating in this plan financial institutions could blackmail taxpayers for another rescue plan. If the government made it clear that they either participate or fail they would participate. I, for one, am tired of being held hostage by financial institutions.

Treasury Secretary Paulson addressed the lack of oversight provisions in his bailout proposal by explaining that he did not intend there be no oversight in his proposed plan. Rather, he felt it should be up to Congress to figure out how to monitor this program. I figured that to be the case, but I have an exception to this. If the oversight was to be determined by Congress, then why put the following provision into the proposal?:

Sec. 8. Review.
Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.

Finally, I ask again, where is the presentation?!? All I am hearing is “this is my opinion as Fed Chairman” and as Treasury Secretary. Taxpayers deserve better than this.

Shock And Awe

2008-09-23T10:11:00.003-04:00

I feel like I did just before we attacked Iraq. I feel as though we are being frightened into doing things that in the long run are very bad ideas, but only those in power know all of the details. It's Paulson's way or else. I think we need debate on how to approach this crisis, and I would love to hear plans that focus on supporting market function while allowing bankrupt entities to fail. One problem is that those working on fixing the problems are the same people who created it and their view is strongly biased toward Wall Street. I have a bad feeling about this.

So far, the steps being taken don’t seem to be working while at the same time are creating the dangers of the next financial crisis. For example, I think there is real subterfuge going on with the IBanks. First, the Fed relaxed rules on using FDIC insured deposits to fund IBank operations (that happened the day Merrill & BOA merged). In effect, this is a taxpayer guaranty for Merrill without any congressional review and could be the seeds of the next disaster. This rule is only effective until the end of January 2009, but if the Ibanks are relying on depositor funds at that time what will happen – they will magically find an alternative source of funds? With Goldman and Morgan converting into national bank holding companies they will benefit from the same rule relaxation as Merrill and perhaps use more favorable accounting treatment to value their assets. If I get some time I want to look into that and I welcome all comments on it. Also, today the Fed relaxed rules on private ownership of financial institutions - another move that could contribute to the next disaster as private equity groups that control all types of businesses purchase controlling interests in taxpayer backstopped institutions. All of these moves have, in my opinion, negative implications for the future of our financial system.

What is missing from this entire debate is a clear description of what exactly we are afraid of. Now, I understand the implications of a complete meltdown of the financial system and I think we should be doing something to address the issues. But I have not heard from Paulson or anyone else a clear description of what happens if we do nothing and what the alternative actions may be. Where is the slide show? Where is the full and complete analysis? How does this flow of funds from the US Taxpayer to privately owned financial institutions that continue to pay dividends to their investors fix the problem? Why are these institutions still paying dividends? Shouldn’t there be a prohibition on dividends until taxpayers are made whole through recourse guarantees or some fund created through dividends that would have been paid to investors? Is there a way to fix this problem from the bottom up rather than the top down? Shouldn’t there be some executive compensation limitations? Etc., etc., etc. Rather than all of these issues being addressed we are getting shock and awe. Congressional hearings are beginning – let’s hope our representatives in government step up to the plate. They have certainly heard from me, and you can express your views by going here and contacting your Senator.

Rule Manipulations for IBanks?

2008-09-21T22:59:00.003-04:00

Just when I thought I was caught up, Morgan and Goldman are approved by the Federal Reserve to become bank holding companies. What I suspect this means is that they will now look to acquire banks that can provide stable depositor based funding. The Federal Reserve just relaxed the regulations prohibiting bank holding companies from using federally insured deposits to fund investment banking assets so we end up with FDIC (taxpayer) guaranteed deposits funding investment banking operations. I hope I am wrong, but if this is the case it is a shameless manipulation of the rules to use unsuspecting taxpayers in a bail out for equity and bond investors in these banks and it should not be allowed to proceed without full and honest disclosure and approval from Congress. If these banks are insolvent the fix should be that equity and then, as necessary, debt gets wiped out, not that a roundabout free taxpayer guarantee provides the means for funding.

Credit Market Developments

2008-09-21T19:54:00.006-04:00

Treasury has proposed a $700 billion taxpayer funded (through issuance of debt) purchase program to acquire real estate assets from the financial industry. This has been coming for a long time, and goes all the way back to the failed Super SIV that was being discussed last Fall. Of course, the numbers have grown from what was a $70 - $100 billion plan to the current $700 billion plus plan, and this plan has the taxpayers purchasing the bad assets directly. The accounting issues of valuation, however, have not changed. What has changed is that the crisis has become so bad we are probably willing to throw out the rules to save the game.

The plan is essentially a $700 billion revolving line to acquire real estate assets at whatever prices and from whatever sellers Treasury wants. There is no protection for taxpayers in Treasury’s proposal, and I can only assume Treasury has left this aspect of the plan for Congress to address. If this isn’t ringing alarm bells all over Washington and Main Street I don’t know what will.

Treasury Secretary Paulson has submitted a very broad plan that gives him extraordinary discretion and prohibits any agency or judicial review. You can see a copy of what was submitted in this CNN article and read a description of the plan at the Treasury’s website. The submission raises many questions, three of which I will point out.

1. There is no provision for protection of taxpayers. As written, it seems that Treasury will simply purchase, at whatever price Treasury determines,

Mortgage-Related Assets.--The term "mortgage-related assets" means residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages, that in each case was originated or issued on or before September 17, 2008.

The big question – at what price? If Treasury purchases securities at current market prices it doesn’t necessarily help the financial institutions that own them. Right now losses that would occur at market prices are being deferred through secured lending by the Federal Reserve, but this is obviously insufficient. If these assets are in addition to those pledged to the Fed, then this is a multi-trillion dollar problem. If Treasury pays more than current market prices, then how is the taxpayer protected? Not to get off on a rant here, but it seems to me that any financial institution that sells securities to taxpayers pursuant to this program should, at a minimum, direct all dividends to the Treasury until taxpayers have been fully repaid, at which time they can have the balance of the securities returned. It really irks me to think that financial institutions could sell the crap they profited from so handsomely over the past decade to taxpayers, letting us assume the risk, while the owners continue to collect dividends. Absolutely horrible result that I truly hope Congress will address. Some may argue that this would make it difficult for these institutions to raise capital, but that should be irrelevant now since the taxpayers are providing the capital if we pay above market prices for their securities. Another point – why are we purchasing commercial real estate assets and what are the limitations on commercial vs. residential?

2. I think there is a lack of transparency. The current proposal provides for a report to Congress three months after the program begins and then every six months. As a taxpayer whose money is being spent on these assets I want to know every week how much, who, when, and so on. I want to know which institutions are benefiting, how we are getting compensated for it, what is the asset rated, what is the mark-to-market value, and so on. Without full disclosure this plan is ripe for abuse and all purchases need to be fully disclosed. I suppose there is an argument that disclosing which institutions are selling assets to taxpayers could jeopardize the institutions, but since they would be receiving a capital infusion from the purchase this should not be an issue. Poor disclosure is one of the issues that got us here in the first place and any plan to address this crisis must include full disclosure.

3. The amount of this bailout is unclear. It specifies that:

The Secretary’s authority to purchase mortgage-related assets under this Act shall be limited to $700,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time

. This means we could be purchasing a lot more than $700 billion worth of this stuff, we just will not own more than $700 billion at any one time. How do we account for the value of these assets? If Treasury purchases an asset for $1 million and receives principal payments that reduce the face amount of the asset, do those payments reduce the $700 billion even though we may still take a loss on the balance of the $1 million we paid? If so, this is more likely a $1 trillion plan (or more).

In other bailout news (post AIG taxpayer bailout), the Fed established a line of credit that is reportedly $230 billion to purchase asset-backed commercial paper on a non-recourse basis (meaning the Fed will own the stuff). Asset backed commercial paper was at the heart of this crisis to begin with and is where funding dried up last week. What does this commercial paper fund? Everything, including auto loans, credit cards, and so on. If this market freezes your credit card may not work, and the resulting panic could be devastating. Think how you would react if told you could not charge your groceries on your credit card because Citibank doesn’t have the money to lend you. In addition, companies could find it impossible to fund payrolls causing more panic. This is one of the reasons Treasury acted on its plan – justified fear. (For a good explanation about how asset backed commercial paper works see this fitch report).

So what happened in the commercial paper market? In general, money market investors put money into money market mutual funds that then use the money to purchase assets including asset-backed commercial paper. But when a large money market mutual fund reported that it took a loss and that investors would lose money, money market mutual funds in general received calls for redemptions from investors who feared losing their money – a run on money market mutual funds. As night follows day, the mutual funds stopped purchasing commercial paper and put their liquidity into Treasury securities, driving the interest rate on short term Treasuries to negative on at least one issue and the interest rate on commercial paper way up. This is a clear dislocation in the credit markets and the Fed jumped in to provide liquidity for commercial paper. In addition to the Fed’s new plan to purchase commercial paper, Treasury reached back to a depression era law to insure money market mutual funds. Funds can buy into the plan that will insure investors against losses. This has irked some banks that believe this places them at a competitive disadvantage to insured money market mutual funds and could cause their funding to dry up – more unintended consequences (do I hear whack-a-mole?).

One more item on the list of things being done to avoid a total meltdown – relaxation of regulations on financial firms. Since these firms cannot raise any capital because their business models are in question regulators have relaxed capital requirements – temporarily, of course. Another thing regulators did was relax the restriction on using commercial bank deposits to fund investment bank operations. After the great crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression, Congress split up the investment banks and commercial banks because investments made by investment banks in equities were too prone to value fluctuation that could wipe out depositor funds. The FDIC was established to insure deposits and banks were limited as to what they could do with those deposits (to protect the taxpayers from having to bail out excessive risk taking). The law that kept investment and commercial banks separated was repealed in 1999, but there was regulation in place that prohibited these new combined banks from transferring commercial bank deposits to investment bank affiliates. Some of this regulation is currently being relaxed so that investment banks that are affiliated with commercial banks can get access to the stable deposit based funds of the commercial banks. The result is that to some extend the FDIC and taxpayer are now behind assets of the investment banking affiliates of the large commercial banks that have such affiliates. We have gone backwards (I bet Merrill Lynch and Bank of America appreciated this change that occurred the same time they merged).

For a time I was keeping tabs on the total cost of this credit implosion and the risk to taxpayers but the numbers are getting hard to follow. Based on current media reports the Fed is now up to $700 - $800 billion in credit and commitments, Treasury is asking for a $700 billion revolving credit facility from the taxpayers that is likely to be more than $700 billion in aggregate purchases, and so far the Federal Home Loan banks have issued some $250 - $300 billion in new taxpayer guaranteed debt to lend to banks against mortgage collateral. Oh yes, FHA has approximately $100 billion in new loan guarantees from FHA Secure and has another $300 billion authorized guarantee capacity to refinance defaulted mortgages. Are we at $2 trillion yet? If not, just add the GSE loans and MBS purchases Treasury plans (there are no limits on the amounts here) and whatever funds the GSEs need to stay solvent, and we have taxpayer exposure of well over $2 trillion even before the federal guarantees of the GSEs’ debt. These numbers don’t include losses that banks have reported on write-downs of securities. The result so far - Treasury has asked for an increase in the debt ceiling twice, this time to $11.3 Trillion (approximately 80% of GDP). One more point. If the total of all residential mortgages in The United States is in the $10.6 trillion range, and taxpayers now explicitly guarantee $5.5 trillion through Fannie and Freddie and are or will be at risk for say $2.5 trillion through all of the interventions noted above, then taxpayers could ultimately be on the hook (either through guarantees or ownership) for some 75 - 80% of the entire outstanding amount of residential mortgages in The United States. I find that staggering.

A couple of nits that I have:
1. Too bad Treasury didn’t go out and raise the money last week when interest rates on Treasuries were at historic lows. Probably would have saved a lot in interest.
2. CNBC should stop praising Jim Cramer as though he is some sort of visionary for talking about a bailout plan like this one. Everyone has always known that the government could step in and get behind lots of private debt to shore up the markets. In fact, everyone has been talking about it for some time. Treasury just didn’t until it was necessary because if it did it wouldn’t get approval for it. No great vision here. When Cramer comes up with a way to protect taxpayers that Congress will pass and that will resolve the credit crisis call me.
3. If there was ever a time to fix the unfair and disproportionate tax treatment for hedge fund and private equity managers (the 15% rate on “carried interest”), now would be it. In fact, several years ago would have been better. When this was in the public discourse several months back industry pundits argued that if you taxed hedge funds you would get less of them. Right now that sounds like a good idea. Fewer hedge funds, fewer credit default swaps, less systemic risk.
4. Like many of the talking heads on television, I am angered by all of the blatently excessive amounts of compensation paid to Wall Street bankers and executives over the past six years or so that is ultimately proving to be gains from the largest Ponzi scheme in the history of the world. There should be some recourse, though I don't claim to know how that could work.
5. With absolutely no proof that trickle down Reagan/Bush-onomics has ever worked, an exploding national debt, an exploding national deficit, and the impending baby boom retirement isn’t it time to stop talking about tax cuts for the investor class?
6. And finally, when will we, as a taxpaying and voting public, stop allowing the politicians to distract us with witch hunts for evil short sellers from the real issues – the fact that the political system has been for sale to the highest bidder and the highest bidder often turns out to be Wall Street and Wall Street.

PS - there are other developments, such as the Fed now accepting equities as collateral for certain loans under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. To find out more about what the Fed is up to you can go to its website and click around the press releases.

Trickle Up or Trickle Down?

2008-09-08T21:28:00.001-04:00

Now that I got the details of the GSE takeovers out of the way with my last post, I wanted to write a more controversial opinion piece about this socialization of the mortgage market. As with many opinion pieces the topic is overly simplified in order to get the opinion across, but that's where all the fun is!

First let me note that although it is socialization now, the plan is to wind down the GSEs to approximately one quarter of their current size so ultimately this is a mortgage market privatization plan as much as it is a socialization plan. What has caused all of this turmoil? How did we get to this point? Here is one perspective for your consideration.

First, lets put a few factors into play. The divide between rich and poor has gotten very wide – the GINI coefficient has risen from under 40 in 1967 to 47 in 2006 (from Wikipedia.org). Second, we have seen falling or flat real wages as globalization has put pressure on labor’s ability to negotiate increases at the same time labor has become more productive by leaps and bounds. Third, corporate profits have been excellent over the past several years prior to the “credit crunch”. Finally, we have witnessed a huge increase in the level of debt owed by the average American household. Are all of these things related? I think they are, and my conclusion may not sit well with free marketeers.

At the heart of a capitalist system is the drive for profits. This drive, in an environment of free market competition, should result in innovation and, in turn, a rising standard of living. I agree with this concept and believe that there should be competition in markets. But does this system always work without unacceptable excesses? Of course not, and the current fallout is just one example. I believe that the imbalance of power between capital and labor has had a lot to do with our current situation, and if that sounds Marxist so be it.

Capital seeks profit. This is what drives a capitalist system. It gets profits by taking some of the value created by labor and keeping it for the owners of capital rather than sharing it with the producers – labor. Whether you believe this is good or bad is irrelevant for my purposes, so I will dispense with value judgment here. In order to maximize profits owners of capital seek to compensate labor at lower levels, and modern globalization together with governmental trade policies have enabled owners to take the upper hand in labor/wage negotiations. This is clearly evident in the fall of unionization and falling real wages, and is currently playing out at Boeing as labor seeks to limit management’s ability to outsource production. By successfully seeking lower labor costs owners created increased profits (lower labor costs net of increased transportation expenses). The higher levels of profit meant more new capital seeking profit. That means more investment in productive capacity. If the system gets out of balance, there is too much capital seeking profit and we get over-production. The problem is, who will purchase the surplus production, especially when real wages are falling? In theory this would result in declining prices and capital would be allocated away from production because profits would fall. So what got in the way of this process? Where is the invisible hand?

Enter leverage, the elixir. All of the excess capital was turned into even more excess capital through leverage in the financial industry. This leverage is evident in all of our financial institutions, from the failure of Bear Stearns to the liquidity crisis to the socialization of the GSEs. Leverage was enabled by our government through regulatory steps that opened the door for massive levels of debt relative to the existing pool of capital. This partnership between Wall Street and Congress is, I believe, bi-partisan and well entrenched. The result – consumers had the capacity to borrow and purchase even though they did not have the income to support the ongoing cost of ownership. Therein lies the imbalance between capital and labor that has resulted in our current situation. Too much capital allocated to production and lending for consumption, not enough wages to support ownership. The signs are there – rising inequality between rich and poor, outstanding corporate profits (until recently), consumption exceeding production, and stagnant or falling real wages. Now, as losses mount in the capital and money markets from all of the foolish extensions of credit (capital seeking profit), the process goes into reverse. Credit is difficult to come by and only allocated to the most worthy of borrowers. Consumers can no longer consume above their incomes and the price adjustment process that should have occurred a long time ago arrives with ferocity. Welcome to the credit crunch! What was the cause? Unrestrained and under-regulated capital.

As we de-leverage business profits will suffer from falling demand, asset prices will fall, and unemployment will rise. For the less well off there is the struggle to maintain the household, obtain food, and keep up with payments. For those with capital there is the struggle to preserve and grow it in an environment where prices are unstable. The current struggle is also playing out in the context of the political contest for President. Whether both parties are actually shills for the wealthy interests is a matter for debate and many believe this to be the case. Taking the candidates at face value, however, the Democratic party is calling for a redistribution from wealth to wage, while the Republican party is calling for a reduction of social benefits for wage earners to pay for ongoing tax cuts that benefit high income earners and owners of capital. Trickle up or trickle down. That is the question.

The Plan for GSEs

2008-09-08T09:59:00.006-04:00

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator of the GSEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) announced today that it is putting these two behemoths into conservatorship. I have read through the announcement from Treasury Secretary Paulson and the statement made by James Lockhart, both of which are available at the Treasury Press Room online. (Please note that any quotes in this article not otherwise noted refer to this release.) There are some interesting aspects to this plan, as well as interesting questions.

The first question is why. Why put these entities into conservatorship now? According to today’s statements, the root cause of the problem is the inherent conflict within these organizations of being run for profit but with a purpose of serving a public interest. Of course, these institutions have existed in this form for quite some time (1968 for Fannie Mae and 1970 for Freddie Mac), so this would not be why they are being put into conservatorship now. They are being put into conservatorship now because they are no longer able to accomplish their mission of helping to provide liquidity to the mortgage market and “respond appropriately to the private capital market,” (see the legislation that created Freddie Mac here) and they are at risk of failure which could have devastating ripple effects in the financial industry and the broader economy. Mismanagement, excessive lobbying success, and the rapid decline in home prices have left them inadequately capitalized to carry out their missions.

Because they are undercapitalized investors have not been snapping up GSE liabilities. The poor demand for their debt results in the GSEs paying higher interest on borrowings, and this translates into more expensive mortgages for borrowers. So, even though the Federal Reserve has the target Federal Funds rate down to 2%, a negative real rate, interest rates in the mortgage markets are going up. Some believe this situation goes well beyond the GSEs and is a reflection of the entire financial system in the United States, but don’t expect to hear any politician or regulator tell you that in public. A Heard On The Street Column in The Wall Street Journal Online Edition makes that point this morning.

In order to provide liquidity to the mortgage market (which means demand for mortgage backed securities and debt issued by the GSEs), the Federal Government has decided to step in with a four-point plan. The hope is that if this plan is successful, mortgage interest rates will decline causing increased housing demand softening the housing price declines we are seeing. In turn, this should speed a recovery in the overall economy as falling home prices represent a huge drag on consumer spending. In addition, the systemic risk from a failure of the GSEs goes away (is transferred to the United States taxpayer).

One point I want to mention before getting into the details of how the plan works is that according to the statement released by James Lockhart, “all political activities – including all lobbying – will be halted immediately.” I find this ironic, and I would like to know when this rule would be applied to Wall Street.

That’s the why, now to the how. Step one is placing the GSEs into conservatorship, meaning they will now be run by FHFA. Investors who own stock lose all of their rights although they can keep the stock in the hope that at the end of all of this there will be some value in it. There will be no dividends paid to common or preferred shareholders. There is a ripple effect to this part of the plan, as any financial institution that holds a large amount of stock in the GSEs will likely realize a sudden and dramatic loss. The agencies involved in the financial system

encourage depository institutions to contact their primary federal regulator if they believe that losses on their holdings of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac common or preferred shares … are likely to reduce their regulatory capital below ‘well capitalized.’ The banking agencies are prepared to work with the affected institutions….

In any event, the largest players in the mortgage markets are now in the hands of regulators.

Treasury announced an additional three steps it will take to shore up confidence in the GSEs so their debt costs will come down and to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. These are (i) taxpayer guarantees of GSE debt backed by taxpayer purchases of Senior Preferred Stock of the GSEs as required (initially up to $100 billion for each GSE), (ii) “market” purchases of GSE mortgage backed securities (MBS) in an unspecified amount, and (iii) a taxpayer credit line of an unspecified amount for loans to the GSEs and the Federal Home Loan Banks secured by GSE MBS (or, in the case of the Federal Home Loan Banks, advances). These steps are all in addition to the $400 billion of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve, the recent $300 billion taxpayer guaranteed FHA refinance plan, and the $250 billion of taxpayer guaranteed debt issued by the Federal Home Loan Banks since this “contained” “subprime” mortgage crisis began.

First, the Treasury (that would be the taxpayers) has guaranteed the solvency of the GSEs. So, if these entities lose money and become insolvent, the United States taxpayer will purchase up to $100 billion of Senior Preferred Stock in each entity that will be senior to existing preferred stock and common stock outstanding. This amount is not necessarily a limit on what taxpayers will invest – rather it is an amount chosen by Treasury as an initial facility size. Just to put this amount into perspective, the current common equity of Freddie Mac is approximately $12 billion. This taxpayer investment program is aimed at shoring up demand for GSE debt in the hope it will reduce the cost of debt and, in turn, bring down mortgage interest rates. In order to protect taxpayers, Treasury also gets warrants to purchase, at a “nominal” cost, up to 79.9% of each GSE. Senior and subordinated debt issued by the GSEs and the MBS they issue and guarantee remain senior to taxpayers and are, in fact, guaranteed by taxpayers because if the GSE can’t pay them taxpayers purchase more Senior Preferred Stock to provide the funds. The total amount of this debt is massive, but these are backed by mortgages and so losses are what we should be focused on. Even so, we are talking about a total principal exposure of over $5 trillion dollars.

As part of the agreement between Treasury and the GSEs, each GSE must shrink its on-balance sheet mortgage assets by 10% per year from $850 billion (a little more than what they are today) on December 31, 2009 to $250 billion. The impact of such a reduction in size on the GSEs’ ability to act as a conduit between lenders and the secondary market is likely to be substantial. According to FHFA this should address the systemic risk posed by the size of these institutions. It seems a shame, however, that publicly assisted housing finance that had worked so well until a few years ago is being forced to all but disappear. The ultimate losers would be the general public and the ultimate winners – well – whoever will satisfy all the mortgage demand when the GSEs are too small. Hopefully Congress will figure out a way to preserve the public benefit (Representative Frank?).

The second step Treasury is taking is initiating a program of purchasing GSE MBS that are credit guaranteed by the GSEs. Now remember that pursuant to the step just discussed these guarantees are now guarantees of the Treasury. Yes, the taxpayers will be purchasing taxpayer guaranteed debt with taxpayer funds. This part of the plan hopes to provide additional liquidity to the market for mortgage backed securities – something that the $400 billion or so that the Federal Reserve has provided, plus the $250 billion or so the Federal Home Loan Banks have provided, plus the $300 billion FHA plan, have not accomplished. Treasury will designate “independent asset managers as financial agents” to make purchases of mortgage backed securities on behalf of Treasury. Of course, none of these people know one another so we can rest assured that there will be no favoritism regarding who Treasury purchases the GSE MBS from (hummm). Two glaring mysteries in this part of the plan – how much will taxpayers purchase and from who?

Finally, Treasury is providing a collateralized loan facility to the GSEs AND the Federal Home Loan Banks. So, if the market for GSE debt is unfavorable even after all of the other steps, taxpayers will lend the money to the GSEs taking MBS as collateral, and if the Federal Home Loan Banks run into problems issuing their taxpayer guaranteed debt they too can borrow from the taxpayers directly (this type of borrowing would fund advances at these banks that are collateralized by mortgage assets of financial institutions). These lines of credit are available until December 31, 2009, as authorized by the recent legislation passed by Congress. There is no stated limit on the overall size of this facility.

If you are interested in following your money Treasury will be releasing information on borrowing by the GSEs and Federal Home Loan Banks in the Daily Treasury Statement. Purchases of MBS will be reported monthly in the Monthly Treasury Statement.

All of this raises some very interesting questions about our overall economic system. If time permits I will publish a perspective on possible root causes of all of these deviations from our “free market” system.

Oil and Speculation - Again

2008-07-19T22:38:00.008-04:00

OK, more on speculation and oil prices. I have followed Paul Krugman’s reasoning for a while on the oil price/speculation issue. His reasoning is very solid and at first blush seemed unassailable to me. His basic model on spot and future prices can be found here and I think is really worth a read. To give a brief summary, the logic is that if excessive speculation in the futures market was driving prices in the spot market there would be a couple of signatures we could observe. The first signature would be future prices that exceed spot prices (a condition called contango) providing the incentive for producers to withhold product from the market. Why deliver it today for $120/barrel when I can deliver it tomorrow for $125/barrel? Sell it tomorrow at a higher price rather than today at the lower price. (Note that holding current supply from the market would cause spot prices to increase and the aforementioned inventory build.) The other signature is that there should be a build in inventory as oil is held off of the market for delivery in the future. Neither of these signatures is evident in today’s market, however, so the conclusion is that speculation in the futures market is not impacting oil prices. To see this on his graph I have reproduced a modified version here.

The blue lines represent the original graphs (as drawn by me using crude tools). Expected appreciation is the curve on the left graph, and if future prices are expected to exceed spot then expected appreciation is positive (contango). If spot prices exceed future prices we get negative expected appreciation (backwardation). Equilibrium that determines the spot price is the intersection of expected appreciation and carrying costs. Looking at the blue lines, the typical argument that future prices are driving up current prices suggests there is excess supply (the supply being held off of the market). This would be the other signature – inventory build.

This model assumes, however, that supply is fixed. If I want to deliver less oil today, I must store the excess. What if instead producers are making output decisions that are influenced by future prices. Strong future prices at lower volumes of output would suggest less elastic demand, which in turn would suggest lower output for profit maximization. I illustrate this using the red lines. If the supply curve shifts to the left because of distortions caused by strong future demand, current output equals current demand and we are in backwardation at the same time spot prices are impacted by future prices. If strong future demand is impacting the output models of oil producers this model could explain why the signatures we would expect to see are absent. I have no particular experience with the oil industry and don’t know whether they set production based on models or based on maximum capacity. If they use supply and demand models, as I would suspect they do, then strong speculative demand for future delivery, particularly in the physical delivery market, could have a meaningful impact on spot prices through output model distortions. (I note that if in fact producers are setting output at lower levels than they otherwise would the lower level of supply could appear as a peak oil issue.)

All input welcome. I am not an expert on this topic and want to learn!

Oil and Speculators – Anecdotal Evidence

2008-07-15T12:24:00.001-04:00

There has been a lot of debate going on about whether or not speculation is driving up oil prices. I haven’t taken a position one way or the other. I am not an expert in the commodity markets and I have been impressed with the evidence on both sides of the argument. Paul Krugman has done some interesting analysis (see this post and follow-up posts throughout the month of June) on this issue ultimately arguing that speculation is not driving oil prices. He points to the lack of inventory build that would be present in a traditional speculative driven market resulting from owners holding product off the spot market to sell at higher future prices. On the other hand, some very smart investors and former regulators have been arguing that speculation has caused somewhere in the neighborhood of $50/barrel of the price increase in crude. Finally, there is the common sense issue. Financial markets fall apart, stocks and bonds become less attractive investments, the housing bubble bursts, and suddenly there is a sharp increase in the price of a commodity that just happens to be in a market that was partially deregulated several years ago. This last part sounds too familiar to me to be ignored.

Today, I was watching the testimony of Ben Bernanke before Congress when the subject of speculation in the energy markets was raised. It was clear that Congress is serious about passing some regulations to address margin requirements and possibly other issues in this market. Suddenly oil dropped $9.00 a barrel from around $145 to $136. That’s a 6% decline within minutes. Now, whether this price drop was caused by the congressional testimony or not is something I cannot determine. The CNBC commentators are saying the cause of the price drop is banks liquidating their energy positions to meet capital requirements. Isn’t that speculation? And look at this coincidence: the investment banks decided it was a good time to unwind their energy position right at the moment it became clear Congress is going to act on the issue of speculation in the oil markets. Do you believe in coincidences like these?

Rational economic arguments aside, the anecdotal evidence suggests that “speculation” is having a meaningful impact on oil prices.

What Caused The Credit Crisis?

2008-07-13T12:39:00.006-04:00

I have been following and writing about the credit crises for some time. Watching the stock prices of the financial companies plummet over the past few months has been painful if you own any of them. As I wrote in March I have been expecting this decline, but its acceleration in recent weeks has been breathtaking.

I have been reading a lot of commentary about what caused the credit crisis. Most recently I read the first section of “The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century” published by VoxEU.org. This is a collection of articles written by renowned economists addressing the credit crisis, and part one deals with the causes. Unless otherwise noted my references in this article to other writers refers to their article in this collection. There is a rather long list of suspects, but in my opinion the cause of the credit crisis was a failure of the regulators of the financial system to adequately protect it from systemic risks that they should have seen at the time. Determining why they failed under such circumstances should be the primary path of inquiry. This involves uncovering the reasons why, in the face of compelling evidence of a major financial storm in the making, financial regulators did nothing. The same can be said for Congress.

I believe there is plenty of blame to go around and there were many bad actors involved in generating loans that should never have been made. In one of my early articles I pointed the finger at many of these actors. But it is the job of regulators to monitor the financial system and prevent excessive, systemic credit problems and they failed to do so. When banks are lending people 100% of the value of a home, waiving income verification, and basing the borrowers ability to pay on a loan payment that is based on a temporary teaser rate there is abject foolishness in the market. This condition existed for at least two years while bank regulators and Congress looked on and did nothing. As if this wasn’t enough, at the same time there was obvious chicanery in the credit markets relating to housing we experienced a housing bubble of massive proportions. Regulators and Congress still did nothing, except that Congress and the President began to brag about home ownership rates.

Some commentators (see Tito Boeri and Luigi Guiso, pg 37) (see also Theodore Forstmann, “The Credit Crisis Is Going To Get Worse”, The Wall Street Journal Online Edition, July 5 2008) argue it was classic supply-push in the credit markets caused by excessive monetary easing from 2001 – 2004 that caused the stupidity that led to this crisis. I tend to agree that monetary policy has been too accommodative and is one of the root causes of the current crisis. However, we have always known that monetary policy easing increases risk taking so to blame this as the cause of the crisis misses the point.

Some argue that new innovations, such as CDOs, where not fully understood (see Guido Tabellini, pg 45). I find humor in this though I am not happy with the result. If we take a lot of crappy assets and put them together, will the resulting “diversified” pool of crappy assets have less risk? Well, when all the assets are correlated to the housing market and are the most sensitive to any price changes (subprime) then obviously all you have done is made a bigger pool of crap. Add to this the fact that history exists in the subprime lending world and it is not good. Where the assumptions came from underlying the ratings on CDOs is a mystery to anyone who has seen subprime lenders crash and burn. To say this was a failure of the statistical models is a nice way of saying the assumptions were wrong and upon further inspection this should have been obvious. Statistical complexity aside, what happened to common sense? Isn’t this where the regulators are supposed to come in? When the market is doing things that are clearly high risk and in large magnitude? Where were they?

Some argue it was the rating agency conflicts that enabled this debacle to occur. I agree this was a contributing factor, but Congress and the regulators knew this problem existed since, at the latest, 2002 when it was presented to Congress in testimony relating to the Enron bankruptcy by Frank Partnoy (see part II. D). There were very clear and explicit warnings that this type of crisis was waiting to happen yet Congress and the regulators turned a blind eye.

Some argue that it is the over reliance on statistical modeling that led to this crisis (see Jon Danielsson pg. 13). The lack of backtesting data for those once in 100 years events meant that the science was flawed. In addition, the correlations are all wrong when everyone acts the same way at the same time (the heard). I buy this argument, but what I don’t buy is the argument that the regulators were fooled by all of this. This was clearly a movement to allow financial institutions to self regulate using their own internally developed models. Whether this was politically driven or truly a belief among regulators that this was a better way I do not know, but it takes a lot of the burden off regulators to monitor and regulate! Now regulators are calling for additional powers. I ask, where were they when this crisis developed?

I actually know part of the answer to my last question. One thing the regulators were working on was providing the financial system with large amounts of leverage that would ultimately be at the root of the liquidity part of this crisis. In 2004 regulators codified banks’ use of off balance sheet entities, those SIVs and asset-backed commercial paper conduits that leapt onto the front pages last Fall, with minimal regulatory capital requirements. At the same time there were regulatory changes for the investment banks that have been referred to as the “Bear Stearns Future Insolvency Act of 2004”. With respect to the banks, the result is easily discernible from the graph above. Asset-backed commercial paper outstanding skyrocketed as banks utilized their newly codified leverage structure to take on the CDOs and other securities where the true risk of all this absurd lending was being hidden. Especially notable here is the absence of the SEC. These securities that were being rated and issued were, apparently, not understood by anyone. By extension, they were not understood by the SEC – isn’t that part of its job? Unfortunately, when investors discovered that there was excessive risk in these vehicles they stopped purchasing the commercial paper that funded them. The result was a severe liquidity crisis as the banks had to honor lines of credit they provided to these entities securing the repayment of commercial paper under just these circumstances. The Federal Reserve has received great admiration for its creative tonics when this crisis broke out, but I believe that is like honoring a firefighter for extinguishing a very dangerous fire that the firefighter ignited in the first place. I can’t finish this part of my rant without pointing out a couple of issues here. First, a crisis in the commercial paper market would certainly present a systemic risk to the financial system if all the banks had credit lines backing their $1.2 trillion in asset-backed commercial paper. Given this fact, together with the knowledge from Enron that off balance sheet treatment does not eliminate risk but increases risk taking, how did the bank regulators determine that is was 10 times safer to fund assets this way than the traditional method of holding them on a bank’s balance sheet? This seems like an extraordinary conclusion, extraordinarily wrong headed.

Of course the current crisis is well beyond a mere liquidity event. The off balance sheet leverage combined with excessive monetary easing provided much too much liquidity to the markets, and the resulting stupidity in the credit world will ultimately cost institutions their solvency. As of this writing Bear Stearns no longer exists (although the taxpayers now own $29 billion (and falling) of mortgage-backed securities that Chase didn’t want while the shareholders walked with cash) and the FDIC has seized IndyMac, a large bank with extensive mortgage operations. I don’t believe this will be the last, and taxpayers will be paying for this debacle for years to come.

So what caused this crisis? Those responsible for ensuring a sound financial system failed, plain and simple. Regulators and Congress are to blame as they were well aware of the risks of rating agency conflicts, off balance sheet financing and excessive leverage yet they turned a blind eye when it came to the financial sector. The fact that rating agency conflicts and other abuses by Wall Street and others played a role does not change the fact that those responsible for regulating these activities failed. In fact, these issues should have made the regulators even more watchful in light of the fact that they were warned of rating agency conflicts that go to the heart of the regulatory system they set up.

In hindsight all of this looks obvious, and what is obvious in hindsight is not always so clear at the time. Perhaps it was not so obvious to regulators or Congress at the time. But why didn’t they figure it out? These are the best and brightest in the field and it is their job to figure this out and monitor and protect the financial system. What forces were at play such that this set of events could be set in motion and play out without any reaction from the Fed or Congress? Perhaps there is something structurally wrong with having the Fed involved in bank regulation at the same time it is responsible for monetary policy. Perhaps there is an issue with the appointment of regulators such that a given administration’s policies become too pervasive. Perhaps too many key people in the regulatory authorities come from the very institutions they are there to regulate or get jobs at those institutions when they leave. Perhaps the financial industry has too much influence in Congress and it is the broken political system where money buys influence that caused the credit crisis. In my opinion these are the fundamental issues raised by the credit crisis and I believe they should get more attention than they are getting now. I also believe that these very same regulators should not be setting the agenda for the new regulatory regime that will follow this crisis, but as of now they are.

California v. Countrywide

2008-06-25T23:14:00.003-04:00

Let the fun begin! I found this link to the draft complaint filed by California against Countrywide and its executives for deceptive practices in the mortgage market. California charges that Countrywide AND some of its executives knowingly used deceptive practices to lure customers into taking on riskier mortgages than they needed or could afford in order to increase the profit Countrywide made selling these mortgages into the securitization market. The complaint makes for interesting reading (to nerds like me). I like the fact that it provides examples of some of the loan payments and how the negative amortization features work.

By the way, flying through Congress is a plan to authorize FHA to guarantee refinancing of $300 billion of mostly subprime loans. Of course, the taxpayers stand behind FHA guarantees, so get ready to dig into your pocket to pay off the banks and investors who own the kind of bad loans described in the complaint. According to this Washington Post Report portions of this plan were submitted by Bank of America. Bank of America is set to purchase Countrywide and reportedly has the largest portfolio of mortgage securities of any of the major banks (call me a conspiracy theorist). I don’t always agree with WSJ Editorials, but if you take the political finger pointing out of this one it pretty much hits the mark. Here’s more from tomorrow’s WSJ. I reviewed this legislation last month and wrote a more detailed analysis here.

So far the Federal Reserve has advanced some $400-450 billion to banks and investment banks secured by mortgage securities (we believe but can't verify), FHA is already well into refinancing many bad loans and looks to be getting authorization for an additional $300 billion, and the Federal Home Loan Banks (funded through taxpayer guaranteed bonds) have advanced over $250 billion to banks for mortgages, all since this broke out last year. That’s $1 trillion, and that’s without counting any possible exposure to the largest mortgage companies we have, the government sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or the impact of negative real interest rates from the Federal Reserve (again). To put the $1 trillion into perspective, it is about 7% of our GDP and about 11% of our entire national debt. It’s a lot of money.

I hope the summer is treating you well!

Sheriff John Green

2008-06-06T00:51:00.002-04:00

I was reading this article in today’s Wall Street Journal, Online Edition and was struck by some of the conflicting messages it highlights for many. I am a student of financial markets and to some extend the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”), so I have a certain perspective on the whole subprime mortgage debacle that is no secret to anyone reading my column. I object to bailouts, whether it be for homeowners or Wall Street, and I have been writing that opinion since last October when I first started publishing my blog. But this article got me thinking about these Philadelphia residents who are being evicted from their homes because they can’t pay their mortgages. Circumstances have now changed, and they have changed because the Fed, no doubt with the blessing of Treasury, has bailed out Wall Street. (For more on this there is another article in today’s Wall Street Journal Online expressing one Federal Reserve Bank President’s concerns about the Fed’s recent actions and the market distortions that can be expected as a result.)

Admittedly bailing out Wall Street is good, in some ways, for everyone as it lessens the risk of a major economic blowup. But tell that to a resident in Philadelphia being evicted from their home who can understandably be thinking “they can bail out those Wall Street executives and their customers but they can’t help me?” Enter the Sheriff, John Green:

Sheriff John Green has spent 37 years in law enforcement. But these days he's best known around town for the law he won't enforce.

With the economy soft and thousands of Philadelphians delinquent on their mortgages, Sheriff Green this spring refused to hold a court-ordered foreclosure auction. His move raised eyebrows on the bench and dropped jaws among lenders and their attorneys, who accuse him of shirking his duty to enforce legal contracts….

Mortgage lenders, servicers and their attorneys thought Mr. Green was acting more Robin Hood than sheriff. "It's not his job to postpone things in favor of certain people," says Michael VanBuskirk, a Philadelphia attorney, who describes the city as a "legal free-fire zone." The city, he says, is "less attractive to business if you can't be certain that the sheriff won't invalidate a contract."

Fed policies to help rescue Wall Street firms have created distortions that have hurt many innocent bystanders in this debacle as savings rates plummet and inflation increases. In fact, the inflation in food and energy prices caused in large measure by negative real interest rates is likely a direct cause of many of the foreclosures as those consumers most at risk can no longer afford to pay all of their bills. So in keeping real interest rates negative to rescue the financial industry Fed policies are hurting many of those who would be hurt in a larger financial collapse anyway and the impact is falling disproportionately to the most vulnerable among us. To hear mortgage lenders now object to the Sheriff’s actions because they favor one group over another is, in my opinion, entertaining at best. In my view, looking to the public policy issues behind this story presents a very different picture than a simple issue of contract law.

I believe we are witnessing the spread of the bailout mentality that has been established by the Fed (and sanctioned by the Administration) in favor of Wall Street. Regardless of the ultimate consequences of allowing major Wall Street firms to fail, the general public will understandably view these actions as favoring those on Wall Street as opposed to them. Let’s do a thought experiment. The first part is to ask: “Why is it good for the Fed to bail out these Wall Street firms by providing credit at taxpayer risk?” The answer, of course, is that to do so will help avoid an economic collapse that would hurt everyone. The second part is to ask: “Why should the Sheriff refuse to sell foreclosed homes at auction?” The answer, of course, is that doing so helps avoid an economic collapse of the neighborhoods involved that would hurt everyone. So, is the Sheriff acting like Robin Hood or following the example set by the Fed? In the eyes of those on the ground I think taking the latter view is easily comprehensible.

The distortions caused by the Fed’s bailout of years of negligent lending activities by Wall Street and all of its subsidiary tentacles has set the stage for redistribution fights such as this one, and I don’t know how you put this genie back in the bottle. So at the end of this piece I have an unanswered question: Is the creativity demonstrated by Mr. Bernanke, with the certain blessings of Mr. Paulson, good for our society in the long run or just another example of how being too creative (ever heard of a CDO squared?) can really mess things up?

Oil and Wall Street

2008-06-04T04:12:00.003-04:00

I am in Seoul, South Korea on a teaching assignment. I have been here for a week and will be here for another. I haven’t had time to write anything useful, even though there is so much going on. Seoul is a great city and the people I meet here are very warm and kind. I also admire their willingness to stand up in protest as tens of thousands did last weekend in objection to the lifting of the import ban on US beef (which has now been delayed).

Although I don’t have time to write an analysis I wanted to publish a couple of links regarding the impact of speculation in the commodity markets on oil prices. There have been several hearings going on, and some hedge fund managers and others seem to be speaking out against certain trading strategies and deregulation dating back to Enron that could be causing significant upward pressure on energy prices. Here is a link to Michael Greenberger’s Congressional Testimony from this morning that I found stunning. He appeared today before the Senate Commerce Committee together with the well known hedge fund manager George Soros and others. It is not the easiest testimony to read but if you have 10 minutes I highly recommend you give it a go. You don’t need to follow all of the statutory references or read the entire document to get the drift of what he is saying so you can skip a lot of the detail and still get the message. Here is another link to some Congressional testimony by Michael Masters, a hedge fund manager, from May 20, 2008 that I think is also worth a read.

In a nutshell, some informed people believe that a large portion of the run-up in oil prices is a Wall Street phenomenon and federal regulators are simply looking the other way as US consumers are being separated from their savings. If Mr. Greenberger is correct then I believe this is an outrage of gigantic proportions and another monumental regulatory failure by our government. I hope our elected officials get to the bottom of this one quickly either way because the thought of paying $5.00 a gallon for heating oil next winter is bad enough, but to pay that much so that some investors can earn a nice return really twists my insides.

Hope for Homeowners Act of 2008

2008-05-21T13:01:00.004-04:00

I have reviewed portions of the Committee Print of the proposed GSE bill (the “Bill”) that came out of The U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (the “Senate Banking Committee”)as announced by the Senate Banking Committee on May 19, 2008. In particular, I have read Secs. 401-403 of the Bill titled “Hope For Homeowners Act of 2008.” I believe this Bill is a recipe for disaster and likely the next big target of fraud against taxpayers. First, I will attempt to summarize how this plan works, and then I will comment on it based on my interpretations and opinions.

How it works (if passed as is):
This plan authorizes FHA to provide guarantees for mortgages up to an aggregate of $300 billion. These mortgages get packaged and sold through the Government National Mortgage Association, or GNMA, and the securities sold by GNMA are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States (and that means the taxpayers).

Who can borrow under the plan:
These loans will only be made to borrowers who “provide a certification to the Secretary [of FHA] that the mortgagor has not intentionally defaulted on the eligible mortgage” and the current borrower debt to income ratio must be GREATER THAN 31 percent! So, we are talking about people who cannot pay their mortgages because they have too much mortgage debt relative to their income (I note that the Bill states “mortgage debt to income” as the ratio, but I am assuming it means to say “mortgage debt service to income” as a total mortgage debt to income ratio of 31% would make no sense in this context). Bill Sec. 402(e) The penalty for falsely stating that you did not intentionally default on your mortgage can be steep, including fines and prison time (how one proves this and what it means is beyond me – if one intentionally buys food instead of paying the mortgage is this an intentional default?)

How is this a bailout for investors?
Once a borrower is qualified, they can borrow up to 90% of the appraised value of the home to refinance their existing mortgage, assuming the mortgage holders (including the holders of the first mortgage and all subordinate loans) agree(s) to a full satisfaction of all of the borrowers obligations from the proceeds of the new loan. So if this is a better deal for the mortgage investor than foreclosing on the property and realizing larger losses, the investor should buy into the refinance. That’s where the bailout comes in – investors would be liquidating their positions at favorable recoveries based on taxpayer guarantees. In order to protect taxpayers, the Bill provides that the appraisal must not be influenced by an interested party (curiously there are no stated penalties for a breach of this requirement and no absolute limitation on using related parties). There is also an insurance fund to back these loans before taxpayers would be on the hook.

The insurance is provided through a new insurance fund, the Home Ownership Preservation Entity Fund, to be used by FHA to carry out its mission that states, in part, “to allow homeowners to avoid foreclosure by reducing the principal balance outstanding, and interest rate charged, on their mortgages…” Bill Sec. 402(b)(2) The fund is funded through an initial payment of 3% of each loan amount, paid from the proceeds of the loan, plus an annual premium of 1.5% of the remaining principal balance of each loan. Bill Sec. 402(i) Now I admit that I am not a mathematician and have not constructed a detailed quantitative model to figure out the risk that this fund will be insufficient to cover losses. I do, however, have serious doubts that this fund will support losses from these loans and I believe it is likely taxpayers will eventually be on the hook.

I wonder how the premium rate of 3% plus an annual 1.5% of non-defaulted loans plus a share of a share of future equity appreciation compares to default rates on refinanced defaulted loans? I don’t think the data exists to make this calculation, but I could be wrong about that. Even if they do, however, I wonder how any assumptions regarding default rates hold up when this plan is full of incentives for abuse by almost everyone involved:

1) FHA - FHA wants to show results and will actively try to guaranty a lot of loans. Unfortunately, as discussed in this Congressional testimony, there is already serious concern about FHA’s ability to manage its existing portfolio, let alone a huge new program like this one. That means quantity over quality – a recipe for trouble in any lending business. One other point I would like to mention is that back in December I wrote about a plan to reform the FHA. In that piece I linked to the website of the Senate Banking Committee for a copy of congressional testimony by Basil Petrou from Federal Financial Analytics that discussed many weaknesses of the plan and the FHA. That link has been taken down, and I have had to replace it with a link to the Federal Financial Analytics website. Curious. If you are interested you can now find that testimony here.

2) INVESTORS - Existing lenders want out of their bad loans and that provides incentive to push borrowers into this program thereby limiting their losses. Again we have the quantity over quality problem.

3) APPRAISERS – Appraisers are under pressure from their clients, lenders, because they appraised so many properties for too high a value. These appraisers have a strong incentive to help the lenders exit these loans at the highest possible recovery, and that means highest appraisal.

4) HOMEOWNERS - Homeowners love this even if they don’t plan to stay in the house. If you are a homeowner with two mortgages, default notices, foreclosure threats, and all of your other personal assets at risk because you are under water, would you love to get one of these loans and make all of those problems go away? The trade-off for making it all go away is being obligated for one loan that’s guaranteed by the taxpayers. Sounds like a nice value proposition for the homeowner to me. In furtherance of this perverted incentive structure, the Bill provides that any equity in the home that is realized through a later refinance or sale is shared between the homeowner and the FHA (a portion of which, if applicable, is for distribution to any subordinated mortgage holder who took a loss). If the home is sold or refinanced in the first year any appreciation goes to FHA, in the second year 90%, third year 80%, and so on to 50% after five years and forever thereafter. So, refinance with FHA at no cost or very little cost, get all of the lenders off your back, then walk away from one loan guaranteed by the taxpayers leaving them with the problem.

Lets review. What the Bill proposes is to find mortgage borrowers who cannot afford their mortgage payments and are in default. Then, an appraisal is secured through an appraiser (the same group that got values completely wrong the last time around and are likely conflicted because of their relationships with lenders). The FHA then guarantees a loan to refinance the existing mortgages up to 90% of the appraised value. All parties have incentives to do these transactions that are unrelated to the resulting credit quality. In fact, the worse the credit quality is the greater the incentive for the investor/appraiser and the homeowner to participate. Then, once the FHA is on the hook, the homeowner is given the disincentive to remain in the house because under the best of circumstances they will realize only 50% of any future equity appreciation in the home. Under these circumstances is 3% plus a share of a share of future appreciation plus 1.5% per year (on loans that do not default) enough to cover the losses on this impending portfolio? I, for one, am not convinced that it is. Of course I could be wrong and this plan could turn out to be a great idea, but I see too many conflicts and perverse incentives in the current draft to believe this plan will actually work to the benefit of taxpayers. Instead, I see too much opportunity and incentive for quick transfers of bad loans from investors to taxpayers under the inadequate supervision of FHA and, as a taxpayer, that concerns me.

[There are other issues with the Bill that, for the most part, are left to FHA to figure out. For example, does a home improvement add to the homeowner’s equity or is the value added by improvements shared as future equity? The Bill also describes future equity in a very strange way: “any equity created as a direct result of such sale or refinance”. I suppose you can consider a sale the creation of equity although that is arguable. I certainly do not see how equity is “created” through a refinance. Another issue is that the Bill provides for refinancing up to an amount not exceeding 132 percent of the old conforming loan amount – in other words jumbo loans.]

Understanding the Inflation Report

2008-05-14T12:19:00.003-04:00

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported today that inflation was contained in April, with prices rising only .2% (this would be about 2.4% on an annualized basis). This was welcome news for the equity markets that responded positively to the report. Sounds good, except we have the usual adjustments and assumptions built into how this number is calculated. The biggest standout in this report is Transportation, which is down by .7 percent in April. Lets take a look at this category to try and understand how these numbers work.

Here is the report’s discussion of why Transportation prices fell by .7% in April:

The transportation index declined 0.7 percent in April, reflecting a 2.0 percent decrease in the index for gasoline. The index for new vehicles declined 0.2 percent and was 1.3 percent lower than in April 2007. The index for used cars and trucks declined 0.3 percent in April, but was 1.8 percent higher than a year ago. The index for public transportation declined 0.4 percent in April, reflecting a 0.5 percent decrease in the index for airline fares. (Prior to seasonal adjustment, airline fares rose 0.9 percent and were 10.1 percent higher than a year ago.) (Gasoline prices rose 5.6 percent in April. Compared to a year ago, these prices were up 20.9 percent. Gasoline prices increase seasonally during the first five months of the year, with the largest increases occurring in March and April and decline seasonally for the remainder of the year).

Taking a closer look at this part of the report, it states that the gasoline price index is down 2 percent in April. This would probably surprise most drivers. In fact, gasoline prices were up 5.6 percent in the month, so how can they be down 2 percent? Well, the government expects gasoline prices to go up 7 percent in April as people drive more, and then go down later in the year as people drive less. Because prices only rose 5 percent, the seasonally adjusted price index fell 2 percent. This assumes that gas prices will, as the report states, decline seasonally from June through December. We know, however, that oil prices have risen for future delivery and gasoline prices are expected to go up, not down. Based on the seasonal adjustment figures, prices should go up about 3.5 percent in May, then drop for the rest of the year. So should the gasoline number be seasonally adjusted downward by 5.7 % even though oil futures are up? I suppose what that means is that future inflation numbers will be worse.

The next subcategory is new vehicles. According to the report new car prices fell .2 percent (the seasonal adjustment for this category is .22 percent, so prices must have fallen by approximately .4 percent). This is interesting, especially when Toyota just announced price increases for their new vehicles in the U.S. These increases will reportedly become effective later in May, so this price decline will likely also reverse next month or in June. That’s bad news because based on the seasonal adjustments, car prices are supposed to go down .32 percent in May and .33 percent in June, so once adjusted this category could look even worse.

The drop in the price of used cars and trucks is not surprising given that we are in the midst of a shift to more fuel efficient vehicles. Used vehicles, which would tend to be high fuel consumption vehicles, are declining in value. If a person goes to buy a new car, don’t they usually trade in the old one? So if the value of the old one declined, the actual cost of a new car, on a net basis, has not declined by .2 percent because the buyer will get less credit for the trade-in. So this is good news for used car buyers but not as good for people who buy new cars.

Finally, airline fares declined! That’s news to me. Before seasonal adjustments they were up .9 percent. So if the reported number fell .4 percent, we know the expected seasonal rise must have been 1.3 percent (there are rounding issues – the actual adjustment is 1.44 percent). Because they rose only .9 percent, on a seasonally adjusted basis they were down .4 percent! What about the fact that the Easter holiday was in March this year but April last year? The seasonal adjustment is down a bit from last year, from 1.95 percent to 1.44 percent, but so is the March adjustment, from 1.23 percent to 0.97 percent. These changes do not reflect adjustment for this point as far as I can tell. Airline prices may reflect this increasing a seasonally adjusted 3% in March and decreasing a seasonally adjusted .4 percent in April.

Seasonal adjustments do make sense to me on a normal ongoing basis, but when we have better information (such as futures prices for oil) perhaps we should take that information into account. Then again, there is a lot to be said for consistency, so making adjustments to adjustments may not be such a great idea. Finding the real story, however, requires work.

In the unlikely event that you would like to look at other categories in this way you can find a lot of information at the BLS. The way to do it is look at the seasonal adjustment table for 2008. The expected change is the percentage change in any given category from one month to the next. If you get a 1 percent increase, then an actual increase of 1% will be reported as a zero percent increase. If you are a statistician and want to get into the calculation of the seasonal adjustments you can start with this report.

Subprime and the Bush Administration

2008-05-03T10:34:00.004-04:00

What did the Bush Administration have to do with the credit crisis? I keep hearing people say that a president does not have very much influence on the economy and they are given too much of the credit or blame when the economy fluctuates. I disagree for two reasons. The first is that fiscal policies can have a rather dramatic and immediate impact on economic activity as the President is making clear today by touting the fiscal stimulus plan. Tax cuts and government spending certainly impact the economy in a direct and timely way. The other reason is the general regulatory oversight that each administration is responsible for. For example, who heads the SEC and what are the priorities given it by the administration? What about the Treasury Department? I believe these policies have a direct impact on economic activity and are responsible for a lot of the fluctuation in the economy as well as income distribution from one administration to another. Here is an example.

As hedge fund investor David Einhorn laid out in his recent remarks, ”Private Profits and Socialized Risk” the SEC, under the Bush Administration, altered the capital requirements for broker-dealers. Einhorn concludes that the result was a lower capital requirement leading to higher leverage. The higher leverage, as we know, leads to higher risk and that higher risk culminated with the failure of Bear Stearns. So, is this why we have the credit crisis? Wait, there’s more.

The SEC regulations applied to the broker-dealer world. What about the commercial banks? What have they got to do with all of this? Well, as I wrote about last October, the rules regarding commercial bank capital requirements were also altered back in 2004 through rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve and Treasury as regulators of the commercial banking system. In effect, these rules said to banks they could move loans and other assets from their balance sheets to off-balance sheet conduits and reduce their capital requirements. Banks love this because it allows them to – guess what – leverage! They set up something called a conduit that purchases assets from the bank and/or a bank customer. The conduit gets the money for the purchase by issuing securities, like commercial paper. The rating agencies rate the commercial paper based, in part, on the fact that the bank typically provides a line of credit to the conduit so that if the commercial paper market dries up the conduit can borrow to repay maturing commercial paper. This is a very general description and these structures can get very complex, but this is the basic idea. So how does this increase leverage? The rules promulgated in 2004 established that under this structure banks could provide these credit lines to back these conduits but hold only 10% of the risk based capital they would hold against the same assets if they were on the bank’s balance sheet. You can find the announcement of the rules here. So, using this structure, banks can leverage their capital in multiples. Eureka – a way to get around the sound banking principals established by the regulatory framework over the past 90 years! The regulators behind these rules included the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Treasury), The Federal Reserve System, The Office of Thrift Supervision (Treasury), and The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Lets review. According to Mr. Einhorn, in 2004 the SEC relaxed capital rules for broker dealers, placing more of the regulatory requirements in the hands of the banks and allowing them to use more leverage than before. In the very same year the Federal Reserve and Treasury codified the rules that permitted commercial banks to leverage through off-balance sheet entities. (In case you were wondering, Congress had hearings on many of these issues as well.) All of this turned out to be extremely profitable for the banks, brokers, and rating agencies.

Suddenly, there is an incredible credit bubble that begins with loans and ends up as securities in the portfolios of, among others, the investment banks, banks, and off-balance sheet bank sponsored conduits. I wonder if there is a link between these events? Now, to be fair, the credit bubble began a little before these regulatory changes. But these changes must have accommodated a huge demand that was unsustainable. The graph accompanying this post illustrates the credit bubble I am referring to.

What really caps all of this off is the cries from many of these agency heads now about what should be done to fix this mess. For example, Sheila Bair, head of The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, has been calling for months for a bailout of subprime borrowers. First, back in October, she called for a freeze on interest rates for those who had adjustable rate subprime mortgages. She is now lobbying for loan modifications to reduce principal for those subprime borrowers whose mortgages exceed their property values. From her recent comments before Congress

Permanently forgiving part of the principal amount can provide a better financial result for investors than foreclosure by creating long-term, sustainable solutions that will allow borrowers to stay in their homes. This approach also has the added benefit of limiting the overall adverse affect of declining property values on communities.

In closing, Ms. Bair states

Congress, the SEC, the Treasury Department, as well as federal bank regulators have expended considerable time and effort to assure that the industry has authority under tax and accounting rules to modify loans proactively. The industry needs to demonstrate greater commitment to using those authorities.

They should be expending all the time they possibly can and they should never mention it because these agencies are collectively, in my opinion, among the most culpable groups in this entire debacle.

To be fair to Ms. Bair, she was appointed to head the FDIC in 2006, after these regulatory changes. She was, however, on the FDIC’s Advisory Committee on Banking Policy. Donald Powell was FDIC Chairman in 2004, John Snow was Secretary of the Treasury, William Donaldson was Chairman of the SEC, and our old friend Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Who appointed these people?

Some Hidden Costs of the Credit Crisis

2008-04-27T17:45:00.007-04:00

The Federal Reserve (the Fed) is likely causing dramatic distortions in the markets by lowering interest rates below the level of inflation and the impact may only be evident in retrospect. One side effect of the Fed's actions is a massive shift of the costs associated with the credit crisis from borrowers to savers. While negative real interest rates are helping some homeowners keep their payments down they are also fueling inflation resulting in a tremendous loss in value to those who have saved for retirement. Artificially low interest rates are also causing pain for those living on a fixed income through both inflation and loss of investment earnings. Here are a couple of hypothetical situations based on real stories I am hearing from friends and relatives to illustrate these distortions I am referring to.

The first story is about a hard working middle-class family headed by Dick and Jane. Dick and Jane grew up in the 1950s and 1960s. They have worked full time for almost 40 years, raised a family, a dog and several cats, and have been preparing to retire. They have contributed to Social Security from every paycheck they have ever received, and have been frugal and lucky enough to put aside some money for retirement. They purchased their home 30 years ago and have paid off the mortgage through 360 consecutive monthly payments of principal plus interest. Everything was going along according to plan until, suddenly and without warning, the earnings on their investments began to plummet.

They couldn’t understand what was happening at first. Because they were getting close to retirement they had allocated much of their portfolio to fixed income investments, and some of those were falling in value at the same time they could not get more than a 3% return on CDs and Treasury securities. They went to their bank to get advise and were told that because the Federal Reserve had lowered interest rates safe investments were yielding very low returns. They took out their calculator and figured that if inflation is around 4% and the real interest rate is 2.5%, they should be earning 6.5% on a risk free investment. Instead they are being offered 2.5% on a CD, so the cost to them is 4%. Based on their retirement portfolio of $750,000 they are losing $30,000 per year! Even if they can get a 3.5% return the cost is still $22,500 per year. But that’s not all. If we believe that these low interest rates are also causing inflation in basic goods such as energy and food, the value of their retirement savings is declining. Where $750,000 may have been enough based on all reasonable forecasts just a year or so ago, now it is not enough because of the cost of living increases.

Confused and angry, Dick and Jane reconcile to the fact that they will likely not be retiring as planned unless they cut back dramatically and save as much as possible. They will delay any major expenditure until absolutely necessary, and because of inflation they have less to save. The $1,100 fuel oil bill drove this point home last week. A portion of their retirement has disappeared through no fault of theirs, and they wonder why. Why is it that with inflation getting worse interest rates are going down? Shouldn’t it be the other way around?

The second story is about Cathleen, a neighbor of Dick and Jane. She retired from her clerical position ten years ago. Her husband passed away several years back and she now lives on Social Security and the income from the $250,000 portfolio of treasury securities, money market accounts, and CDs left from their lifetime savings and her husband’s live insurance. She can’t understand what is happening, but for the first time since retirement she must liquidate some of her retirement portfolio to pay all of her bills. Her Social Security income of $1,500 per month doesn’t come close to covering all of her expenses so she has relied on the interest from her portfolio for the rest. Last year her interest income was $13,750, giving her total income with social security of $31,750. This year her interest income was $8,750 giving her total income of only $26,750. Adding the rising costs of her medications, property taxes, food and energy she is for the first time concerned that she could run out of money. She wonders why, and she has decided she must cut back to only the necessary expenditures.

While lower interest rates are helping some homeowners with adjustable rate mortgages they are hurting savers and those living on a fixed income. Inflation also harms savers but benefits borrowers. At the same time, as between the average savers and the average adjustable rate mortgage borrowers it is the latter who have more culpability for the crisis in the first place. It is clear that the American people are paying the price of this credit crisis one way or another, and the question at hand is whether the distortions resulting from the remedy are making things better or worse as the burden is shifted from borrowers to savers?

There are at least three reasons for the Fed to be lowering rates right now. Let’s take a look at each of the primary reasons for the Fed to be lowering interest rates.

The first reason to lower interest rates when the economy is soft is referred to as the wealth effect. When interest rates are lower asset values tend to be higher. If mortgage payments are lower house prices can be higher because it is more affordable based on the payments. This applies to financial assets as well. As interest rates fall, in general, the value of financial assets rise. In practice, this effect makes people feel better off because their assets are worth more and this is good for the economy because when people feel wealthier they tend to spend more. This sounds great, but there is dark side.

When inflation becomes a problem rising asset values tend to be offset by rising costs. While keeping interest rates depressed may help support the value of certain assets it is also fueling inflation, and the inflation is countering the wealth effect. Low interest rates don’t always spark inflation, but in the current global economic situation commodity prices are rising dramatically and inflation is becoming a real issue. Lower interest rates in the US hurts the value of the dollar and sparks price increases in dollar denominated commodity prices. Anyone who goes to the grocery store or drives a car or heats a home knows that inflation is a rising problem today. So assuming low interest rates are in fact supporting asset prices the resulting inflation could be countering the impact because real values (adjusted for inflation) are not changing or are, perhaps, even falling. Is the wealth effect of lower interest rates working this time? I question its efficacy under current conditions when real interest rates are negative AND we have supply shocks in energy, food, and metals all at the same time.

The second intended effect of lowering interest rates is to spur business investment by making it less expensive for businesses to borrow and invest. This should also lead to increased employment as businesses hire more workers. Before businesses invest, however, they must believe that consumers will consume. Helping to keep mortgage payments down for a portion of the population will certainly help consumer sentiment, as will the resulting benefit of slower price depreciation in housing. But there is also a downside to consumers of low interest rates and the inflation we are now seeing. The retirement savings of the baby boom population are losing value to inflation, while at the same time low interest rates are cutting into the income of those living on their savings. The loss of real savings and real income (from both depressed interest rates and the impact of inflation) to the population of savers and spenders is likely to have a negative impact on consumption, especially as those close to retirement increase savings and those in retirement are forced to cut back on spending. This, in turn, could offset the positive impact of low interest rates on consumer sentiment. Consumers also have more debt as a percent of their personal income now than at any time in the past several decades and probably need time to pay it down rather than consume more. So will lower interest rates spur investment under these circumstances or simply prolong the reckoning while causing a very troubling inflationary spiral? There is certainly room to question the efficacy of further rate cuts on business investment in the current economic climate.

The third reason for lowering interest rates right now is to help rescue the financial industry in the US and prevent a collapse of the financial system. A major meltdown of the financial industry would certainly be a problem that would have a negative impact on all of us because it could result in a severe recession or even a depression. If the banking system becomes insolvent (meaning the banks do not have capital and cannot make loans) then anything people purchase on credit could suddenly experience dramatic reductions in demand, while at the same time businesses would find it very difficult to obtain funds for investment. When things get really bad you get deflation because there is simply not enough demand for anything to keep prices from falling. This may sound OK at first but in fact it is worse than inflation in many ways. Who will lend you money to buy a house if the value of the house is expected to decline next year? The same logic holds for a car or any other major purchase. Imagine your mortgage payment staying the same while your home value and wages drop – that’s deflation and it can spiral down the same way inflation can spiral up. At the same time unemployment would rise dramatically because businesses facing falling demand and lack of funds for investment would be laying off workers. This is certainly a situation to be avoided. So how does lowering interest rates help us lower the risk of this happening? Aside from the wealth effect and business investment helping the economy stay afloat, the lower interest rates help to support the value of assets on banks’ balance sheets (remember these are interest bearing financial assets). That means fewer write downs and, in turn, lower losses and more capital. The low interest rates also reflect banks’ cost of obtaining funds to lend, and when their costs go way down their profits can go up. More profit means more capital and more incentive to lend. So lowering interest rates helps the banks to preserve and add to their capital helping to lower the risk of financial system insolvency. Of course, if this is truly the reason for lowering interest rates right now one must wonder why banks continue to pay dividends to investors. If they are under-capitalized that should be the first place they go for capital preservation, not to the policies of the Fed. This is especially true when the Fed policies are creating distortions in the market and may not be helping to support the economy for reasons discussed above. If the financial system is in fact under-capitalized perhaps the Fed should be reaching back into its bag of tricks and figuring out another way to add capital to the banking system.

Fear or Greed (today)?

2008-03-30T13:07:00.003-04:00

This is a very non-analytical discussion of how I have been feeling about the markets. Sometimes I sit down and do research. You know, go and get actual numbers from reliable sources and analyze what they say. Other times I just think about the general news and events and work to a conclusion based on the “how it feels” method. I have had some successes and failures using both methods. This piece is about the current state of my “how it feels” method. This can change with one news story because fear and greed are very powerful impulses.

Most professionals will tell you to pick good companies and invest for the long term. That’s probably great advice, but I don’t want to see my net worth collapse with the market, even if it is temporary. So I try to keep up with what’s going on in the markets and react accordingly. I find it exciting to watch the financial news each day as the stock market gyrates between hope (greed) and fear. Up 400 on the DOW one day, down 300 the next. Listening to the traders on money shows is interesting as they banter about their proposals for moneymaking trades. Take this position today, then get out and take that one next week. I wonder how many non-professional stock traders, common folk like me, actually trade like this? When watching CNBC one needs to remember whether one is a trader or an investor. Fast Money, Mad Money, buybuybuy – sellsellsell. “Start buying the financials because they haven’t been this cheep in decades”. I have been hearing that for months while they continue to decline. If I had a share of JPM for every time I heard that…. It seems no one wants to think about the lost revenue sources for the financials. All they talk about is write-downs – when will the write-downs be over. But when the write-downs are over, then what? How much of that precious fee income from the originate-and-distribute model will be coming back on line in the near future? How can they replace it with net interest income if they are short capital from the write-downs? What about fees from off-balance sheet commercial paper entities? What about the smaller regional banks that financed local real estate developers? Is now really the time to be buying financials with all of these unanswered questions? Not in my book, but I am a very nervous type of investor. I thought it was time to buy the financials in 2002 or thereabout when I purchased some JPM. I did pretty well with it and sold it in February 2007 because I got nervous. Sometimes it’s good to be nervous. I think there will be a time to get back in, especially JPM and perhaps BAC, but for me there are too many questions right now. In fact, there are so many questions that I went, and still am, short the financials in general. I may get burned, but I think it is a better play right now than going long financials. So far gains from this position have offset losses from long positions I have, so taking this position helps to hedge my little portfolio.

What is going on in the commodity markets? “The commodity play is real, it’s all caused by skyrocketing demand for global resources.” China, India, billions of new consumers. This skyrocketing demand suddenly happened over the past nine months? What about the past 5 years of global prosperity – wasn’t demand skyrocketing then? I don’t know, and I haven’t crunched the numbers, but if you step back and look at this objectively I think there is a lot of risk in those markets. Stocks down, treasuries and commodities up, and this is because of global demand? If that were the case then why are global stocks down and treasuries up at the same time? Wouldn’t global stock markets be up because of all of this global demand? Perhaps this is just the latest place for the “fast money” to park while the credit markets work out the current turmoil. Using the “how it feels” methodology I am afraid of commodities right now because it is possible that this is the next asset bubble to burst. That’s easy for me to say because I am not a big commodity investor anyway (in fact, I am not a big investor period). I’m sure there is some validity to the global demand story and, in fact, there have been articles in the press lately questioning whether a Malthusian catastrophe is in the works. So commodity prices should probably be on the rise, but the sudden skyrocketing of prices seems a bit overdone to this amateur, especially on the heels of what appears to be some serious economic weakness. Commodity prices are also being pressured by the falling dollar, but how much more does that have to go (better hope not much)? Of course, had I invested more in commodities I would have made more money, assuming I would know when to get out.

If you are living on a fixed income right now you are likely to be worried (unless of course it is a very large fixed income). Treasury and CD rates are very low and anything else in the credit markets is too scary right now, so how do you get income without risking your nest egg? This is one of the prices being paid for the orgy of debt we had over the past seven years. It seems counter intuitive at first that interest rates should be low (perhaps even negative in real terms) after we had a debt binge, but this is because the Federal Reserve has been flooding the markets with liquidity in the hopes of avoiding a major financial collapse while investors are bidding up the prices of treasury securities as they run for cover from riskier investments. So while it is not easy to get credit right now if you are looking to borrow, at the same time the typical safe investments for retirees and others on a fixed income are paying less and less interest. Perhaps some Fannie or Freddie securities or municipals make sense, although the tax advantage of municipals to investors on a fixed income may not be worth the low yields.

Oh yes, and there is inflation. I really don’t care what the CPI, PCE, PIG or SHI! say, filling up the car, the cupboard, and the heating oil tank have taken a much bigger bite out of my income on a percentage basis this year than any other in memory. That is inflation no matter what you call it. I was at the bagel store the other day and there was a sign up saying that due to the rise in the cost of flour bagel prices have been increased – a lot. The last time I started to see this kind of thing on a regular basis was back in the days of double-digit inflation. Not that we are having double-digit inflation now, but the memory is disturbing. Even if price increases slow down, they have already increased a lot.

So what do I do? I wish I had the “right” answer. I am still very nervous about where this whole credit crisis thing ends up. I did some reflecting and I decided that I needed to deal with the fear and greed issue. I thought about all of the credit market news and the financial bailouts, the falling real estate prices (sales were up some 2.7% in February – “maybe we are seeing a bottom!”), soft employment numbers (my most important indicator), and weak capital spending, and I decided that there is a lot of risk in all of the markets right now. Of course, when things are really bad is when you are supposed to have courage and get in, and countering all of the bad news is the totality of all of the Federal Reserve and federal government actions being taken to avoid a financial disaster. But when was the last time I though there was a real possibility of a financial disaster???? That’s enough for me – fear it is, today. The gains I may give up by sitting this one out are easily outweighed by the potential losses. So I have hedged my portfolio by reducing exposure to equities and going short on some general and selective indexes so that when the market goes up I don’t, but when the market goes down I don’t. I may also do a little gorilla trading here and there to try to juice returns as I can. The rest has been reallocated to those lousy-return safe investments like treasuries and FDIC insured CDs for now. As they mature I will be on the prowl for better returns, but with caution. Perhaps some high dividend yield stocks hedged with shorts on a lower yielding equity index. If I miss a big upswing in the stock market I will be less well off than had I been more aggressive and motivated by greed. If I miss a big drop I’ll feel really smart and then start buying. In the meantime I will keep watching all of those economic indicators, including the general tone and gyrations of the CNBC talking heads, as my “how it feels” indicator evolves.

A Long Article about the Credit Markets

2008-03-17T00:03:00.001-04:00

OK, here is my take on the current goings on in the financial markets. I want to preface this with the fact that this is not investment advise and it is my opinion. I do not have the time to provide backup for all of the numbers but they are readily available from current news sources. Where I don’t know the exact number I tried to be conservative. It is very difficult to try to boil this down to any reasonable length so a lot is left unsaid and what is said is meant to stress the risks we currently face. Many if not most professional economists believe we will have a mild recession and return to growth in the second half of 2008. That said, here goes:

1. The US has relied on foreign capital to support a large and long-term trade deficit. As we consume more than we produce, the net difference is imported from overseas. At the same time we export dollars to pay for these things we import. Those dollars often find their way back here in the form of investors looking for return. With all of these dollars looking for investments added to the normal amount of available investment capital, the markets work their way down the food chain. First they make good investments until those run out, then they make mediocre investments until they run out, then they make bad investments until the cracks begin to show as with the subprime mortgage meltdown. While this is going on the economy is booming because people are buying things, in fact, spending even more than they are making. Once investors realize they have made some very bad investments, however, they do exactly the opposite and run from these investments. Foreign investors take their money out of the US and bring it home or invest it elsewhere. This causes the value of the dollar to fall as everyone is trying to sell it in exchange for their own currency, and it reduces the amount of financing available to support asset prices and economic activity in the US.

2. As foreign investors pull their money out of the US and domestic investors run from financial assets prices of financial assets in the US fall because there is less demand for them. This is especially true when investors realize that the assets they invested in are not of the quality they expected. Mortgage backed securities, private equity buyout loans, and so on are all worth less than they were last year, not just because of defaults but because there is just less money around looking to buy these assets. This is referred to as re-pricing of risk. This flight to quality is seen in the dramatically low interest rates on Treasury securities that fall as demand for these safe investments increases – investors are selling riskier assets and purchasing safer ones. They are also purchasing hard assets as seen in the recent explosion of commodity prices.

3. As asset prices fall and capital flows out of the country and out of certain financial assets, banks begin to feel pressure. They need to raise funds to meet the demands of deposit withdrawals and to fund loans to customers who can no longer raise money in other markets such as the commercial paper market (again because the flow of money has reversed from in to out). Normally banks will borrow from other banks or depositors, and/or sell assets to raise the liquidity necessary to meet these demands. Today, however, they cannot do enough of either because they are all in the same boat and because there is a lack of demand for their assets – remember the capital is going out, not coming in. In order to sell assets and raise liquid funds the banks would be forced to take big losses on their assets, and that would reduce bank capital. The more they have to sell the lower the price they will get and the more bank capital is reduced. This could ultimately lead to insolvency of the banks, which is worse than illiquidity because it means that even if the banks had liquidity, they could not make any loans. No loans, investment plummets and employment follows. Of course, if this happens the loans on the banks’ balance sheets get even worse because as employment falls loan defaults increase in this downward spiral.

4. The Fed is using all kinds of tools, new and old, to prevent the system from collapsing under the weight of this de-leveraging (the term for when investors who provide capital leave the markets). First, it is lowering interest rates rapidly, with the federal funds target rate down from 5.25% in September to 3.0% now and another cut expected on Tuesday. Lowering interest rates is targeted at two things: lower rates in general means the rates on investments should go down and the re-pricing of assets should be less severe; and lower rates should support additional investment and consumption assuming those rates make it to the borrowers. The problem is that the lower rates are not making it to the borrowers and so the intended effect is not yet being felt. One reason this is happening could be that the banks are, in fact, insolvent based on current asset prices so they cannot make loans even if they have the liquidity. The other reason this could be happening is that the liquidity crisis is so severe that the banks are simply keeping up with their own balance sheet changes without making many new loans. Either way this is very troubling.

5. In addition to lowering interest rates, the Fed normally acts as lender of last resort to commercial banks. If a bank has a liquidity problem it can pledge collateral to the Fed and the Fed will then make a short-term loan to the bank through the discount window. This has also run into to trouble, however, because none of the banks want to borrow from the Fed this way. They are worried that if they do it will signal a problem and everyone will withdraw their funds from the bank – a classic run-on-the-bank scenario. To deal with this, the Fed created a new program called the Term Auction Facility, or TAF. Under this $100 billion facility the banks bid for loans from the Fed, and if they win they pledge collateral and get a loan for 28 days. The Fed has opened up the collateral pool to include basically anything the banks have to pledge (they can pledge anything they could have pledged for a discount window loan). The names of borrowing banks are not made public, and there is no schedule of the collateral the Fed takes to secure these loans released to the public.

6. The TAF was a very good idea, except it did not provide liquidity directly to the investment banks because they cannot borrow from the Fed without drastic action. In order to address this issue, last week the Fed announced a new $200 billion swap facility called the Term Securities Lending Facility. Under this facility an investment bank can give the Fed mortgage backed securities and other collateral and the Fed will give the bank Treasury securities from its own portfolio. The investment bank can then sell the Treasury securities for cash to get liquidity, and 28 days later it reverses the transaction by returning the Treasury securities for the collateral. Unfortunately this facility is not yet operational so it was too late for Bear Stearns. Bear experienced a run-on-the-bank Thursday and Friday of last week, and the Fed took that drastic action to lend directly to Bear Stearns through JP Morgan Chase. The Fed has not done this since the Great Depression.

So between lowering interest rates (the cost of funds to banks) and providing a source of liquidity (the loans and swaps) for the banks’ assets that are re-pricing, the Fed is hoping to avoid a major collapse of the system that could include runs on many institutions such as the one experienced by Bear Stearns last week. If the banks cannot raise liquid funds then they cannot meet the demands of depositors and borrowers and once this is known, there is a run on the bank. All told, the Fed has announced at least $400 billion in new facilities to provide liquidity to the banking system, which is about 44% of its entire balance sheet. Unfortunately interest rates to borrowers are still not declining signaling an even deeper liquidity crisis or an insolvency crisis. The falling dollar confirms the exodus of capital from the US markets and no one knows how far this will go. In the interim, the economy looks worse as banks do not extend credit for investment or consumption in large enough quantities to support economic growth. The very interesting and as yet unanswered question is what happens if the banks cannot repay the loans from the Fed and the pledged collateral ends up being worth less than the loan?

7. The Fed has a dilemma on its hands and there may be no solution available to it. On the one hand interest rates must be low to stimulate the economy by promoting borrowing and investment/consumption. If interest rates are high businesses will not invest and consumers will postpone purchases, so low rates traditionally help spur the economy. This is the standard policy response to a declining economy, and we are in a declining economy. On the other hand, however, low rates drive more capital out of the markets as it seeks better returns elsewhere. Witness the current boom in commodities, surely the next asset class to bubble over, and the continuing decline in the dollar. These trends are also leading to higher inflation as witnessed at the pump. So lower rates help to spur the economy and hopefully place some floor under the assets being re-priced, but at the same time chase away much needed capital (perhaps worsening the re-pricing because of lack of purchasers) and create a higher inflation risk. If the capital stays away because of the lower rates banks will not lend and we could have a severe economic downturn. Raising rates may help attract the much-needed capital, but it will slow the economy at a time when it is already vulnerable possibly resulting in a severe economic downturn. Therein lies the dilemma. It is very possible the Fed does not have a solution to the current problems.

8. Remember from number 1 above that this cycle of asset pricing and re-pricing was at least in part created by the unsustainable trade deficit of the US. The trade deficit reflects the fact that we have been consuming more than we have been producing, and paying for the difference by borrowing (and, in some cases, selling our assets). We have simply blown our credit beginning with the subprime mortgage meltdown, and it is now time to pay down some of the debt because our lenders are cutting off the flow of funds. That means a combination of selling our assets (as in Citigroup equity sold to foreign sovereign wealth funds) and saving. Saving is the opposite of consuming, so the more we need to save the less we can consume. The less we consume the lower the GDP, unless of course we cut all spending only on imports which is impossible, especially with our dependence on foreign oil. So I predict a fairly substantial slowdown in our immediate future as all of this works its way through the economy. If the flight of liquidity is severe enough we could also witness even more stress in our financial system, without which our economy comes to a halt. Because of this don’t be surprised if there is a large Federal bailout of the banking system on the horizon, regardless of what noise comes out of the White House about free markets and the like. If Bear Stearns is too big to fail so are all of the other major banks, both commercial and investment.

9. A taxpayer bailout of any magnitude is the last thing we need right now, especially with rising budget deficits, two wars, and ever increasing health care commitments. Tax increases may be unavoidable, even if they do further depress economic activity (though there is debate over whether this would be the case under these circumstances). The flight to commodities and resulting price pressure may or may not be sustained, depending in part on how long and how deep the economic downturn turns out to be. If the economy falls into a very deep recession, and especially if the global economy follows, we could see a reversal of the commodity price boom and, potentially, a period of deflation as all asset prices fall (this would be a worst case scenario).

10. How big of a crisis do we have on our hands? We can look at what the Fed and the Federal Government have done so far. At least $400 billion of liquidity facilities have been announced beginning in December and this does not include whatever loans have been made to Bear Stearns. Approximately $200 billion of mortgages have been funded by The Federal Home Loan Banks, an extraordinary increase on a historical basis. The FHA is in the process of refinancing defaulted subprime loans, and there are proposals in Congress to increase the total amount they can refinance to $300 billion. Congress and The President have passed an economic stimulus package estimated to cost approximately $160 billion. All the foregoing is taxpayer backed in one form or another. On the private side, banks have so far written off approximately $150 billion in losses on their assets and many expect another $135 billion to follow. Are we over $1.3 trillion yet? I think so. This sounds like a big problem.

A History of The Great Economic Collapse of 2008

2008-03-16T13:24:00.004-04:00

Looking back several decades at the economic downturn in the United States that began in the third quarter of 2007 and lasted for the better part of a decade, the causes seem predictable and inevitable. The United States had been consuming more than it produced for many years, running massive trade deficits. At the same time consumers were borrowing from international sources of capital to finance consumption, the United States Government was also running budget deficits, financing its expenditures largely from foreign investors and the retirement funds of the baby boom population – some 75 million Americans. Some of this over-consumption was funded through asset sales, especially after the initial decline in the dollar, as foreign investors thought they were getting bargains purchasing US assets.

The cracks in the system began showing up in earnest in 2007 with the great Subprime Mortgage Meltdown. This crisis in the subprime real estate market ultimately spread to the rest of the market and triggered an exodus of capital from the financial system as investors realized they had been taking on too much risk for the promised returns. Notwithstanding valiant attempts by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to the banking system, the risk re-pricing forced historic write-downs of assets on the books of the major banks, both commercial and investment, resulting in capital shortfalls at the major institutions. The first bank to experience a run was the 83-year old investment bank Bear Stearns, which was temporarily kept afloat through emergency loans from the Federal Reserve. This marked the first time such a loan was made since the Great Depression of the prior century. The resulting lack of financing into the economy drove investment to levels not seen in decades and unemployment soared. At the same time as the employment picture soured, many in the baby boom generation were retiring. Unfortunately the insolvency of the Federal Government resulting from tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans and deficit spending required massive cuts in health care and social security as well as large tax increases, further depressing the economy. A massive portion of the population retired into poverty.

In an attempt to fight both the re-pricing of assets and the lack of financing in the economy the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates dramatically, from 5.25% to 1%, at the same time inflation was running up. The interest rate targeted by the Federal Reserve at the time, the Federal Funds Rate, was negative in real terms for the second time in a decade. Unfortunately, these lower rates did not pass through to borrowers because the banks’ lack of capital prevented them from making loans regardless of how low their cost of funds was, and the fear of insolvency prevented banks from lending to one another which was how the system worked at the time. In fact, the monetary easing resulted in a further flight of capital as investors sold dollars to invest elsewhere where returns were better. The resulting fall of the dollar was also historic in nature as it hit all time lows against a basket of currencies week after week. This would have been a bright spot due to its impact on net exports, except that the decline in the US economy spread to the rest of the developed and developing nations reducing demand for exports.

Ultimately the Federal Government had to step in and bail out the financial system that had profited so handsomely for many years prior to the meltdown. The size of the bailout dwarfed the S&L bailout that was still visible in the rear view mirror, enraging much of the population. At the same time, those who had amassed fortunes during the boom years were able to acquire vast holdings of productive assets thereby widening the already large gap between the wealthy and the poor. Despite passing law after law and amending regulation after regulation in favor of the banking lobby for two decades, Congress professed shock at the actions taken by some of the major financial institutions during the ensuing hearings. The conflicts of interest of the rating agencies, the off-balance sheet accounting, the lax capital requirements, and several other issues resurfaced in the public view. Once the population at large learned that all of these issues had been brought to the attention of Congress years before, but ignored at the behest of the finance industry, there was a near revolt in the streets. This resulted in what we now refer to as the Great Political Restructuring.

Between the devaluation of the dollar and the massive infusion of funds to rescue the financial system inflation raged out of control for some time until the collapse progressed, after which deflation took hold as the world economy followed suit and demand for everything fell off globally. The lessons of this era remained strong and bank regulation was revised and strengthened. However, due to advances in technology and other systemic changes, the banking industry is now lobbying Parliament for additional powers such as combining their commercial and investment banking operations and allowing them to export interest rates from their home state to other states. They are also seeking reform to the bankruptcy laws and a declaration of Federal Preemption for protection from state regulators. Some argue that we should honor the lessons of the past and deny these powers to the banks, especially since the banks are ultimately backed by the taxpayers as lender of last resort. The neo-neo-conservatives, however, argue that the free markets will provide better competitive results for all consumers and the bankers, notwithstanding their incentives to take excessive risk, will adequately manage any potential risks to a systemic crisis. Paul Krugman, the sage economist now in his 98th year, declared such proposals outrageous and claimed they will lead the economy on a path to great divergence of wealth and the rebirth of the poverty population. Larry Kudlow, the underground talk show pundit whose age none can ascertain, pronounced this to be a great day for America, the likes of which he has not seen since the Great Political Restructuring. Time will tell which of these elder statesmen is still connected to the political economy and which is simply disconnected.

[Of course, I hope none of this is true and we see a rebound in the second half of 2008 as many predict. I just could not help having a bit of fun with this. I may do a serious analysis if time permits.]

The F-LEF, or the Federal Reserve Liquidity Enhancing Facility

2008-03-11T01:02:00.004-04:00

The Federal Government is in full swing on the current crisis in the financial markets. We have the FHA refinancing subprime loans and financing purchases with no money down (they claim 3% is required but this can be satisfied with a Seller’s Concession for closing costs, and we all know that’s code for raise the price to cover the concession); we have the Federal Home Loan Banks lending hundreds of billions of dollars to the banks on mortgage collateral; we have pressure on the GSEs Freddie and Fannie to step up their participation in the mortgage markets at a time when they are experiencing large losses themselves; we have the fiscal stimulus package (that, in part, increases the amount FHA and the GSEs can lend against homes from the high 300ks/low 400ks to $729k in many markets); and we have the Federal Reserve not only lowering interest rates but also providing $100 billion in liquidity for the banks through the new Term Auction Facility, or TAF. Wow! I have written on all of the foregoing steps taken to blunt the impact of the financial crisis that started with subprime mortgages except the TAF. You can find these articles by clicking on the “bailout” keyword on the list of keywords below. Today I want to look at this TAF.

Several months ago many commentators, including me, where writing about the Treasury plan to create a master liquidity enhancement conduit, or M-LEC. The purpose of this conduit was to be a buyer for assets that struggling SIVs, or structured investment vehicles, needed to liquidate. SIVs, at their core, take advantage of short-term financing at low rates to invest in longer-term assets that pay higher rates making a profit on the spread. When the short term funding dried up because of concern over the value of the assets held by SIVs they were forced to look elsewhere for funding or sell their assets. The problem was that the SIVs could not sell many of their assets into an unfavorable market without suffering losses on those assets. If they were sold at losses investors would suffer and the market could be permanently harmed. Enter the M-LEC that could purchase and hold these assets until the markets returned to “normal” and then sell them or simply hold them until maturity, thereby eliminating the need to sell them at a loss. Of course this raised accounting issues, among others, because if the market value of these assets was below the amount they were sold for the accounting really didn’t work. In the end the M-LEC was never formed. Instead, some banks that sponsored these SIVs ended up taking the SIV assets onto their balance sheets in order to avoid very embarrassing and reputation devastating results of SIV failures. Others were restructured into longer-term debt or liquidated at a hair cut to investors. (There were also liquidity lines from banks to these SIVs at stake, although the reporting on these was and is very confusing.) So in the end, the assets that caused the trouble ended up sold or on the balance sheet of the sponsoring banks.

Now enter TAF, or the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility. This was introduced in December, around the time the M-LEC was originally to be finalized. The TAF is a loan facility from the Federal Reserve to banks. The Federal Reserve has been increasing the amount of the TAF facility in the aggregate from an original $30 billion to $60 billion, and last week to $100 billion. Here is what it does. Bank A needs liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals and/or loan commitments. It can try to get more deposits if it can, but apparently the banks can’t. It can borrow from other banks, but apparently the banks don’t want to lend enough to each other right now either. It can sell an asset on its books to raise liquidity, although this would reduce its profits by shrinking its balance sheet. Or, perhaps it can’t sell an asset on its books to raise the needed liquidity because the market value of the assets is below the carrying value and Bank A would take a loss. Hum, food for thought.

Enter the TAF, where Bank A can pledge assets to the Federal Reserve in exchange for a loan as long as 28 days in duration. Problem solved, Bank A has the liquidity it needs and the markets are not flooded with assets no one wants to purchase. All of this has me wondering – has the Federal Reserve become the Master Liquidity Enhancing Conduit that the banks and Treasury could not work out? The amount, about $100 billion, seems about right. The timing seems about right. It walks and talks like a duck, so maybe it is. I call it the F-LEF, or the Federal Liquidity Enhancing Facility.

The next question that follows is what assets is the Federal Reserve taking against these $100 billion in loans to the banks? Are they those same assets that moved from SIVs and perhaps other asset backed commercial paper conduits sponsored by the banks to the balance sheets of the banks? Seems like a very logical sequence of events viewed this way, so I decided to try to verify whether this was in fact the case. (The banks can pledge collateral that includes mortgage-backed securities, even ones that may contain subprime mortgages). Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve has not, to my knowledge, published a schedule of the collateral it has taken for these loans. So, the usually transparent Federal Reserve has hit a wall of opacity. It is not publicizing which banks are borrowing and it is not disclosing what assets are being pledged against those loans.

I, for one, would like to know what collateral the Federal Reserve is accepting and how it is being valued. Until these facts are made public, I will assume that the Federal Reserve has done what the M-LEC failed to do by creating the F-LEF through which the banks are delaying sales of assets that have been negatively impacted by the changing markets in order to preserve liquidity (or is it the appearance of solvency?). At the same time the banks are being openly encouraged to raise additional capital. So just how solvent are the banks?

Some very interesting questions and issues have been raised by this TAF. On the one hand, some commentators believe it could be the first step to nationalizing the banks (see this article by Steve Randy Waldman). If there are margin calls on the collateral that the banks cannot meet, what is the Federal Reserve to do? Convert the loan to equity? Interesting point. One colleague of mine suggested the Federal Reserve could simply forgive a portion of the debt, or “write it down”, just like the Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke is suggesting lenders should do with mortgage loans that are more than the property values securing them. That would raise a lot of very interesting issues. Others have said this is just a more effective way to provide needed liquidity to the banking system and should be well down the list of current concerns (see this article by Caroline Baum in Bloomberg).

Stay tuned – I have a feeling this isn’t over yet.

(Ordinarily banks that are solvent can borrow from the Federal Reserve using the Discount Window. The TAF is different in several ways. First, the Federal Reserve will not publish the names of the banks that win the auctions so we just don’t know which ones they are. These loans are also much longer in duration at 28 days and the Federal Reserve has assured the markets that it will provide these lines of credit for at least six months unless market conditions clearly show they are no longer needed and will increase the size if necessary. In the Federal Reserve’s words:

First, the amounts outstanding in the Term Auction Facility (TAF) will be increased to $100 billion. The auctions on March 10 and March 24 each will be increased to $50 billion--an increase of $20 billion from the amounts that were announced for these auctions on February 29. The Federal Reserve will increase these auction sizes further if conditions warrant. To provide increased certainty to market participants, the Federal Reserve will continue to conduct TAF auctions for at least the next six months unless evolving market conditions clearly indicate that such auctions are no longer necessary.)

For more details about the TAF visit the Federal Reserve's website.

Inflation from China?

2008-02-21T10:55:00.001-05:00

I have been reading a few comments lately about how inflation in China, running quite high in the 7% range, is not causing inflation in the US. Paul Krugman made this point and points to a WSJ commentary that does the same on his blog. The reasoning is that our total imports from China account for only 2% of our GDP, so it would take astronomical inflation in China to have an impact on inflation in the US. Unfortunately I think this analysis misses the point.

What is causing inflation is primarily the cost of raw materials such as oil, copper, metal, etc. These costs are rising because of the incremental demand from China and other developing countries for raw materials for both production and infrastructure development. The same is true for food – as incomes are raised around the globe the demand for food increases. These trends are, of course, exacerbated by the decline in the value of the dollar that drives up the price of imported materials such as oil, but without that decline we would likely be in a much worse economic condition right now than we are. I have not done any specific research on this topic, but I have heard many executives from the various mining and metal companies come on CNBC and explain that the demand from China is one quarter to one third of their total demand and until they can gear up to meet this demand prices will be higher. Others imply that speculators may be driving up prices as well, perhaps even creating the next bubble – commodities.

So in the end, inflation in China is not causing inflation in the US, but this analysis misses the point. The point is that because of the increase in demand for raw materials from China and other developing countries (and perhaps some speculation) the prices of materials for everyone, including China and the US, are going up and that is causing inflation in both countries. Perhaps some of the commentators can do a bit of numerical research on this in their spare time. If I find some perhaps I will.

Proposals for Taxpayer Bailout of Banks

2008-02-13T23:57:00.003-05:00

I was reading this article in The Wall Street Journal Online Edition titled Worried Bankers Seek to Shift Risk to Uncle Sam about proposals being shopped around DC to move defaulted subprime loans to FHA. According to the article:

The banking industry, struggling to contain the fallout from the mortgage debacle, is urgently shopping proposals to Congress and the Bush administration that could shift some of the risk for troubled loans to the federal government.

One proposal, advanced by officials at Credit Suisse Group, would expand the scope of loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration. The proposal would let the FHA guarantee mortgage refinancings by some delinquent borrowers.

This will almost certainly lead to a taxpayer bailout in my opinion. I have been writing about this for months and the fact that it is being considered in DC is truly troubling. Congress has been warned about the consequences of this in 2006 testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. You can read that testimony here. If you would like my article on this issue you can find it here. The ideas discussed in the WSJ article referenced above go beyond what I wrote about back in December.

If you object to taxpayers bailing out the banking industry, again, I urge you to write to your congressional representatives.

Income, Debt, Taxes, and The Economy

2008-02-01T12:20:00.000-05:00

I have been trying to figure out why so many people (including myself) have been so negative about the direction of the economy so I have been playing around with some data published by various governmental sources, primarily the Bureau of Economic Analysis tables and Federal Reserve Z.1 from December 2007. I created a few graphs because I believe a picture says a thousand words and I wouldn’t expect anyone to read so many of my words. So, here goes.

The first chart I think really lays it out. This is Consumer Debt plus Mortgage Debt as a percent of Personal Income. I also charted Personal Disposable Income and it looks the same except the percentages are a little higher. This ratio has increased from 51% in 1974 to 112% in 2006 and an estimated 111% in 2007. So the good times for consumers over the past three decades appears to have been funded through incremental relative debt burden as opposed to income gains. This is simply another way of saying that we have been spending more than we are producing (unless we are borrowing to save, but keep reading), and perhaps we are close to hitting the proverbial wall.

The second graph titled Debt to GDP breaks out some components of debt as a percent of Gross Domestic Product. Note the sharp rise here too. One reason this is so steep is because I have added the National debt to the mix. This does not include State and Local debt, but believe it or not as a percent of GDP those items are relatively unremarkable. Business debt to GDP has also increased, but not at an alarming rate. It averaged 60% over the 1974-2007 time period and is currently high at 69.5%, the highest point in the time series. This is not a net number so it does not take into account cash that businesses have, so if businesses are flush with cash the higher number could be meaningless.

The graph titled Percent Change in GDP Components illustrates the makeup of GDP over this time period. The reason I like this graph is because it gives you an idea what is driving the economy; business investment, personal spending, or residential real estate. What I would like to point out here is the surprising suggestion that business investment is not what has driven the economy since the Bush tax cuts. In fact, with the exception of one spike in 1984, business investment doesn’t look very strong during the Reagan and Bush I presidencies either. I find it hard to see in this data support for the idea that tax cuts on high incomes lead to business investment raising all boats (you know, the trickle down theory). What, then, has been driving growth in this decade? We know from our Debt to GDP graph that mortgage debt increased dramatically over this period in both absolute and relative terms. Is it consumers borrowing against real property and spending that has fueled the economy? Add that to the fiscal stimulus of continuing budget deficits and maybe that’s the answer. To put this into perspective, take a look at the final graph, Personal Consumption and Business Investment. These amounts are in nominal dollar amounts. As the graph illustrates, we have been increasing our consumption at a much faster rate than business investment, and it appears this is what has fueled our economic growth. Borrow and spend, at the personal and federal government level. And this is why, I believe, there is so much bad feeling out there. Unfortunately it may be justified.

So where do we go from here? Well, if we have a major economic downturn we could go through an extended period of hardship as debts are written off and asset values decline. This is one school of thought – that we are headed for a period of deflation (not just disinflation but actual falling prices and values). On the other side is inflation. If you owe a lot of money, inflation is good for you because as overall prices and wages rise, the debt you owe becomes a smaller and smaller amount in real terms. So we could inflate our way out of this by flooding the system with money – but this creates more debt. Ah, and therein lies the problem. How much debt will it take to inflate our way out of debt? Looking at the Debt to GDP graph I am not feeling very good about this approach.

I want to go back here to the economic policies of the past 27 years, since we began the reduction in marginal tax rates. I don’t have the numbers yet to support this so consider it an unsupported hypothesis for now. If I find some time I will look for the numbers, if they are even available, to try and support this. What if, instead of tax cuts that benefit the wealthy resulting in business investment the tax cuts actually resulted in cheap available consumer credit? Lets take an example. Person A makes a very good living, say $2 million a year. Person A gets a tax cut and finds they have an extra $100,000 at year-end. What happens to that 100,000? Perhaps some gets spent, and that could account for some of the increase in personal consumption. But what if a large portion of it goes to a hedge fund for investment? Perhaps much of it flows into safe investments such as CDs and money market funds. What is the impact of the additional savings? The result would be an increase in the supply of funds available and, if our Eco 101 is working, a decrease in the cost of capital. If business does not use this capital to invest, it will find its way into some use because sitting idle it makes no return at all. We can speculate where this money may have ended up, and I speculate that over the past few years it ended up in places that include exposure to subprime mortgages and other consumer debt funded through securitization and commercial paper. If this is correct, then tax cuts to the wealthy do not in fact trickle down to the rest of the population through employment and income. Rather, they trickle down through debt, leaving the wealthy to accumulate more wealth and many of the not-so-wealthy wondering how they will make their next credit card payment.

The cost in revenue to the Federal Government of the Bush tax cuts is estimated to be approximately $1.7 trillion through 2011. This begs the question: what if those tax cuts went to the middle and lower income taxpayers who would be more likely to have spent it rather than invest it. On average, that would be like getting the current stimulus plan being rammed through Congress every year for ten years. Would Greenspan have felt it necessary to keep interest rates as low as he did after the 2001 recession? Would the economy have rebounded faster? Would we have had the real estate bubble without the historically low interest rates? We will never know the answers to these questions, but I think they are well worth asking.

More Phony Baloney from Art Laffer

2008-01-25T15:23:00.000-05:00

Although I had planned to pen an article today regarding the stimulus plan and some other pieces of information from the week, I was alerted to this OP-ED piece in Today’s Wall Street Journal Online Edition and felt a need to respond. This piece is, in my humble opinion, another example of professional obfuscation by the very experienced Art Laffer. It requires little to dispose of this three-plus page propaganda piece, which states:

Since 1980, statutory marginal tax rates have fallen dramatically. The highest marginal income tax rate in 1980 was 70%. Today it is 35%. In the year Ronald Reagan took office (1981) the top 1% of income earners paid 17.58% of all federal income taxes. Twenty-five years later, in 2005, the top 1% paid 39.38% of all income taxes.
There are other ways of looking at tax receipts by income bracket. From 1981 to 2005, the income taxes paid by the top 1% rose to 2.96% of GDP, from 1.59% of GDP. There was also a huge absolute increase in real tax dollars paid by this group. In 1981, the total taxes paid in 2005 dollars by the top 1% of income earners was $94.84 billion. In 2005 it was $368.13 billion.

He goes on to devote almost an entire page to listing statistics about shares of taxes paid by the top 1% vs. the bottom 75% illustrating the point that the poor unfortunate top 1% have been carrying a much larger share of the total income taxes. What he does not explicitly mention is what I have set forth in the first graph above. The top 1% paid a larger share of the income taxes because the top 1% continue to get more and more of the total income. In fact, in 1986 the top 1% of taxpayers earned 11.3% of the total adjusted gross income reported to the IRS. In 2005 the top 1% earned 21.2% of the total adjusted gross income, an increase of 87.6%. In 1986 the top 1% paid 25.75% of all personal income taxes paid to the IRS. In 2005 the top 1% paid 39.38% of all the taxes, an increase of 53%. How is this bad for the top 1%? (See how easy it is to manipulate numbers? Think for a minute why percentage increase in income share is so much higher than the percentage increase in tax share. I will point this out to you, unlike some.) In reality, that entire page of percentages is irrelevant to anything other than deflecting from the fact that the rich have achieved higher riches relative to everyone else and this has occurred during the period in time that tax rates on the top 1% have been dramatically lower (the post 1981 period).

Mr. Laffer goes on to claim that the effective tax rate on the top 1% really does not change from year to year (thus proving my point above), concluding that this is because the rich find ways to alter their income so as to avoid the higher marginal rates (not that the wealthy don’t do some of this but it does not result in flat effective tax rates for the wealthy). There are two problems here. First, he is wrong as evidenced by the second graph above titled "Average Effective Tax Rate Top 1%". The effective rate does vary and the effective rate is measured over ALL income, not just the marginal portion at the higher rate. As a result we would expect the effective rate to vary much less than the marginal, and it does. The other problem is that if he is correct then the rich are masters at tax avoidance and the easy way to fix that is enforcement. His argument finishes with the proposition that if we cut taxes on the middle-class we will lose that revenue and if we raise taxes on the upper income earners, since they never pay the higher amount, we will lose income there too. Of course we just learned that this is not true, at least in connection with the top income earners.

Mr. Laffer’s piece ends with this hopelessly biased and unsupported conclusion:

Mark my words: If the Democrats succeed in implementing their plan to tax the rich and cut taxes on the middle and lower income earners, this country will experience a fiscal crisis of serious proportions that will last for years and years until a new Harding, Kennedy or Reagan comes along.
Trained economists know all of this is true, but they try to rebut the facts nonetheless because they believe it will curry favor with their political benefactors.

Really?

I have one final point about Mr. Laffer’s “analysis”. I find it interesting that he begins at the point in history when the highest marginal rates were dramatically lowered but goes no further back in time. I wonder if this change in income tax philosophy so strenuously argued for by the likes of Art Laffer has enabled the vast accumulation of wealth that appears to be concentrating at the top? I suspect there is a reason the analysis begins when it does.

Note: This article was revised from the original to add the second graph.

Why I Think We Will Have A Recession

2008-01-24T00:39:00.000-05:00

Here is why I think we will have a recession. The graph above plots the Financial Obligations Ratio from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. This ratio is an estimate of consumers' fixed payment obligations as a percent of their disposable income. Here is how the Board describes it:

The household debt service ratio (DSR) is an estimate of the ratio of debt payments to disposable personal income. Debt payments consist of the estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage and consumer debt.
The financial obligations ratio (FOR) adds automobile lease payments, rental payments on tenant-occupied property, homeowners' insurance, and property tax payments to the debt service ratio.

So this ratio tells us the estimated percentage of the average person's disposable income that is already committed to making these fixed payments. The rest of the disposable income goes to pay for everything else including food, clothing, energy, education, savings, and so on.

The wavy line is the FOR for the third quarter of each year and the dark straight line is the trend line. I think this graph says a lot about why I hear people talking about being "tight" and not having extra income to spend lately. Add rising food and energy prices and I think there is just less truly discretionary money in the average household. This is also why I think any stimulus should be focused on consumers.

Two Ways to Lose Your Job

2008-01-19T02:56:00.000-05:00

I just wanted to juxtapose two situations that are similar but very different. The first relates to a person who lost their job when the factory he worked at closed. The second relates to a person who lost his job because he did a terrible job costing his company billions of dollars.

After 30 years at a factory making truck parts, Jeffrey Evans was earning $14.55 an hour in what he called “one of the better-paying jobs in the area.”… Wearing a Harley-Davidson cap, a bittersweet reminder of crushed dreams, he recently described how astonished and betrayed he felt when the plant was shut down in August after a labor dispute. Despite sporadic construction work, Mr. Evans has seen his income reduced by half.
So he was astonished yet again to find himself, at age 49, selling off his cherished Harley and most of his apartment furniture and moving in with his mother.

From the NYT here.

Former Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive Stan O'Neal has found a new home: Alcoa Inc., which Friday named Mr. O'Neal as a director.
The move came a day after Merrill Lynch reported a $9.8 billion loss for the fourth quarter, the worst in the firm's 94-year history. The results were driven by $16.7 billion in losses on complex securities, subprime mortgages and other debt that piled up as the bank took what ratings firms have said were excessive risks under Mr. O'Neal's watch….
Mr. O'Neal left Merrill with benefits valued at $161.5 million from various pension plans and stock grants.

From The Wall Street Journal here.

Where Should The Stimulus Go?

2008-01-17T14:46:00.000-05:00

There is a lot of talk today about a stimulus package from the Federal Government to help counter the slowing economy. A lot of generalities were discussed during Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's testimony before The House Budget Committee. You can read his prepared statement here.

Some pundits and politicians are arguing the stimulus should be focused on business with ideas such as accelerated depreciation. The thinking behind this is that it will stimulate businesses to acquire capital goods and the only cost to the government is the time value of money because businesses get the tax benefit now instead of over time. I haven't heard anyone yet limit such a plan to goods manufactured in the US, and without that this idea could be very watered down. That's also an issue with any of the other plans, however, but using a depreciation incentive to spur purchases of capital goods could be targeted toward domestic manufacturers as other plans may not be. Of course there are likely trade partner issues with any such limitations.

On the other end of the spectrum is giving to the poor. Expand the food stamp program and other help to the poor. The argument here is that these people will immediately spend the money and it will have the most immediate stimulative impact on the economy. If the stimulus is limited to tax breaks these people will see no help at all because they are not taxpayers to begin with.

Then there is tax relief for the investor class, otherwise known as the good old trickle down theory. According to this thinking, if we cut taxes on investing businesses will have access to capital and will invest thereby putting people to work and lifting all boats. Of course, if business in general is already sitting on large piles of capital then this plan would have no impact other than to add to the coffers of the wealthy.

Also under consideration is a tax break for the middle-class. The thinking here is that many people will spend it because times are tough, and so the stimulative impact will be relatively quick. An argument against this is that so many middle-class families are in so much debt that a large portion of such stimulus will go to paying down credit cards rather than new expenditures. This would help in the long run as consumers in too much debt can't consume, but there would be a delay in the impact. This plan could be attractive to the banks and credit card companies, so I think it has a pretty good chance of being at least part of any plan.

There are those who argue that this is the time to make the Bush tax cuts permanent. This just goes to show how extreme the position of this wing of the Republican party is. This would have zero impact until 2011, and is simply not relevant to the discussion of a stimulus plan. You can, however, count on those regular foot soldiers of the neocons who have gone a long way to destroying the fiscal health of our country to come out and tell us why this would be a good idea now.

As far as the Fed Chairman is concerned, he was non-committal on any particular stimulus package although he clearly warned that any plan that increased the structural fiscal deficit must be avoided, and government must address that issue sooner rather than later. He avoids recommending the solution to Congress, as he should, because he is not political (not supposed to be anyway) and this is clearly a political issue. What he does say is that the long term problem is simple arithmetic. What comes in must equal what goes out or at some point we have a crisis (and that point is within the next decade or two). In crafting a stimulus package:

As I have discussed on other occasions, the nation faces daunting long-run budget challenges associated with an aging population, rising health-care costs, and other factors. A fiscal program that increased the structural budget deficit would only make confronting those challenges more difficult.

I have a suggestion for Congress and the President. Since the years of following a policy of tax-cuts, borrow and spend have left us in the painfully foreseeable position of a pending fiscal crises, perhaps it is time to change course. As a place to begin, I suggest the research of Romer and Romer oft-cited by supporters of tax cut policies as evidence that their way is the best. What we do not hear about is the conclusion reached in that very same research report that a tax increase to repay an inherited deficit does not have a negative impact on economic growth. Just in case those tax cut pundits misplaced their copy, here is a link to it.

For tax increases to deal with an inherited budget deficit, the results are more interesting. The
point estimates imply that output does not fall at all following deficit-driven tax increases.

(From page 24)
If you would like a really good example of how the tax cut soldiers use this kind of report, here is a link to a recent Art Laffer report, as in the Laffer Curve. If you search this report for "Romer" you will find that he relies on it heavily. I cannot, however, find any reference in his report to an inherited deficit. I also love the title of his report: THE ONSLAUGHT FROM THE LEFT, PART I: FACT VS. FICTION. The true onslaught is a 28 year old attack on the poor and middle class from the right.

Supreme Court Speaks, Investors Lose

2008-01-16T12:42:00.000-05:00

OPINION ARTICLE

The Supreme Court published its opinion in the Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., et al. This case asked the court to determine whether, under rule 10(b)5 issued by the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a company (a third party wrongdoer) that assists a publicly traded company in misleading the public about its financial results can be held liable to the investors in that public company for damages caused by the misleading actions.

In my humble opinion the case can be summarized as follows: It is better to let investors suffer at the hands of fraudulent business activities than to potentially raise the cost of doing business by holding businesses accountable for their fraudulent actions. The SEC can, in its discretion, take action against a third party wrongdoer but private investors cannot.

Here is my short version - the long version (with details) is below:

The Court noted two issues with allowing investors to sue third party wrongdoers other than its review and ~~manipulation~~ interpretation of prior law. The first is that it would raise the cost of doing business because every company would be exposed to potential liability and harassment by discovery proceedings for investors with weak claims. This could drive up the cost of doing business, and so businesses need to be protected from this harassment. The second is that this additional cost of doing business in the United States could deter foreign companies from issuing securities in our markets and doing business with domestic firms. Interestingly, the Court never addresses the cost to businesses or investors of meltdowns such as Enron and Charter and all of the other fraudulent market disasters experienced over the past decade. How can it conclude that the cost to business would increase when it does not even consider the other side of the ledger? What costs would go down if businesses acted more ethically? What about bad debt write-offs for one? Doesn’t this very decision reduce the cost of wrongdoing? These points are not addressed in the opinion. Nor does the opinion address the cost to the economy of a lower level of investor participation due to a lack of confidence in the market. This decision, in my opinion, was pre-determined and I wrote that back in October.

What businesses stand to gain disproportionately from this ruling? Think about the major financial institutions and all of those very complex transactions they helped structure for Enron. Think about those subprime securitizations and CDOs. You are now getting warm.

Here is the long version if you are interested in some specifics.

Two set-top box makers (Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta) knowingly entered into phony transactions with Charter Communications so Charter could fool its accountants and report higher income than it actually had. It was a classic fraud scheme wherein Charter swapped long-term depreciation expense for short-term reportable income. Charter then issued false financial statements, investors purchased the stock, the scheme was revealed, and the investors lost money. Now the investors want the set-top box makers who entered into these fake transactions with Charter to pay. Here are the facts from the Court:

Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent practices so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow. The fraud included misclassification of its customer base; delayed reporting of terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs that should have been shown as expenses; and manipulation of the company’s billing cutoff dates to inflate reported revenues. In late 2000, Charter executives realized that, despite these efforts, the company would miss projected operating cash flow numbers by $15 to $20 million. To help meet the shortfall, Charter decided to alter its existing arrangements with respondents, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola…

Respondents supplied Charter with the digital cable converter (set top) boxes that Charter furnished to its customers. Charter arranged to overpay respondents $20 for each set top box it purchased until the end of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter. The transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalize its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter to fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers. Respondents agreed to the arrangement.

So that Arthur Andersen would not discover the link between Charter’s increased payments for the boxes and the advertising purchases, the companies drafted documents to make it appear the transactions were unrelated and conducted in the ordinary course of business. Following a request from Charter, Scientific-Atlanta sent documents to Charter stating—falsely—that it had increased production costs. It raised the price for set top boxes for the rest of 2000 by $20 per box. As for Motorola, in a written contract Charter agreed to purchase from Motorola a specific number of set top boxes and pay liquidated damages of $20 for each unit it did not take. The contract was made with the expectation Charter would fail to purchase all the units and pay Motorola the liquidated damages.

To return the additional money from the set top box sales, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola signed contracts with Charter to purchase advertising time for a price higher than fair value. The new set top box agreements were backdated to make it appear that they were negotiated a month before the advertising agreements. The backdating was important to convey the impression that the negotiations were unconnected, a point Arthur Andersen considered necessary for separate treatment of the transactions. Charter recorded the advertising payments to inflate revenue and operating cash flow by approximately $17 million. The inflated number was shown on financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and reported to the public.

So what did the court decide? Well, first it determined that the set-top box makers didn’t make any misleading statements, so they didn’t directly violate the statute in question. The next step, then, is to determine if they can be held liable under a theory of aiding and abetting Charter’s misstatements. The court then goes through a long history of cases explaining that the set-top box makers did not do anything “in connection with the sale of a security” so again they are not liable, and they had no affirmative duty to disclose this information to the public nor did they communicate these acts to the public so the public could not have relied on them. The dissenting opinion does a good job of debunking these arguments in my opinion.

The investors argued:

Liability is appropriate, petitioner [the investor] contends, because respondents [the set-top box makers] engaged in conduct with the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of material fact to further a scheme to misrepresent Charter’s revenue. The argument is that the financial statement Charter released to the public was a natural and expected consequence of respondents’ deceptive acts; had respondents not assisted Charter, Charter’s auditor would not have been fooled, and the financial statement would have been a more accurate reflection of Charter’s financial condition.

Liability is appropriate, petitioner contends, because respondents engaged in conduct with the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of material fact to further a scheme to misrepresent Charter’s revenue. The argument is that the financial statement Charter released to the public was a natural and expected consequence of respondents’ deceptive acts; had respondents not assisted Charter, Charter’s auditor would not have been fooled, and the financial statement would have been a more accurate reflection of Charter’s financial condition.

Sounds like perfectly sound logic to me, and it would place liability where it belongs, at the doorstep of the wrongdoers. So why does the Court reject this argument? Here we see the true agenda behind this ruling:

Were this concept of reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole market-place in which the issuing company does business; and there is no authority for this rule…

In Blue Chip [a prior Court case], the Court noted that extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from innocent companies…

Adoption of petitioner’s approach would expose a new class of defendants to these risks. As noted in Central Bank [a prior Court case], contracting parties might find it necessary to protect against these threats, raising the costs of doing business… Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business here. See Brief for Organization for International Investment et al. as Amici Curiae 17–20. This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company under our law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.

So in the end, the Court does not want to protect individual investors from this type of bad activity because it could raise the cost of doing business for all companies. Inherent in that decision is the belief that it is better to let investors and other businesses suffer at the hands of fraudulent business activities than to potentially raise the cost of doing business by holding businesses accountable for their fraudulent actions. Absent from this reasoning is the cost to businesses of fraudulent practices (which has just gone down for the wrongdoers) and the cost to businesses and society due to lower investor participation in the financial markets. How many businesses entered into transactions with Charter based on its reported financial condition to later find out they could have a write-off on their hands? How many investors burned by these frauds have left the market and what is the cost of this loss of participation?

In making its ruling the Court goes beyond this case into what the law is, concluding that there is no private right of action in the Securities Exchange act (a private right means every day citizens can sue under it vs. only the government) for aiding and abetting in a securities law violation. The Court points to legislative action were the congress passed a new law that specifically provides for this liability but only mentions the SEC for enforcement. From this, the Court concludes Congress did not want to provide a private right of action in these cases. So, in the end, we the people as individuals cannot sue to recover damages from companies that aid and abet in these cases, only the SEC can. If it decides not to, nothing happens, and it may or may not recover damages for the investors.

Who may benefit from this ruling? Think about the major financial institutions and all of those very complex transactions they helped structure for Enron. Think about those subprime securitizations and CDOs. You are now getting warm. Who makes fees from underwriting securities? Warm again. The Court, in its infinite wisdom, has determined that protecting these interests is more important than ensuring ethical business practices.

If you would like to read the opinion of the Court, you can find it here.

Who Is Purchasing your Candidate?

2008-01-13T20:39:00.000-05:00

OK, this is just to let everyone know why I think nothing will really change after this election. Financial CEOs will continue to take home mega paydays, hedge fund and private equity managers will continue to get 15% income tax treatment, interest rates on credit cards will stay high, and we the taxpayers will bail out the wreckage from the subprime meltdown caused in large part by the financial industry. You may be thinking "oh no, all the candidates are for change." Well, before you vote you should know who your candidate will owe if they get in.

Go here and click on your candidate. How far down the list is the first financial firm? How far down is Goldman Saks, Merrill Lynch, Citi, JP Morgan Chase, and so on? By the way, don't just look at who, also look at how much. Note who is missing as contributors to those candidates that are doing poorly or have dropped out. Then go Here and take a look at some of the same numbers organized by industry.

Campaign finance and lobby reform are the only things that will change anything about our system of government as it stands today, in my humble opinion. If we really want change I think we need to deal with three issues in the politician's life cycle: getting in; being in; and getting out.

On getting in it seems more evident in each election that we need campaign finance reform. Looking at the links I have posted drives that point home for me.

On being in, I would like to see some serious ethics reforms with oversight from independent sources, and perhaps large pay raises for all members of congress at the same time. The pay raises could attract more qualified candidates (as could campaign finance reform) and perhaps make them a little more immune to special interests.

On getting out, that's a difficult one. Here is a good example of the problem. Apparently Representative Richard Baker (R-LA)is stepping down to take a very lucrative position in an industry he has received a lot of financial support from and one he dealt with while in congress:

Baker also serves as a longstanding member of the House Financial Services Committee, where he is widely viewed as an expert on capital markets, insurance, and housing finance.

(From his congressional website)
Perhaps a simple prohibition against this would help.

Stubborn Poverty

2008-01-12T19:51:00.000-05:00

This "article" is actually a response to a question in another blog here. It is a good thread and I encourage giving it a read and a vote. Here is the question I want to address here because a picture tells a thousand words and I don't think I can post a picture in a comment box:

The question for me is this: In a free society, where people are free to make bad choices, how much poverty can we eliminate without rewarding, and hence encouraging, bad choices?

And despite $6.6 Trillion spent on anti-poverty programs, the poverty rate has not budged much since 1968--regardless of the party in power or plan of attack.

I think this is a really good question, good enough to send me to the Census Bureau to dig up the chart above. What it shows is that poverty in this country was very bad in the 1950s and fell throughout the 1960s and 1970s. At first I thought the downward trend had a lot to do with the economy in general, but looking at the GDP growth rates doesn’t seem to indicate that was the reason. Labor unionization likely played a part as some jobs that did not provide a living wage became subject to collective bargaining (a trend that is now reversing).

I then looked at the minimum wage. I found this quote here.

The minimum wage was first enacted in 1938 as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). It is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor's Employment Standards Administration. Initially just 25 cents per hour, the minimum wage has been raised several times in the decades since. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, the minimum wage reached its peak in 1968, when it was worth $6.92 in 1998 dollars.

So minimum wage legislation could certainly explain some of the downward trend in poverty over this time period. Today, the minimum wage has finally been raised again to $6.55 beginning in July of 2008 and $7.25 in July 2009. At the current rate of $5.85, a full time minimum wage worker would make about $12,000 per year working 40 hours per week with no vacation. This is above the poverty line for a single person, but well below the $16,000 poverty line for a family of three. And getting “Mom” out to work does not pay because childcare costs more than the available earnings. At $7.25 per hour we get close to the line for a family of three, but by that time it will be further below the poverty line due to inflation. So what we see is that many very hard working people live in poverty.

(On minimum wage – if we make employees more expensive, we provide incentive to innovate. This results in fewer jobs in that particular field, but more jobs in the field of the innovations. So, the idea that raising the minimum wage translates directly into inflation is just wrong, and in fact raising it could be, in the long run, exactly the incentive we need to continue innovating to compete globally.)

Then there is The Great Society, and the war on poverty launched by the Johnson Administration. This war included all of the types of programs I here today’s conservatives speak about, such as community development, job training, education, and so on. You can get a pretty good summary of those here. Two of the most important programs implemented were Medicare and Medicaid, and this likely had a lot to do with the rapid decline in poverty among seniors. Note that the poverty rate among seniors in 1959 was in the 35% range, hardly justifiable based on laziness and clearly unacceptable by today’s standards.

So, certainly the programs of The Great Society launched during Johnson’s War on Poverty in the 1960s had a lot to do with declining poverty rates throughout the 1960s. Since those programs were fully implemented and integrated into our society, the poverty rate has remained somewhat stable although they have begun to track up again. I think this goes back to the minimum wage issue.

So, back to the original questions. First:

In a free society, where people are free to make bad choices, how much poverty can we eliminate without rewarding, and hence encouraging, bad choices?

I wish I had an answer to this question but the fact is I do not. This is a question that I believe is impossible to answer because the only way to do so is to know how many people being helped would actually not need it if it were not available to them. We did see, however, what happened in our society when it was not there – a quick look at the graph tells me that poverty rates were very high by today’s standards and would be unacceptable to us in this more modern era.

The second question:

And despite $6.6 Trillion spent on anti-poverty programs, the poverty rate has not budged much since 1968--regardless of the party in power or plan of attack.

We see that the basic premise of this question is correct because the poverty rates have not improved all that much since 1968 when most of the major Great Society programs were enacted. However, this may be in part an answer to the first question. Perhaps in this great society where people have the opportunity to amass great wealth and live with luxuries unimagined by most people in this world through all of its history, the cost is a 12-13% of the population living in poverty (I would hope not, but our track record seems to support it). The losers, if you will, in the great game we call our “free market” economy. So the question then becomes this: In our Great Society, do we want to see the accumulation of wealth never before seen in the hands of the few while we fail to honor our promises to provide benefits for those who are in need of them? Do we want to trade massive wealth for the few for massive suffering for the many? That is the question at hand, and I come down very clearly on the side that says share the wealth a little more. Has the $6.6 trillion been well spent keeping millions of our seniors and children out of poverty for the past 40 years? That’s a judgment call for each of us to make. The “free market” conservatives apparently think not, while the “bleeding heart” liberals think so. These programs have been under attack since 1980 and we are approaching, in my fear, a point of no return as this debate goes on and the wealth moves up.

One final note - the wealth distribution is not fully justified by "free markets" and all one need do to observe this is to follow the money in politics. If you want to eliminate waste, that would be the best place to start, in my humble opinion.

For more statistics on poverty go here.

Federal Budget for 2006

2008-01-09T18:29:00.000-05:00

Here are the rest of the federal budget numbers re-classified in a way that I think makes them understandable. They are approximate because the government figures use varying classifications depending upon where you get the numbers from. These amounts also ignore unemployment insurance, but the net impact of doing so is relatively small. The inflows are without including any payroll taxes as that is dealt with in the Social Security and Health Care pieces referred to below. Outflows are without Social Security and the portion of Medicare paid for by payroll deductions. My hope was to isolate those programs from the other government programs that we fund through general revenues rather than payroll taxes that fund Social Security and a portion of Medicare. By doing it this way, if you want to know how much you are paying toward any particular item you can get a very rough estimate by multiplying the amount you paid in federal income tax times the percentage to the right of the outflow category (plus your share of the additional national debt used to fund the shortfall, so add another 30% or so).

Interest expense is not "net interest" because the portion that the government considers a wash (about $169 billion) is "paid" to trust funds like Social Security but then immediately re-borrowed. Because of this the government accounting figures a net interest amount as though it really wasn't paid. In any event, about $100 billion of the interest expense is paying the interest on the money borrowed from Social Security, so if you like you can add that to your retirement costs.

Non-SS Mandatory Income Security includes all of the means tested entitlements.

The difference between the inflow and outflow explains the additional half trillion or so of national debt from end of year 2005 to end of year 2006 (approximately $574 billion).

A final note - to really understand who benefits and who pays in our system it is necessary to go beyond a simple inflow/outflow analysis. It requires a real analysis of the tax code to understand who is getting a better deal and who is not. One example of this is the capital gains treatment of carried interest for hedge fund and private equity managers that allows them to pay 15% on large portions of their (often seven figure) incomes. I hope, however, that this analysis provides some insight.

For health care go here.
For Social Security go here.
For welfare go here.

Federal Health Care Expenses

2008-01-09T14:48:00.000-05:00

2006, Dollars in millions.
Here are the numbers for Federal health care expenditures. By way of background, Medicare Part A, hospitalization, is paid from payroll deductions while Parts B and D are paid from premiums and general revenues. Part A is currently self funding, but projected to fall into major deficit in the short and long run. In addition, Parts B and D are drawing from the general funds at a level that requires the President to propose modifications by 2009. What all of that means is the costs of health care are expected to increase dramatically and there has been no trust fund established for the bulk of the costs.

All of the numbers come from Tables 2.4, 3.2, and 8.5 of The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2008 Budget Of The United States Government Fiscal Year 2008 Historical Tables except for Premiums, Taxes on Benefits and Interest which came from Status of Social Security and Medicare Programs, A Summary Of The 2007 Annual Report.

To sum this up, the Federal Government spends 22.7 cents of every dollar it collects (over and above payroll deductions) on health care. If you are an "average" taxpayer making $50,000 per year and paying 12.45% of your income in federal taxes, then you are contributing $1,414 to health care from income taxes and $725 from payroll deductions (1.45%) for a grand total of $2,139.00. This is in addition to any non-governmental health care you may be paying for.

For Social Security go here.
For welfare go here.
For the balance of the budget go here.

Social Security Figures

2008-01-09T14:44:00.000-05:00

2006, Dollars in million

Here is my estimate of the 2006 Social Security budget. These are estimates as they come from different sources (which is necessary to obtain the full picture). The data represent 2006 Old Age & Survivors Insurance (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) which are both funded through payroll deductions.

For the revenue side, I used both The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2008 Budget Of The United States Government Fiscal Year 2008 Historical Tables Tables 2.4 (page 43) & 8.5 (page 142), and Status of Social Security and Medicare Programs, A Summary Of The 2007 Annual Report. On the outflow side I used the OMB report.

Net savings to the fund is the amount of the increase in the Old Age & Survivors Insurance (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) trust funds for the period. Note that a significant contribution to Social Security revenue comes from interest on funds borrowed by the Federal Government from the trust funds and taxes on benefits. These get ignored when looking only at the OMB Budget figures but are certainly relevant here. The interest represents interest paid (and, of course, re-borrowed) by the Federal Government to the trust fund. Although I am calling these estimates, the net increase to the fund based on the SSA figures is within $1.5 billion looking at their figures vs. my estimates. This is pretty good, especially considering the fact that the OMB Budget report has Social Security outlays of $548,549 million in table 3.2 and $543,900 million in table 8.1. But hey, what's $4.5 billion among friends? (It was explained to me by an intern at OMB that this is due to classification differences.)

For "Welfare" costs go here.
For health care go here.
For the balance of the budget go here.

How Much Does Welfare Cost?

2008-01-08T15:32:00.000-05:00

Based on information I received from the Office of Management and Budget I have revised this post. The numbers changed by enough that I though it worth revising.

I have been involved in some discussion of late regarding fairness of our tax system, income distribution, and income redistribution. It seemed to me that there was a lot missing in these discussions. In particular, the facts! So I set out to plow through some government reports to get a handle on were the money comes from and where it goes. This has turned out to be quite a challenge, especially since I am not an accountant (although I think even some accountants would be baffled by some of this stuff).

As I progressed it became obvious to me that this is a project that will need to be broken down into pieces. I decided the first piece would be welfare related expenditures because that has been a popular topic in my conversations and political debates. With that introduction, here are some of the welfare figures. I hope to have more analysis soon, depending upon when one very nice young intern named Karl at the Office of Management and Budget gets back to me with some information. (Karl has since gotten back to me which is why this has been revised. Thank you Karl!)

According to The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables, total outlays for Means Tested Entitlements in 2006 were $354.3 billion. This was 2.7% of GDP and

Includes Medicaid, food stamps, family support assistance (AFDC), supplemental security income (SSI), child nutrition programs, refundable portions of earned income tax credits (EITC and HITC) and child tax credit, welfare contingency fund, child care entitlement to States, temporary assistance to needy families, foster care and adoption assistance, State children’s health insurance and veterans pensions.

(from Table 8.1, page 133)

The cost of these programs has increased from 0.8% of GDP in 1962 (before Medicaid) to 2.7% of GDP in 2006, or by 1.9% of GDP. If we exclude Medicaid, health care for children and veterans pensions it is 0.89 % of GDP, or $117 billion. (The numbers for the excluded items are found in Table 8.5, page 142). This represents approximately 7.5% of total non-Social Security receipts to the Federal Government. So, for every one of your tax dollars to the Federal Government, about 7.5 cents goes to these programs. I hate to use averages, but the average taxpayer had a tax rate of 12.45% in 2005 (the latest data available here), so if we multiply things out we see that about 0.93% of the average taxpayer’s income went to non-medical “welfare”. So, if you made $50,000 and paid $6,225.00 in Federal income tax, approximately $465.00 went to all of these programs x-health care and veterans pensions.

Next up I hope to isolate some of the health care numbers. I believe this is truly where our fiscal crisis lies and I hope to see whether I am correct. It will require working through historical budget numbers together with Social Security numbers - my head hurts already!

For Social Security go here.
For health care go here.
For the balance of the budget go here.

Managing Expectations

2007-12-29T13:31:00.000-05:00

I have a stump speech I give students going through my classes about expectations. I find many younger people have not yet developed sensitivity to the concept, and they often find it interesting (or entertaining). The concept is based on the premise that people do not like bad surprises, but good surprises are well received. It applies to personal relationships and business relationships. Here is what I tell them:

Suppose after class a few students ask me to go out and have a beer with them. Being the sociable type, I accept. It turns out we have a great time, and around midnight we break up and I go home. My wife greets me at the door at 12:300 with “WHERE HAVE YOU BEEN, I HAVE BEEN WORRIED SICK?!?” Well, lets just say I’m not getting any tonight!

Now, what if instead I called her after class and told her I was going out with a few students. I may be late, but if after one o’clock I’ll call. At 12:30 I come through the door with a big smile and a “hi honey I’m home.” Everything is fine. The simple difference, of course, is that I managed her expectations by calling her and there was no bad surprise (in this case a surprise when I did not come home at the usual time). The other point of this is that we are the ones who often set the expectations that others have of us. If we recognize this in advance, we can use it to our advantage.

Suppose you are in your first serious job after college and your boss calls you into her office. She wants you to review a stack of data, summarize it, and prepare a report for her. She asks when you can have it for her, and of course, you want to make her happy so you say “before I go home” or something like that. Your boss says thank you, and off you go back to your desk with this pile of data.

Once you start looking through the data, you realize that it will take you a considerable amount of time to analyze it and prepare a quality report. In fact, it will probably take you at least all day and most of tomorrow. Now what? You have several options, all bad. You can be late delivering the report, do a poor job but deliver it on time, or go to the boss and tell her it will take longer than you thought and ask for more time. Of course, the proper course of action is the last one, but what if your boss has relied on your estimate of time and made a commitment to someone else? Now she looks bad, and to her you look bad.

Now change the scenario. Instead of replying that you will get the report finished right away, try something like “I would like to look through this data and organize my thoughts to get an estimate of how long this will take. Can I call you in 30 minutes and let you know?” Any reasonable boss will say OK to that sort of reply. So, you go and review the assignment and you see it will take all day and most of tomorrow. You call your boss (in something less than 30 minutes) and let her know you believe you can make a good job of it by the end of the day tomorrow. Your boss says OK and thank you for getting back to her promptly. You are now inspired because you did something that worked and made you look good! So, you stay late and work on the report, and come in early the next day to finish it up. Around lunch time you deliver a quality report to your boss and say to her that you hope it is what she was looking for, and if she would like you to make any changes or additions you would be happy to do so. Now you look great! You delivered the report early, have time for her to review it before the promised deadline, and did a quality job. Go take a long lunch because you earned it.

Be careful, however, not to abuse this. If you believe the job will take you until the end of tomorrow, you can say that you think that it will be finished by then but you may need a little wiggle room. What you don’t want to do is say it will take you three days, even if you deliver it in two, when it should only take two. You can get a reputation as someone who manages expectations, and then the expectation will always be that you will deliver ahead of schedule. Now you have to manage that expectation too!

I am interested in any comments on this little stump speech. Is it a good one for college students who will be entering the job market? If you are in a supervisory role, are there any improvements/changes that you would make? If you are a young person, does it resonate with you?

More Subprime From Schumer

2007-12-21T02:43:00.000-05:00

I just posted the opinion piece below that relates to how Senator Schumer continues to ignore Wall Street's role in the current mortgage crisis. Apparently, Wall Street and other banks were so hungry to originate mortgages, 23 year old kids were able to defraud them of millions of dollars. The FBI has geared up dramatically to uncover and prosecute those responsible. Here is a quote from this December 21 Wall Street Journal page 1 article:

Fraud goes a long way toward explaining why mortgage defaults and foreclosures are rocking financial institutions, Wall Street and the economy. The Federal Bureau of Investigation says the share of its white-collar agents and analysts devoted to prosecuting mortgage fraud has risen to 28%, up from 7% in 2003. Suspicious Activity Reports, which many lenders are required to file with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network when they suspect fraud, shot up nearly 700% between 2000 and 2006.

Here is the article I posted last night:
Charles Schumer is at it again. On December 19, 2007 he presented "A Call to Action on the Subprime Mortgage Crises: Putting Common Sense Ahead of Ideology" to The Brookings Institution. I have read those remarks and find that I must discuss them in order to keep the record, as I see it, clear. If you are new to my blog, you may not know that in October I reviewed a report sponsored by Senator Schumer that set up his current proposals. This presentation is the next logical step in the progression of deflecting attention away from the Wall Street participants and moving the burden to mortgage brokers, non-bank lenders, shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and taxpayers. There is so much to be said about this that I will first provide a summary and then review the Senator’s remarks. If you are not familiar with Wall Street’s role in the subprime mortgage market, I suggest you read my October post first.

Senator Schumer’s presentation contains some things I agree with. For example, I can’t argue against a plan that says borrowers should be informed about the loans they are taking, or that borrowers should have an advocate if they are in default (two of Senator Schumer’s proposals). The problem, however, is that Senator Schumer continues to ignore the primary causes of the crisis and tailors remedies that shift the burden to other parties. According to the Senator, the crisis was caused by homeowners who were duped by unscrupulous mortgage brokers into taking out bad mortgages. To fix the problem requires regulation of those bad brokers and refinancing hundreds of thousands of loans even if it means putting taxpayers on the hook and even if these borrowers were not first-time homebuyers. I’m sure there are unscrupulous mortgage brokers and that some borrowers didn’t fully understand the terms of their mortgage. But is it the root of the problem? The Senator completely ignores the role of Wall Street and the subprime mortgage fee-fest that fed many of his campaign contributors over the past five years. He also ignores the role of the Federal Reserve and its failure to do anything to prevent this long developing crisis. Of course, his political motives for this are obvious and I believe he really does understand the origins of this problem. If not, I suggest he read some of the recent reporting to educate himself. This Businessweek article would be a good place to start learning about Wall Street’s role (the link only goes to page two – click back a page to start). He can also read this Fortune article that discusses how the Federal Reserve ignored this problem for too long.

I will give the Senator credit for at last acknowledging the issues relating to credit rating agencies and the conflicts of interest that pervade the securitization of subprime mortgages (as well as everything else). Of course, Congress was warned of these problems in connection with Enron as far back as 2002 and again in 2006 but chose to ignore these warnings. We are now paying the price for Congress’ failure to act.

Finally, Senator Schumer claims that Chairman Bernanke supports his plan to raise the caps for loans made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) to include jumbo loans. I have two problems with this. First, Senator Schumer believes that the GSEs should use their lending capacity to refinance subprime loans on homes that cost, potentially, seven figures. He believes they should do this even though the GSEs have said refinancing these subprime loans is not profitable for them. Of course, these entities were chartered to help provide affordable housing and are owned by shareholders, but apparently that no longer matters. Let the funds be used for the well off and the shareholders pay the price.

Second, Senator Schumer states that this proposal has the support of FED Chairman Bernanke. I am not sure about that. In fact, I wrote about the exchange between the Senator and the Chairman regarding this issue. What the Senator does not state is that the Chairman did not give his support to this plan of simply raising the caps. Rather he was asked if the government could do something like this and he said yes. He said the GSEs could make loans up to $1 million and have the federal government guarantee them. That could be done. However, it would require a large political price because these would be taxpayer guaranteed loans in order to protect the GSEs. You can read about that exchange here – click on “stupidity”. The Senator does not mention anything about the taxpayer guarantee part of the exchange. If this is the “support” from the Chairman that he is referring to then this is a shameful act of political maneuvering and misinformation, and Senator Schumer should, in my opinion, clarify this point. It was obvious when he set the Chairman up for this. So obvious that I wrote about it.

At the end of the day, Senator Schumer apparently believes that taxpayers and shareholders of the GSEs should pick up the tab for this Wall Street mess, mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders should be regulated, but the Wall Street banks need not even be mentioned. It makes me wonder who is actually running Congress. It’s as good as money can buy.

With that introduction and summary, here is my review of Senator Schumer’s remarks.

Senator Schumer’s remarks begin by bashing the Bush Administration’s economic policies as too ideological and irresponsible. I agree with him, especially when it comes to tax policy and saving for baby boomer health care. His next focus is on what he calls the “Four Myths Surrounding The Subprime Crises.”

His first myth is that subprime lending led to millions of brand-new, first-time homeowners. He states that according to the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, only 11 percent of subprime loans went to first-time buyers last year, so the majority of subprime loans were for refinance or buyers who had already owned a home. He then goes on to conclude: “Too many of these borrowers were talked into refinancing their homes to gain additional cash for things like medical bills.” He provides no support for this claim and implicates mortgage brokers as evildoers out to rip off poor desperate homeowners. He then goes on to say that “too large a percentage [whatever that means] went to investors and speculators.” This point is also without support, but is worth remembering because when Senator Schumer speaks about why we need to help out these poor subprime borrowers he is clearly not speaking to this “too large a percent” of subprime borrowers. What is really amazing is that Mr. Schumer goes on to spend an entire page of his presentation talking about how the Paulson rate freeze plan will not help enough borrowers. Which ones? He also ignores steps that have been taken already to help some 300,000 borrowers through FHA programs such as FHASecure and the pending FHA Modernization Act. The spin is so bad it hurts.

His second myth he calls “The Myth of the Unqualified Borrower”. I love this one. He claims that a study of credit scores clearly indicates that many subprime borrowers could have qualified for prime loans. He fails to consider, however, any debt-to-income or loan-to-value criteria (or any other criteria for that matter). So in fact we really don’t know whether these people could have qualified for a prime loan or not. All we know is that their credit scores were in a range that could possibly have qualified them for some mortgage amount. The other thing about this “myth” is how it is in direct contrast to all of the hype we have been hearing from HUD and the FHA. The FHA Modernization Act, supported by the Senate, lowers the underwriting criteria for FHA guaranteed loans. If all of these borrowers could qualify for prime loans, then why do we need to lower the underwriting standards to refinance all of them into FHA loans? Sounds like BS to me. You can get more details on the FHA Modernization Act from my post on it, but it is enough to understand that the thrust is to reduce the amount down from 3% to 1.5% and raise the size of the loan that can be financed. (The FHA role in refinancing hundreds of thousands of subprime loans is also a potential problem that could lead to a taxpayer bailout.) The Senator concludes this “myth” by stating “it’s clear that many subprime borrowers have the financial foundation for sustainable homeownership, but may have been tricked into unaffordable loans by unscrupulous brokers.” There we go again – it’s all the fault of those brokers. Did the Senator ever consider that maybe these borrowers wanted more home with less down and pressured the brokers to come up with a financing arrangement to satisfy their demands?

Myth three is “The Myth that Borrowers Can Easily Obtain Perfect Knowledge of The Terms of Their Mortgage Loans.” Well, if he is referring to the fact that the rate varies and the payments are likely to go up, borrowers can easily obtain and understand that information. The other thing borrowers generally understand is that if they cannot make their payment they will lose the home. According to Senator Schumer, however, most people are too stupid to understand this and so we must step in to protect them. Now, I wonder which people these are. Are these the ones who had to refinance to pay medical bills or the “too large a percentage” of investors and speculators? No, these must be the ones who were duped by the unscrupulous brokers. Yah, that’s it. How many of those are there again?

Myth four is that the free market will fix everything. I agree with his supposition that free markets do not fix everything, but stupid policy doesn’t fix everything either. If the Senate had listened to all of the warning signals it got about the housing bubble and leaned on the FED a little more, or about rating agencies and acted on that, then much of this mess probably could have been avoided. Instead, the politicians (pretty much all of them) stuck their heads in the sand because they didn’t want to throw cold water on a very popular housing boom (especially when their contributors were making a fortune from it). Glass houses and all of that.

The four myths are followed by warnings of impending doom. In fact, according to Senator Schumer “we are facing an economic downturn that we haven’t seen in this country since the Great Depression.” Yikes! If this is true I’m really glad I took most of my money out of long positions in equities! He goes on to point out that “a 10 percent decline in housing prices could lead to an overall $2.3 trillion economic loss…” That would be bad, but less than half of the approximately $5 trillion in losses from the dotcom bubble bursting. I agree this is not good for the economy, but the Great Depression? I hope not.

The presentation ends with seven policy options proposed by Senator Schumer to address the subprime mortgage crisis. Here they are, in a nutshell:

1) Provide more mortgage counselors to serve as borrowers’ advocates. OK, not bad.
2) Raise the portfolio limits for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so they can refinance subprime loans, even though these entities have said this would not be profitable for them. Also raise the cap on the loans they can make to include jumbo mortgages (no mention of the government guarantee part). I don’t like these, especially when the GSEs are saying they want no part of it.
3) Allow states to issue tax-exempt bonds to refinance subprime loans. As long as it’s not my state tax dollars guarantying the loans, fine.
4) Modify the bankruptcy code to change the protection mortgage lenders currently enjoy – mortgage loans are exempt from restructuring in bankruptcy without the consent of the lender. OK, but this could make mortgage loans more expensive in the future. Senator Schumer understands this, and acknowledges that this could be limited to only existing loans. This one gets a maybe and a ho-hum from me. If the lenders will be better off cutting a new deal they will.
5) Enact new regulations covering practices by mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders, including limitations on the types of loans they can make. Remember these brokers and non-bank lenders? They are the bad guys in all of this, according to Senator Schumer. Notice how these are mortgage brokers and non-bank lenders, and not banks or investment banks. If you didn’t click on that link to Senator Schumer’s top contributors you may not get this point as clearly. Here it is again. The Senator simply ignores the role of Wall Street and the investment banks in this crisis and makes no mention of any remedy targeted to them.
6) Create an easy to read summary of mortgage terms for borrowers so the big bad mortgage brokers can no longer dupe them into bad loans. OK.
7) Finally, Senator Schumer proposes to closely examine the role of rating agencies in all of this. Hooray! He is finally getting warm.

Another Win for the Top

2007-12-14T21:09:00.000-05:00

In another victory for the top 1% of income earners, The New York Times reported today that Representative Charles Rangel, Chairman of The House Ways and Means Committee, agreed to drop the carried interest proposal from the legislation that was passed by the House to adjust the AMT threshold.

The AMT was originally enacted to make sure high-income earners paid their share of taxes by limiting the amount of deductions that can be taken over certain income thresholds. The problem is that the thresholds were not inflation adjusted, so every year people with less real income get caught up in having to pay this tax unless Congress passes a law to provide relief. Now, instead of just fixing the problem by changing the law to index the income thresholds to inflation, every year Congress passes a law for the following year only, wasting many of the tax dollars the Treasury does collect in the process. The end result of increasing the income threshold is fewer taxes are collected and millions of taxpayers who don't quite make the top 10% are spared a very unpleasant surprise at tax time. In order to pay for this reduction of anticipated tax revenues, Representative Rangel had proposed a change in the carried interest rules that apply to hedge fund and private equity managers.

The carried interest proposal would have raised taxes on hedge fund and private equity fund managers who benefit from a tax gift, paying only 15% on much of their (often seven figure) income. Basically, these money managers have structured their businesses so they can claim that the income they receive from managing other peoples' money should flow through to them in the same way it flows to those investors. If the investors are getting capital gains, then the managers also get capital gains treatment on their income because their income is based on a share of the investors' income, even though it is not their own money that is at risk (the typical justification for capital gains treatment in the first place). So, hedge fund managers and private equity managers, many of who are in that top 1% of income earners, pay a 15% tax rate on much of their income. Now, if you work for a mutual fund you don't get this benefit. If you sell real estate and the owner receives a capital gain the broker doesn't get this treatment. But somehow, hedge fund and private equity managers do.

Well, there are all kinds of cerebral arguments and debates over this topic. One such argument made by the private equity and hedge fund group is the claim that because they provide such a necessary service to the economy by reallocating resources to their most efficient use they somehow deserve this special tax treatment. Teachers, firemen, and police apparently don’t contribute in ways that benefit society as much as hedge fund and private equity managers because they don’t get special tax treatment. I have written about this rule in the past and how I believe it is a sham on all other taxpayers. You can read that comment if you would like more detail.

All of these very complex and sophisticated sounding debates aside, my cynical brain boils it down to a very simple situation. These very wealthy people who do things that most of us don’t understand hide behind this complexity to gain a tax advantage over the rest of us. They take a portion of this tax savings and they donate it to their elected representatives to ensure that these representatives will not change their tax benefit. See how simple that is? Now, I don’t want to simply dismiss the plight of taxpayers, so lets take a look at the various groups of income tax payers and see how they have fared over the past few years since the Bush tax policies have been in effect.

The latest release to shed light on this issue is the Congressional Budget Office report Historical Effective Federal Tax Rates, 1979 – 2005 (the “Report”). The Report contains interesting data on the distribution of incomes since the Bush tax cuts, especially when combined with the same report from two years ago.

Here is a table of the percentage of all after tax income that went to households in the five quintiles by income (approximately 20% of households fall into each of these quintile categories):

Quintile	2002	2003	2004	2005
Lowest	5.2	5.0	4.9	4.8
Second	10.4	10.3	10.0	9.6
Third	15.7	15.5	14.9	14.4
Fourth	21.6	21.4	21.2	20.6
Highest	48.2	48.8	50.1	51.3

The data make it clear that low-income households have been getting less of the total national after tax income than those in the highest quintile. In fact, the highest quintile is the only one that expanded its share of total after tax income over the period, from 48.2% in 2002 to 51.3% in 2005. Since these are expressed as a percentage of the total income, the gains come from losses to others. In this case the losers are those in the lower quintiles.

About 82.5% of the households in the highest quintile are also in the top 10% of households by income. Here is the trend in income share among those in the top 10%, 5%, and 1%:

Rank	2002	2003	2004	2005
Top 10%	33.3	33.9	35.5	37.4
Top 5%	23.5	24.2	25.9	27.8
Top 1%	11.5	12.2	14.0	15.6

The top 10% did exceptionally well as compared to all others, gaining a minimum of 4% of the total national after tax income while all other groups lost share. But that’s not the whole story. Lets look at what has happened to the actual average after tax income in each group as opposed to group shares of the total. The data for 2002 are in 2003 dollars while the data for 2005 is in 2005 dollars. To compare apples to apples, I adjusted the 2003 dollars to 2005 dollars using the US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator to get inflation adjusted numbers for 2002:

Quintile	2002	2005	% Change
Lowest	15,178	15,300	0.8
Second	32,585	33,700	3.4
Third	47,233	50,200	6.3
Fourth	66,444	70,300	5.8
Highest	141,486	172,200	21.7

It looks like things have been pretty good for those in the highest quintile, with the average after tax income increase (21.7%) of 3.5 times the next best quintile. In the lower two quintiles things have been relatively stagnant with less than single digit gains in the lowest quintile. What about the top 10%?

Rank	2002	2005	% Change
Top 10%	192,328	246,300	28.1
Top 5%	269,811	369,800	37.1
Top 1%	688,008	1,071,500	55.7

Now those are income gains!

The next time you hear any Republican talking about how Democrats engage in class warfare against the rich, remember these numbers. Looks as though it is the other way around, and the rich have been winning all the battles.

Updates

2007-12-13T23:47:00.000-05:00

It’s the end of the semester and I am buried in grading, exams, etc. A lot has been happening over the past week, so I decided to write a quick update on a few topics and provide a few links. I’ll get back to articles when the smoke clears. Thanks for checking in.

Citigroup:
Citi finally stepped up to the plate and announced it would consolidate the SIV assets on its books (my guess is this means no M-LEC). There are net assets of approximately $49 billion. The really important thing to me, however, is that there are finally details! Hooray Citigroup! You can find the announcement by Citigroup here, and the details regarding the SIV assets here. I note the absence of subprime mortgage exposure and that takes the wind out of my Subprime Conspiracy Theory (at least with respect to the SIVs).

According to this Reuters article Moody’s has already downgraded Citigroup senior unsecured debt to its fourth highest rating of Aa3, and

Moody's also lowered Citibank N.A.'s bank financial strength rating to B from A- and Citibank's long-term deposit and senior debt rating to "Aa1" from "Aaa."

It will be interesting to see if any of this impacts the ratings on other off-balance sheet conduits for which Citi provides credit enhancement.

The Credit Crises:
I highly recommend this related article in today’s WSJ Online Edition that provides a well written perspective on the de-leveraging we may be witnessing. If the author of this piece is correct, we could be in for some very bad economic times ahead as we unwind all of the leverage created by securitizations that investors don't want to purchase anymore.

Taxes:
There is a battle going on in Congress over the AMT fix and how to pay for it (although some argue that it need not be paid for as it was never supposed to be collected in the first place). The House Democrats want to increase taxes to pay for the loss of AMT revenue by taking the carried interest sham away from hedge fund managers. I like that idea, but I don’t think they have the votes to get it through the Senate and an almost certain veto by Bush, so righting that wrong will likely take a back seat for now. That’s too bad. You can get my opinion on that tax po$%#@icy here if you like.

Inflation:
With today’s headline year-over-year PPI inflation number of 7.2% (the highest since 1973) and continued concern over economic growth stagflation risk appears to be gaining some momentum, although retail sales came in stronger than expected. I note, however, that if we are about to witness massive de-leveraging (see the Credit Crises above), inflation is not likely to be a problem.

Back to grading.

Subprime Conspiracy Theory

2007-12-07T13:27:00.000-05:00

By now you have certainly heard that the Federal Government is taking steps to help those poor borrowers of subprime mortgages who were duped by banks and mortgage brokers. I’ll refer to this plan as the “Subprime Bailout Plan”. They plan to help as many as they can refinance into more “secure” fixed rate mortgages, and to freeze the adjustable rate for those who cannot refinance. This plan required many varied interests coming together, and they did so under the guidance of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.

At the same time and also with the help of Secretary Paulson, the major money center banks in the US are putting together a plan to finance the purchase of certain assets from Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs). I’ll call this the “SIV Bailout Plan”. Word is that these vehicles were the repositories for pieces of mortgage securitizations, although finding any actual data on these has been an exercise in futility. The basic idea of this plan is to find a financing source for these assets other than the current structure because the current structure no longer works since these assets have been or may be downgraded by the rating agencies. Once they are downgraded, the SIVs liquidate selling the assets in the marketplace. Because the market for these assets is terrible and sales at current prices would produce large losses, the plan provides a purchaser (the MLEC or Super SIV) for these assets. With time, hopefully, the actual cash flows from these assets will be sufficient to repay the financing used to purchase them at above current market prices. The accounting for all of this raises serious questions in my mind, and if you are interested in that part of it you can read my previous post on that topic here.

To the conspiracy part:
Now, I am not making any direct accusations here, but I would like to point out an issue that I believe should be scrutinized carefully. If the assets in these SIVs are indeed mortgage backed securities or in any way tied to subprime mortgages, then the Subprime Bailout Plan is related to the SIV Bailout Plan because refinancing the subprime mortgages and/or fixing rates for a period of time provides both cash in the form of full repayment of these subprime loans to the owners of those loans, and time to work out the other loans that would default if the interest rates adjust. So, the Subprime Bailout Plan and the SIV Bailout Plan are related, and are both being structured with the assistance of the Treasury Secretary. This raises a potential conflict of interest regarding which subprime borrowers actually receive the assistance that the Subprime Bailout Plan is to provide because those whose mortgages are owned by SIVs or impact repayment on SIV assets could gain preference to aid the SIV Bailout Plan. I believe there should be a call for oversight and full transparency of this entire mess because there is the appearance of a potential conflict of interest here.

Unfortunately, that’s just the beginning of the “conspiracy”. Lets follow the mortgage refinancings to see where the risk of all of these defaults is going. Unfortunately, that road leads indirectly to the federal government and, ultimately, the taxpayer. HUD currently plans to refinance approximately 300,000 subprime mortgages raising serious questions about the ability of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund to adequately cover potential future exposure. Any shortfall in the fund would result in a taxpayer liability. If you would like details about this, you can read my post on it here.

The other place many loans appear to be going is The Federal Home Loan Banks. These banks issue bonds backed by the full faith and credit of The United States (that would be us, the taxpayers) and use the proceeds to purchase mortgages from banks. How much do they purchase, you ask? Well, from December 31, 2005 to June 30, 2007, outstanding advances went from $619.8 billion to $640.0 billion. From June 30, 2007 to September 30, 2007, advances went from $640 billion to $824 billion, an increase of $184 billion. Humm. That would be an annualized rate of increase of ($184 x 4) $736 billion! Senator Schumer has recently questioned the quality of the loans being purchased in an open letter to Ronald A. Rosenfeld, Chairman, Federal Housing Finance Board. You can find that letter here.

Lets review. The Treasury Secretary has developed a plan with major financial institutions to move beaten down assets relating to subprime mortgages (we think) to a Super SIV to buy time to try to liquidate and recoup the value of these assets. At the same time, the Treasury Secretary has developed a plan to refinance and/or freeze the interest rate on some 1.2 million subprime mortgages. The refinance portion of this plan relies on FHA guarantees, and we don’t really know how many subprime mortgages are being refinanced through ultimate sales to The Federal Home Loan Banks. The United States taxpayers ultimately back both of these sources. So, is this really a plan to help those poor victims of the big bad banks that made these subprime mortgages or is this really a bank bailout disguised as a plan to help homeowners? I don’t know the answer, but I know I have serious doubts and there should be some oversight of this entire mess.

Assisted Dying

2007-12-05T11:46:00.000-05:00

I read Daniel Bergner’s article in The New York Times Magazine on December 2 and had a very negative reaction to it. Because I was writing about other issues at the time, I decided to ask my father for his input on this article. He and I feel very much the same about assisted dying, having faced the issue head on more than once, and he is very knowledgeable about the issues.

By way of background, my mother was diagnosed with cancer 11 years ago. She lived for about six weeks following the diagnosis. She had recently tended to her only sibling who had died following heart surgery. Her sister lingered for some time in a coma before expiring. My mother told me that she did not want that to happen to her. If she were ever in such a state, she would want an end to it. Unfortunately, I was unable to satisfy my mother’s wishes, and she lingered in a coma for week before her body finally gave out.

Whether my mother wanted to die before slipping into a coma is, to me, the only issue. Whether this was her desire because she did not want to be a burden, did not want to suffer, did not want the indignity of the process, or whatever is irrelevant. At the time of our death we are who we are and we should be allowed to determine our own fate based on that. If we need help to satisfy our wishes, help should be provided.

I want to make a couple of points before I get to my father’s response. The article struck me as the same old “we know better than they do” crap. When is it that children finally learn that they may know different things than their parents, but that doesn’t mean they know what is best or what is right? Finally, regarding Mr. Kervorkian, Mr. Bergner writes:

The first reported patient to seek him out and receive his aid was a 54-year-old woman with Alzheimer’s disease. His first eight such patients were women, and half of them had no terminal condition. Of the reported 75 suicides Kevorkian assisted through 1997, according to research by Silvia Canetto, a psychology professor specializing in the study of suicide at Colorado State University, 72 percent were women, and more than three-quarters of those women were not terminally ill. (Multiple sclerosis affected about 30 percent of them.) The disproportionate number of women could not be explained by the fact that women generally live longer than men and so might be more likely to want to escape life at its end. The average age of Kevorkian’s female patients was a year younger than that of his men. And, Canetto noted, Kevorkian’s women were more often middle-aged than elderly.

This all sounds like maybe we could conclude women are being victimized by Mr. Kevorkian. What Mr. Bergner fails to point out, however, is that MS strikes women at a rate of four times that of men. So, while age may not explain this ratio of women to men, the incidence of MS does. Seems to be pretty obvious.

With that introduction, here is my father’s opinion on Daniel Bergner’s article:

Daniel Bergner's article (Dec.2) on assisted dying was one of the most egregiously specious pieces of journalism I've ever encountered. The opinions of three people, each with a personal agenda that bears no relationship to the objective facts in this controversy, are put forth in great detail, while the Oregon studies, the only reliable indicia of the effects of legalized assisted dying, are virtually dismissed in a few sentences.

Doug Gardner, the born again tennis player, so deeply resentful of his father's neglect in his early years, thwarts the latter's humane concerns by adducing religious arguments about "God's Will." A hundred years ago, people died in great numbers, from diseases that are now routinely curable. Is "God's Will" then, predicated on medical technology?

As for the "scholar," Ms. Susan Wolfe, her radical feminist paranoia causes her to interpret statistics regarding the greater number of women than men helped by Kevorkian, as some kind of gender plot. So convinced is she that her fears are real, she ignores her dying father's pleas for help, and sits "stroking his hair," while he lingers on! What would Ms. Wolfe make of the fact that, among those in the general population, who are not seriously ill, the number of “successfully” completed suicides is overwhelmingly male?

Mr. Duane French's fears that voluntary assisted dying would somehow threaten the handicapped, are without foundation. The very essence of the assisted dying movement, is the belief that the right of those who are terminally ill or suffering, intractably, to seek a quiet, merciful, dignified end to their lives, is the most fundamental right of all; and, the decision to do so, is totally, and without any qualification, voluntary.

Because of the lobbying efforts of the Catholic Church, Oregonians voted, not once, but twice for assisted dying legislation, and voted against repeal of the law by a margin of 60 – 40, substantially higher than the 51% margin of original passage.

The Catholic Church is, indeed, the principal opponent to the legalization of assisted dying, and as such, it's own position is worth examining. It holds that, if a seriously ill person expresses a desire to die, all food, fluids, medication, and life support systems can be withheld, thus permitting that individual's death to be hastened; but, nothing may be provided to him, that would achieve the same goal in a faster, more merciful, and dignified manner. They may claim the moral high ground for such a distinction, I call it meaningless, Jesuitical casuistry.

We live in a society that provides a merciful death for dogs, cats, and serial murderers, but withholds that same mercy from its citizens. It's time that such issues are decided by those most affected by them, and not by religious fundamentalists, the Pope of Rome, gender fanatics, or the misinformed.

Thanks Dad:-)

More On Taxpayer Bailout of Subprime

2007-12-04T13:59:00.001-05:00

UPDATE: Congress is likely to pass the FHA Modernization Act. This will reduce downpayments from 3% to 1.5%, provide for wider use of risk-based premiums by FHA, and raise the maximum loan amount to the "conforming loan" amount for Freddie and Fannie of $417,000.00. The Senate passed this legislation last week and the House passed similar legislation in September. You can get details of the proposed legislation at this summary of the proposed legislation.

On November 13 I wrote an article about the beginnings of a taxpayer bailout of the subprime mortgage mess. I want to add to that article some new information I have found since then. This has nothing to do with the “Paulson” plan, except that his plan seems to be more of a diversion from what is really happening than anything else.

What is really happening? As I wrote in the article referenced above, the Federal Home Loan Banks have increased their exposure to banks by some $183 billion from December 31, 2006 to September 30, 2007. The FHLBanks obtain funds by issuing federally guaranteed securities, so ultimately this is a taxpayer guaranty. Freddie and Fannie have also substantially increased their portfolios over this time period. But there is more.

The FHA is now into the act in a big way. According to this press release yesterday FHA has now refinanced 33,000 subprime loans and plans to refinance another 20,000 by year end. Plans for 2008 are to refinance 240,000 subprime loans. This is all pursuant to the Bush FHASecure Plan. Of course, as with many Bush plans, the name is deceiving. If anything, I believe this plan makes the FHA less secure and more likely to ultimately require a taxpayer bailout.

Granted the FHA program is backed by an insurance fund – the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (the MMI Fund), that is supposed to stand behind these mortgages. The fund is financed with insurance premiums paid by borrowers. The problem is that the health of the fund (which has a capital ratio around 6.4% of outstanding guaranteed loans based on May 31 2007 data that you can find here) depends upon underwriting standards. With all of the buzz around helping subprime borrowers, and based on some observations, I am very concerned that the fund will ultimately be in jeopardy and have to be bailed out by taxpayers. This is based on my reading of the threats to the MMI Fund.

According to this testimony by Basil N. Petrou, Managing Partner, Federal Financial Analytics, Inc. to the Housing and Transportation Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, June 20, 2006. prepared and presented in consideration of FHA reform proposals in Congress, the primary sources of financial risk are identified as low or no downpayment loans and risk-based premiums.

Regarding risk-based premiums, the report warns that FHA is likely to get it wrong. FHA does not have the ability to accurately determine which borrowers are higher and lower risk thereby justifying a higher or lower premium. The current system of cross subsidization is a key part of why the MMI Fund has been successful (cross subsidization refers to the fact that all borrowers pay the same fee, resulting in higher quality borrowers subsidizing the lower quality borrowers).

Regarding low or no downpayment loans, it warns that such loans could result in high default rates and serious harm to neighborhoods where these loans would be prevalent. Adding to the risk, according to the testimony, would be a declining real estate market. Does this sound familiar? It sounds like the justification now being given by politicians for helping to stem subprime defaults. This testimony lays out the subprime problem quite clearly, and warns that FHA should stay away from these loans.

This reform that was in front of Congress was not passed. The Bush Administration has, however, authorized modifications to the HUD program that allow HUD to utilize risk based premiums. According to a HUD press release:

President George W. Bush today announced that HUD's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) will help an estimated 240,000 families avoid foreclosure by enhancing its refinancing program effective immediately. Under the new FHASecure plan, FHA will allow families with strong credit histories who had been making timely mortgage payments before their loans reset-but are now in default-to qualify for refinancing. In addition, FHA will implement risk-based premiums that match the borrower's credit profile with the insurance premium they pay-i.e., riskier borrowers pay more. This common-sense, risk-based pricing structure will begin on January 1, 2008.

“Common sense” – hummmm. Not according to congressional testimony. I also point out the spin. If riskier borrowers pay more, doesn't that mean "less risky" borrowers pay less?

Does HUD plan to implement these changes? Well, according to the Annual Management Report of The FHA:

This past year has seen an increase in interest rates and a decrease in house price appreciation, leading to the current mortgage credit crunch. Accordingly, FHA will expand its refinance program, FHASecure, to include those individuals and families who are in default as a result of an interest rate reset. With the inclusion of delinquent borrowers under the FHASecure umbrella, the government’s largest mortgage insurance provider will now be able to assist even more troubled homeowners. In addition, FHA will implement risk-based premiums that match the borrower's credit profile with the insurance premium they pay. This administrative risk-based pricing structure will begin in early 2008.

(Again the spin - "a decrease in home price appreciation" isn't really an accurate description of the current housing market.)
What about the downpayment issue? Well, according to the same press release announcing the FHASecure plan:

To qualify for FHASecure, eligible homeowners must meet the following five criteria:
1. A history of on-time mortgage payments before the borrower's teaser rates expired and loans reset;
2. Interest rates must have or will reset between June 2005 and December 2008;
3. Three percent cash or equity in the home;
4. A sustained history of employment; and
5. Sufficient income to make the mortgage payment.

Note the 3% cash or equity in the home. This is not much. If it is cash, it is most likely not equity given the decline in home prices (as opposed to a decrease in appreciation) so you are left with 100% (or higher) loan-to-value. The implementation of these requirements also concerns me. For example, here is what the FHA website says:

WHO IS ELIGIBLE
To qualify for FHASecure, and include the delinquent loan payments, homeowners wishing to refinance must meet the following requirements:
1. Have a non-FHA insured ARM that has reset;
2. Sufficient income to make the mortgage payment; and
3. A history of on-time mortgage payments before the loan reset.
Homeowners who are current on their conventional mortgages must have sufficient income to make the mortgage payment.

What happened to the “cash or equity” requirement? It isn’t there. Is this an oversight or a reflection of the implementation of this subprime refinance plan? What is this about refinancing delinquent payments? Doesn't this reduce the loan-to-value ratio (making it negative in many cases)? I am cynical, so you know what I think. Here comes the taxpayer bailout. Don't be surprised if sometime in the not too distant future you hear about a MMI Fund taxpayer subsidization plan. Want more? Here is a clip from the Congressional Testimony referred to above:

Key points to consider for FHA reform include:
• As a government program, FHA should serve its targeted borrowers if they are not already being adequately served by the private sector. It is not appropriate for FHA, as a government program, to launch initiatives to expand its “market share.”
• Recent General Accountability Office (GAO) and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Inspector-General reports, as well as the President’s FY 2007 budget raise serious questions about the Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund’s financial soundness. The most recent available MMI Fund data are for only mid-FY 2005, and these show a serious reduction in the economic value of the fund that undermines its capital adequacy. Mortgage-market trends since then have shown significant weakening, as evident by recent guidance from the federal bank regulatory agencies designed to protect insured depository institutions.
• The FHA should not seek to grow its way out of its current financial problems. Doing so is reminiscent of the actions taken by distressed savings-and-loans during the 1980s.
• The MMI Fund is already taking financial risks. For example, 50% of all FHA loans insured in 2004 had downpayment assistance, with nonprofit organizations that received seller funding accounting for 30 percent of these loans. GAO analysis indicates that these sellers raised the price of their properties to recover their contribution to the seller-funded nonprofit—placing FHA buyers in mortgages that were above the true market value of the house. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is curtailing these programs, but the significantly higher claim rates FHA has experienced from these loans will continue for those remaining on its books. Indicative of FHA’s problems is that its delinquency rates are higher than those associated with private subprime loans. Adding yet more risk means potentially profound FHA losses that will heighten the risk of calls upon the taxpayer.
• From a budgetary perspective, the MMI Fund now is only breaking even, but even this is based only on out-dated information. Any shift in the MMI Fund’s financial condition will convert the program into a net cost to taxpayers, increasing the federal budget deficit.

So why didn’t Congress pass this plan? Looks pretty obvious to me. Of course I hope I am wrong and there is no need for a taxpayer bailout of the MMI Fund. Time will tell.

Another Decade of Dependence

2007-12-02T16:36:00.000-05:00

I was reading the Wall Street Journal Online Edition today and came across an article Sovereign Impunity (subscription may be required). The article points out that the Abu Dhabi fund that just purchased a stake in Citigroup (a convertible preferred that converts to approximately 4.9% of the company’s shares) is funded with oil dollars. This fund now controls an estimated $875 billion according to this article, which is approximately 25% of all of the $2-3 trillion of assets owned by all of the sovereign wealth funds. This is an entity that obtains its funding through the sale of oil which is controlled by the government, not through free market risk taking. The article concludes by stating that it is US monetary policy that is responsible for the growth of these funds:

These funds owe much of their current size from bad U.S. monetary policy. We were nearly as ‘dependent on foreign oil’ in the 1980s and 1990s as we are today. But with a responsible Federal Reserve and strong dollar, there was no boom in petrodollars.

Only in this decade, amid the Fed's dollar abdication, have we again seen the boom in commodity prices that is enriching Russia, the Arab kingdoms, Venezuela (read a related Review & Outlook) and other dubious corners of the globe. Our own monetary mistakes have made these funds richer than they would be under normal market conditions. The response should not be to restrict their investment, but to start protecting the value of the dollar so that the price of oil falls back down to where it reflects supply and demand, not a cheapening U.S. currency.

Now, I may agree that our monetary policy has contributed to the decline in dollar value, but this completely misses the point. Before even considering the real issue, however, I point out that without a declining dollar we never get to a balance of trade that we can sustain over the long term. That said, what is the real issue?

The real issue is energy independence and it has been energy independence since the very first oil shocks in the 1970s. I knew this even as a teenager waiting on line at the gas station to put gas in my car. When we were originally impacted by the oil shocks we learned that we have an issue that must be dealt with in the long term, and that issue is that we are dependent upon foreign resources for our energy needs. As we have supported globalization through our trade policies, we have also increased competition for these foreign supplies from the emerging economies we support, making us even more vulnerable. This is not the 1980s or even the 1990s, and we now have serious global competition for scarce resources. Finally, we are learning that we cannot continue to poor pollutants into our atmosphere without consequence, and burning more fossil fuel is probably a bad idea.

Just how dependent are we on foreign oil? Well, according to the Energy Information Administration, in 2006 we imported on average 12,390,000 barrels of petroleum products per day. Based on a price of $94 per barrel, that’s about $1,164,660,000 ($1.16 billion). So what is today’s value of 4.9% of Citigroup in terms of petroleum imports? It’s about ($7.5/$1.164) 6.5 days of imports. That’s right, 6.5 days of petroleum imports equals 4.9% of Citigroup in today’s market. (I note that prices of different petroleum products differ, and the price changes regularly.)

Is this a result of poor monetary policy? I argue it is not, and the same forces that have driven up the price of oil have driven monetary policy. These factors are primarily related to globalization and our reaction, as a country, to it. For one thing, we have relentlessly pursued the pools of lowest cost labor we can find. This has driven prices of imported goods down at the same time we have made tremendous productivity gains. These forces have placed downward pressure on prices, and even threatened us with deflation in the early part of this decade. (Unfortunately none of this applies to health care or education that, for now, require the actual presence of professionals.) In response, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates according to its traditional mandate so as to maintain growth and price stability. In this case, price stability meant avoiding deflation so the reaction was to keep interest rates extremely low for a long period of time. The natural result of this action is an increase in the money supply and a decrease in the value of the dollar (as well as pricing bubbles in, say, real estate). Ultimately, then, our pursuit of cheap labor comes back to us in the form of higher import prices due to a falling US dollar and asset bubbles. A side effect of this policy is that with a declining dollar the dollar value of our raw material imports increase. Add to that scenario the fact that we are now competing with countries such as China for the raw materials to be found around the globe, and we see why the prices of oil and other raw materials are rising. To blame monetary policy for this is to say that we should have left interest rates higher in the early part of this decade and likely suffered a recession with a simultaneous deflation, something that could be devastating to any economy. So is monetary policy responsible or is it the overall trading policies of the United States? I don’t believe the monetary policy argument is the critical issue.

(For additional reading on the impact of higher oil prices on monetary policy and the economy, there is a good article here at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco website.)

Now that we can at least question whether it is monetary policy that is responsible for rising prices or some other factors that resulted in our monetary policy, we can move to the true cause of our problem. Despite decades of advance warning, we have not pursued, together as a nation, alternative sources of energy. Surely this is a goal that almost every American supports, barring those whose livelihood flows from the vertical chain of the oil industry. Lets take a look at some estimated numbers.

If we take the daily barrels we import and convert that to an annual amount, we get 148,320,000 barrels per year. Multiplying that by $94 per barrel gives us an annual cost of about $424 billion. How much is $424 billion? To put it in perspective, it is over two times the projected 2007 fiscal budget deficit of The United States, and on a monthly basis over 60% of the $56.5 billion total US trade deficit in September 2007.

Of course, finding alternative sources of energy is not free, and the alternative energy itself will not be free (although some sources may turn out to be just that). What it would be is liberating for the United States and other oil importing countries around the globe, and possibly very profitable and stimulating to our economy. So, rather than pointing fingers at who or what is responsible for the current situation that leads to 6.5 days of oil imports = 4.9% of Citigroup and proposing ways to make oil cheaper (not that I have a problem with that), I believe we are ready for the national challenge similar to the Kennedy era challenge of reaching the moon. We should have been ready for it decades ago, but we were lulled into complicity by low oil prices. Think of the change in policies that could result from energy independence. Would we fight as many wars? Would the world fight as many wars? Would we be wealthier? Would we save the earth from global warming? Could achieving energy independence balance the budget? Provide for Medicare? Decrease our defense spending? Etc.

I am certainly not the only person advancing this issue these days, but I feel strongly that more people need to advance it and be heard. Certainly a goal of energy independence through alternative and environmentally friendly sources is worth our consideration, our investment, and our short-term sacrifice. Should this be left to the free markets or should we look at this like a system of highways – something we need to build together, combining public finance and the free market system in order to foster the ability of free markets to further our advancement in the annals of human history? I believe the latter, and hope that even if oil prices fall substantially, we have learned our lesson and will make the necessary investments. At this point in our national history I crave a positive issue to unite around. This sounds like a timely one to me. Of course, that’s just my opinion.

Updates - SIVs, Citi, Social Security, Subprime, and Taxes

2007-11-27T12:38:00.000-05:00

First thing to update is the status of this blog. I started it on October 2, not quite two months ago. Since then I have written 26 pieces for publication, but nothing substantial in the past week. The reason is that maintaining the level of publication I started out with has proved difficult as evidenced by the late payment notices I have been receiving (I have forgotten to pay the bills!). So I took some time off to catch up on the other pieces of life not reflected in the blog (bills, family, work, exercise, etc.). I will continue to post so long as I continue to have visitors, although there will be periods of quiet.

There have been some very interesting developments in the interim, and I am writing today to update the issues I have been writing about in November. If you have been following my blog (thank you) then these should be of interest to you. You can click on any of the topics below to go directly to that topic, or just read from the top.

Citigroup Subprime SIVs Social Security and Taxes Short Rant on policy and responsibility

On Citigroup:
It has been interesting watching this unfold. Citi announced today that it will receive a $7.5 billion capital investment from the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. According to the press release

Each Equity Unit is mandatorily convertible into Citi shares at prices ranging from $31.83 to $37.24 per share. The Equity Units convert to Citi common shares on dates ranging from March 15, 2010, to September 15, 2011, subject to adjustment. Each Equity Unit will pay a fixed annual payment rate of 11%, payable quarterly.

11% seems high to me, about the same as Ford Motor Credit and GMAC high yield bonds give or take a point, and these are convertibles. Abu Dhabi ends up with a 4.9% interest in Citi post conversion.

Now the layoffs are coming in force, and there is a lot of speculation in the media about how many jobs. I heard today on MSNBC anywhere from 15,000 to 45,000. That could be a lot of layoffs and of course it comes just before the holidays.

The investment by Abu Dhabi reinforces the fact that America is currently on sale, as I wrote about in my first piece in November. Interestingly, this purchase is with dollars so the exchange rate is not the issue. Rather it is the price of oil.

Since I wrote that piece, the Fed chairman testified before Congress and released its (now quarterly) report on the economy. The report was pretty much as expected, as was the testimony. Of course some of the dialog during the testimony was simply amazing in that it will likely lead to a proposal by Congress to federally guarantee jumbo mortgages (just what we need – more obfuscation of the “market”). I believe I heard warnings of stagflation in the testimony as well. If you would like more detail on this you can find it here.

While on the subject of the overall economy, I have some anecdotal evidence of a slowdown. Each year my family drives 230 miles to visit relatives for Thanksgiving. Last year the trip took about 6 hours with traffic, each way being a very long drive. This year it took just over four hours each way with almost no traffic. I believe gas prices are beginning to have an impact.

On Subprime:
What is happening there? Well, for one thing the Federal Home Loan Banks have vastly increased their exposure over the past quarter to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. Freddie and Fannie did their part as well, although they have since disclosed problems of their own relating to poorly underwritten mortgages. I wrote abut these increased exposures here. In a pleasant surprise, Senator Schumer is onto this scheme and posted a letter to the Federal Home Loan Bank today. Details here. Other than that there have been increased calls for taxpayer help to bail out homeowners so as to avoid a real economic problem. I don't believe there should be any bailout, and you can read about my reasons for this here and here and here.

On SIVS:
We now know that Citi has taken substantial assets onto its balance sheet relating to the SIVs, and HSBC announced that it is moving approximately $45 billion in SIV assets onto its balance sheet. I believe this is a blow to Citi and the whole MLEC plan because HSBC has taken the matter into its own hands and consolidated the problem. We should ask why Citi does not do the same, but the answer is likely to be one we don’t want to hear. Perhaps Citi does not have the equity to absorb such a move at this point. Whether Citi must consolidate these off-balance sheet entities is the subject of ongoing debate. According to a WSJ Online Edition article there MAY be a requirement to consolidate since Citi has taken over $32 billion in assets onto its balance sheet as of September 30 (as I discussed here). Sounds to me like a lot of intellectual wrangling over a pretty simple issue – if ultimately Citi will be forced to bail out these entities, whether for “reputational” or any other reasons, then they should be on the balance sheet. Of course that’s just my opinion.

The impact of all of this on the money markets is still uncertain. According to this WSJ article:

Efforts by HSBC to protect its SIVs are being watched closely by analysts and managers of money-market mutual funds, some of which have invested in debt issued by the two SIVs, called Cullinan Finance Ltd. and Asscher Finance Ltd. Janus Capital Group Inc. is estimated to have held about $606 million, or 2.7% of its money-market assets, in Cullinan and Asscher through the end of October, which has since been reduced. Federated Investors Inc. holds about $350 million in Asscher in its five largest money funds.

In other words, the mutual funds are still waiting to see whether they will be taking a hit on these. So far it appears they are winding down their exposure, but still have substantial assets tied to SIV structures.

On Social Security and Taxes:
I have been debating with people all week about my stance on Social Security, including the latest proposal by Fred Thompson to address the “crisis” we have. This Fox News Article reports his tax and Social Security plan as follows:

Thompson's proposal, announced on "Fox News Sunday," would allow filers to remain under the current, complex tax code or use the flat tax rates.
Asked whether the plan would cut too deeply into federal revenues, the former Tennessee senator and actor said experts "always overestimate the losses to the government" when taxes are cut.

"We've known for years any time we have lowered taxes and any time we've lowered tax rates, we've seen growth in the economy," Thompson said.

Thompson added that money would be saved by his Social Security reform plan. He proposed that workers younger than 58 receive smaller monthly Social Security checks than they are now promised. Individuals could contribute 2 percent of their paycheck to a personal retirement account, an amount that would be matched by the Social Security trust fund.

The retirement plan "faces up to the fact that Social Security is going bankrupt and we're going to have to do something about it," he said.

Well, first of all Social Security is only going bankrupt if the Federal Government decides not to honor its promise to repay what it borrowed from the Trust Fund (see my article on this topic here). If it does not, then it may be time to sell any treasury securities you have because they would no longer be “risk free”. (The Trust Fund does not own treasury securities, rather special IOUs from the federal government that are backed by the full faith and credit of The United States of America).

Next problem with this statement is the same old crap about the Laffer curve and taxes – if we can decrease taxes to grow the economy it will raise tax revenue. If this is true then why worry about Social Security? We can just cut taxes to pay for it! Ridiculous indeed. Now, to be fair, the article does not actually say that he believes a tax cut will result in higher tax revenue, but this is the argument we consistently hear from Republicans on this issue. I have yet to see any actual proof that the Bush tax cuts CAUSED tax revenues to increase. I have seen plenty of evidence that tax revenues have increased, but never any cause and effect proof. In other words, we do not know if it is the Bush tax cuts, fiscal stimulus from excessive borrowing, or normal economic growth from population growth and global growth that has caused tax revenues to increase. What we do know is that since the Bush tax cuts we are in a lot more debt and that is becoming a problem, especially when no one wants a tax increase to pay it down.

Finally, a flat tax has the potential to be regressive and could be another gift to the high-income population. In any event, a reduction in tax revenue is a problem at a time when we are at war (two wars, actually), and facing the need to begin repaying what has been borrowed from Social Security (not to mention the health care issues). At the end of the day, this boils down to paying for the Bush tax cuts and maybe even more tax cuts by reducing promised Social Security benefits relied on and paid for by lower- and middle-income retirees. It is a transfer of wealth from those with less to those with more. It is a sham. Again, that is just my (somewhat informed) opinion.

A short rant on policy and responsibility.
I think it’s about time we begin taxing to pay for our wars. Until now, we have fought this war in Iraq by borrowing the money and paying civilian warriors so as to avoid a draft and any tax increase. I wonder how long we would be in Iraq if we instituted a draft to get the soldiers we need and raised taxes to pay for it. I see uprisings on college campuses. I hear the cries of the high-income earners writing checks to the Treasury. My guess is we would already be gone. Isn’t this irresponsible? What happened to the party of personal responsibility? Isn’t keeping promises to taxpayers such as Social Security an act of personal responsibility? Isn’t managing the country in a fiscally sound manner an act of personal responsibility? How is it we get lectured on the values of personal responsibility by those who seem to ignore theirs? I shall continue to object.

Schumer Gets It Right!

2007-11-27T11:14:00.000-05:00

I have written a couple of articles that express a poor opinion of Senator Charles Schumer. In the interest of fairness, I want to also salute him for his attention to the taxpayer issues surrounding the Federal Home Loan Banks.

On November 13 I posted this article raising a red flag that the taxpayer bailout of the subprime mortgage debacle had begun through the Federal Home Loan banks. Today, Senator Schumer released this letter to the FHLBanks directly on point. I applaud Senator Schumer for his attention to this issue on behalf of all taxpayers and I hope that he continues to diligently protect taxpayer interests. Here is the letter:

November 26, 2007

Ronald A. Rosenfeld
Chairman
Federal Housing Finance Board
1625 Eye Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Chairman Rosenfeld:

I write to express my serious concern over the lending practices of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, specifically in regard to the significant volume of advances made to Countrywide Bank. I am concerned that the loans being pledged by Countrywide to secure these advances may pose a risk to the safety and soundness of the FHLB system as a whole. I urge you to conduct a careful review of FHLB Atlanta’s collateral evaluation policies, as well as Countrywide’s pledged collateral, in an effort to determine the risk that Countrywide’s collateral poses to the FHLB system. During the current market crisis, it is important that the FHLB system perform its critical mission safely without imposing additional risks on an already strained market.

According to the most recent SEC filings, FHLB Atlanta had made $51.1 billion in advances to Countrywide Bank, representing 37 percent of the Bank’s total outstanding advances as of September 30, 2007 and far exceeding advances made to the next largest borrower. Countrywide had pledged $62.4 billion of mortgages as collateral for the FHLB advances, representing 78 percent of its total mortgage loans held for investment at the bank.

I find these numbers alarming as reports continue to emerge about how Countrywide’s reckless and predatory lending practices were a leading contributor to today’s foreclosure crisis. Moreover, it is my understanding that Countrywide’s loans held for investment at the bank have been far from immune from the credit deterioration that has resulted from unsound lending. Countrywide reportedly held $27 billion of “pay option ARMs” as of September 30, 2007, accounting for over one-third of the loans held for investment by the bank. Countrywide’s option ARMs were (and may still be) often underwritten with less than full documentation – according to UBS Warburg data prepared for the Wall Street Journal, 91 percent of Countrywide’s option ARMs underwritten in 2006 were “low doc.” It has been reported that delinquencies on Countrywide’s pay option ARMS are skyrocketing, jumping nearly 75 percent in the last quarter.

Given this rapid deterioration in the credit quality of Countrywide’s option ARMs, I urge you to conduct a review of the loans that are being held as collateral for FHLB advances in an effort to determine if FHLB Atlanta has adequate collateral to secure these advances. I would also like an explanation of how any second lien mortgages during a time of property price declines could be viewed as adequate collateral for large FHLB advances.
Furthermore, I believe that you should consider preventing any further or continuing overnight advances based on collateral that does not meet the joint financial regulators’ guidance on nontraditional and subprime mortgage products (e.g., Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks and joint Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending). This quarter, Countrywide reported that 89 percent of their 2006 originations of pay option ARMs did not conform to the joint regulators’ guidance, which increases the likelihood that Countrywide is pledging loans deemed predatory by the regulators as collateral for FHLB advances. Importantly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s safety and soundness regulator has specifically prohibited any new direct or indirect investment in loans that do not meet this guidance. As the mortgage crisis threatens to get worse from here, it is critical that the FHFB do the same.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter, and I look forward to working with you on these issues in the coming weeks and months. If you should have any questions, please contact David Stoopler on my staff at 202-224-6542.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Schumer
United States Senator

You can view the original here.